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MITIGATING THE DEFECTS OF PLURALISM: INTEREST GROUP
COALITIONS BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT
Jason Frederick Jagemann, Ph.D.
Western Michigan University, 2000
This project examines interest group coalitional activity before the Supreme
Court in affirmative action cases between 1971 and 1995. First, I address the
characteristics and dynamics o f amicus participants over time. Second, I examine the
extent to which organizations with a smaller base of resources, in terms of staff and
the number of years that organizations have been on the scene, engage in coalitional
activity. I find that organizations with smaller staffs are more likely to participate in
coalitions, and, contrary to my expectations, organizations that have been on the
scene longer are more likely to engage in coalitional activity. Third, I examine how
successful group participation via amicus curiae is in all affirmative action cases. I
found that at the macro level, the proportion of briefs filed on the side of the “pro”
affirmative action litigant significantly affects the probability that the Court will vote
in favor of affirmative action, controlling for the Court’s ideology and solicitor
general participation. I also found, however, that the proportion o f coalitions
lobbying “pro” affirmative action has a statistically negative effect on the outcome of
the Court’s votes. At the micro level, I found that the proportion o f briefs filed in
favor of affirmative action had a positive effect on the probability of the justice’s
voting in favor of the “pro” affirmative action litigant. The proportion of coalitions
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favoring the “pro” affirmative action litigant had a statistically negative effect on the
probability of the justices’ votes. While the ideology of the individual justices was
found to be a strong predictor of their votes in these cases, I found that “pro”
affirmative action participation by the solicitor general had a statistically negative
effect on the justices’ votes.
My findings suggest that while coalitions may help to mitigate the defects of
pluralism insofar as scholars have suggested that access to the Court is concerned, I
do not find strong evidence that the utility of these efforts in coalitions have a positive
effect on the outcome of the Court’s affirmative action decisions.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
As the power o f the federal government has broadened in scope and as it has
become more functionally specialized, the interest group community has changed.
Coalitional activity among groups is now more likely since groups must compete to
place their agenda on the already crowded table and since no one group dominates the
interest group community (Salisbury 1992). Further, as the power o f the federal
government has broadened, interest groups have realigned the utility o f their efforts
before the judiciary (Caldeira and Wright 1988). This project examines interest group
coalitional activity before the Supreme Court in affirmative action cases between
1971-1995.1 address the characteristics and dynamics o f amicus participants over
time in a single policy area: affirmative action. Second, I examine the success of
group participation via amicus curiae in these cases argued before the Court.
Although my analysis is confined to one policy arena, I believe the results will help
scholars understand the dynamics o f coalitional activity in the context o f the courts
and perhaps more systematically understand the characteristics o f groups
participating as amici over time.

1
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2
Interest Groups and the Pluralist Enterprise
Since Madison’s justification for the extended republic in Federalist #10,
interest groups have been viewed as a cornerstone o f American democracy. Scholars
and theorists alike have painted interest groups as essential to the maintenance o f the
democratic process. In Democracy in America, Tocqueville articulated this theme that
associations are essential to freedom due to the secondary effects participating in an
association has in nurturing the democratic practice. In modem times, Dahl suggests
that interest groups play an important function in large-scale democracies by
maintaining "mutual control" over the democratic process in large-scale polyarchies.
Also, interest groups are necessary to challenge democratic elitism (Dahl 1956, 1961,
1982; Dahl and Lindblom 1953). That is to say, organized participation outside o f
state institutions serve as a counter-weight to the power actors in those institutions
that command a fountion o f resources. Moreover, interest groups play a pivotal role
in mediating not only the power o f the state, but also serving as a countervailing force
against the power o f elites that command the helm o f the state’s resources. More
recently, Putnam (1993) argues that the norms and networks o f civic engagement and
associational life foster economic and institutional development.
The role o f interest groups has been a paramount concern to students o f
politics since the turn o f the century. The first students o f interest groups understood
the processes of government as the culmination of groups pressuring the state. For
Bentley (1908), interest groups acquired the social resources they needed from the
institutions of the state but the state was o f little significance in and of itself, as it
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3
simply processed the demands o f groups in society. He argued that interest groups
employ a variety o f strategies to influence the state. They attempt to gain direct and
indirect access to the three branches o f government (Berry 1989), they also lobby to
shape public opinion (Key 1961) and to influence or prevent particular policy
changes. More recent students o f interest groups have turned their attention to
understanding the explosion o f interest groups since the 1960s, and the resultant
increase in the strength o f the state.
Pluralist theorists such as Bentley, Truman, and the earlier works o f Dahl
understood the political process and policy outcomes as a function o f the interaction
between competing groups. In The Process o f Government (1908, 308), Bentley
argued that “all phenomena o f government are phenomena of groups pressing one
another, forging one another, and pushing out new groups and group representatives
(the organs or agencies o f government) to mediate the adjustments.” Robert A. Dahl
(1967, 34) encapsulated the basic tenets o f pluralist theory...
Because one center o f power is set against another, power itself will be
tamed, civilized, controlled, and limited to decent human purposes,
while coercion, the most evil form o f power, will be reduced to a
m inim um .. .and because even minorities are provided with
opportunities to veto solutions they strongly object to, the consent of
all will be won in the long run...because constant negotiations among
different centers o f power are necessary in order to make decisions,
citizens and leaders will perfect the precious art o f dealing peacefully
with their conflicts, and not merely to the benefit o f one partisan but to
the mutual benefit o f all the parties to a conflict.
This classic and benign formulation o f pluralism culminated in Dahl’s empirical
study of pluralism at work (Dahl 1961). In keeping with the classic formulation o f the
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interplay between divergent groups competing on the political stage, Dahl saw
countervailing forces checking the power of each group.
The Defects o f Pluralism

Other scholars reacted against this benign view of pluralism. Schattschneider
(1960) and Connolly (1960) articulated the inherent biases o f pluralism and pluralist
theory. These scholars criticized pluralist theory because it was too uncritical o f the
inequalities among groups in resources and access. Far from being an accessible
stage, competition is aided and abetted by financial resources o f the groups. Conflict
is not simply self-regulated by countervailing forces; instead “the flaw in the pluralist
heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent”
(Schattschneider 1960, 34-35) and the pressure group system is skewed in favor o f a
small minority. Among other critiques, Connolly (1960) argues that pluralism
inhibits certain segments o f society from participating on an equal footing with more
advantaged groups. Connolly argues that the political bargaining table ignores
important interests because “persistent, active, and legitimate ‘groups’ fail to define
these concerns as high priority interests” (Connolly 1960, 18). Additionally, “latent
concerns” (Bachrach and Baratz 1962) are marginalized and not placed on the
political agenda, as status quo biases discourage shifting the terms o f the debate.
Bachrach and Baratz (1962, 7) argue that power holders “limit the scope o f the
political process to public consideration o f only those issues which are comparatively
innocuous.. .to them.”
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Another branch o f scholars points out the potential defects o f an interest group
society. These scholars mount a serious challenge to the notion that groups have equal
access to the political system, as well as the degree to which the interest group society
stultifies governmental effectiveness and responsiveness. Mancur Olson (1965, 1982)
argues that high levels o f associationism is an obstacle in the way o f efficient and
sound governance. Lowi (1969) articulates a similar theme in the context o f the
public policy arena and argues that the crowded and dominant interest group universe
clouds the democratic process, as the state panders to the strength o f organized
interests.
Robert A. Dahl (1982) most notably articulates the dilemmas o f an
asymmetric balance o f power between the state and interest groups. As Dahl suggests,
the underlying dilemma o f pluralist democracies revolves around the degree to which
organizations have independence and autonomy vis-a-vis the state. For Dahl,
complete autonomy may render democratic ideals untenable. Dahl grants
considerable primacy to the existence o f independent associations as a concomitant o f
large-scale democracies in modem times, which he labels “polyarchies.” “To achieve
various rights...citizens also have a right to form relatively independent associations
or organizations, including independent political parties and interest groups” (Dahl
1982, 11). However, an asymmetry in the interplay between the control o f the state
and the autonomy o f organized interests will threaten the stability o f polyarchies.
Most notably, Dahl argues that without some degree o f control, interest group
pluralism may stabilize existing political inequalities. That is, political inequality is a
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likely consequence o f the organizational advantages o f some groups over others.
“ ...Other things being equal, the organized are more influential than an equivalent
number o f unorganized citizens” (Dahl 1982, 40). Further, for Dahl resources are an
integral part o f the success or failure of groups and the extent to which the agenda is
distorted. "The unequal resources that allow organizations to stabilize injustice also
enable them to exercise unequal influence in determining what alternatives are
seriously considered" (Dahl 1982, 47).
Other students o f American politics have observed the asymmetric balance o f
power in the interest group community. Schattschneider’s (1960) observation that the
“ .. .heavenly interest group chorus sings with an upper class accent” struck a blow to
the benign view o f pluralism articulated by scholars such Bentley (1908) and Truman
(1951). Indeed, groups with meager resources have difficulty gaining access to a
political system that has developed a “mobilization o f bias” (Schattschneider 1960). If
new and financially disadvantaged groups gain access to the political system, it is
likely that elites can coopt them and diffuse the intensity o f their challenges, as elites
offer these groups symbolic concessions (Piven and Cloward 1977).
In the face o f an unequal political playing field, disadvantaged groups
(especially in terms o f budget and organizational vitality) are marginalized from
participating as equals in the political system. What are the consequences o f Dahl's
defects o f pluralism for interest group activity? Taking into consideration the relative
growth in the power o f the state, as well as the proliferation o f countless groups
pressuring the state, the rise o f coalitional activity (especially for groups who do not
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have a large resource base) may address some o f the defects o f pluralism Dahl has
identified. That is, coalition building may be a way for groups to counter-balance the
organizational weakness o f disadvantaged groups. Coalitions may have access where
individual groups would otherwise have not because the solitary groups were going it
alone. Moreover, in the face o f these changes in the political system, one relatively
new strategy o f groups has been to form coalitions to influence the increasingly
powerful state. In their now classic study o f interest group activity, Schlozman and
Tiemey (1986) note that interest groups engage in coalitional activity about 90
percent of the time. Although the literature on interest groups has addressed
coalitional activity, scholars have not attempted to empirically investigate over time
why some organizations believe it is advantageous to join alliances to advance their
interests or whether they agree to work alone.
Scholars, like Salisbury (1992), suggest that the context within which groups
participate has changed. If this change has, indeed, occurred, then we should see the
level of group coalitional activity increase over time as a result. There is also a
paucity of literature addressing the types o f groups participating in coalitions over
time. I attempt to supplement this relative vacuum in the literature by examining
interest group alliances in affirmative action cases argued before the Supreme Court
from 1971 to 1995.
In the broadest sense, this project takes Dahl’s theoretical framework
concerning the defects o f pluralism as a stepping stone to examine whether or not
coalitional activity before the Supreme Court helps to offset the asymmetric balance
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o f power between interest groups. To this end I examine the composition o f coalitions
accessing the Court and also assess the extent to which interest groups are successful
in affirmative action cases argued before the Supreme Court.
The second chapter outlines the relevant literature regarding coalitional
activity in the policy process, as well as a discussion about the role o f interest groups
in the context o f the courts. There I pay particular attention to the development of
pluralism and the rise o f what Epstein (1993) calls the “new judicial pluralism.” Here
we will find that the federal judiciary, and especially the Supreme Court, has been
viewed as the most egalitarian institution in the political system. However, as students
of the courts suggest, whereas the courts were viewed as the institution most
favorable to disadvantaged interests, the contemporary judicial forum has seen a
mobilization o f advantaged interests leveling, and subsequently tilting, the playing
field in their favor. For disadvantaged interests, then, coalitions may be a means o f
counter-balancing this bias.
In Chapter HI I document the dynamics o f group participation in the Court
over time. To this end I examine the composition o f those organized groups lobbying
the Court across all affirmative action cases. I also look at the content o f the
affirmative action cases over time, and this, I believe, will aid in the task o f
understanding what kinds o f groups we would expect to press their positions on the
Court. Also, looking at groups over time will help to make generalizations about the
behavior o f group participation over time. Painting a picture o f the affirmative action
cases and interest group participants in these cases over time will help to provide
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some context for the subsequent models to be tested and reported on in the fourth and
fifth chapters. In Chapter IV I examine whether organizational resources such o f staff
size and organizational vitality affect the probability o f organizations participating
before the Court as solo-filers or co-filers in a coalition. In Chapter V I assess the
utility o f organized efforts to influence the Court across all affirmative action cases,
while controlling for relevant variables. The findings from these models will enhance
our knowledge o f the not only who participates in coalitions over time, but will also
determine how successful coalitions and groups are before the Court in affirmative
action cases. I conclude this study with a summary o f the major findings o f this
research, as well as some suggestions for future research.
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CHAPTER 0
LITERATURE REVIEW
Coalitional Activity and Alliance Building in the Policy Process
This study examines coalitional activity in the context o f the Supreme Court.
But before we explore group and coalitional participation in the Court, we need to
understand why coalitional activity is more pronounced in today’s political
environment, as well as why groups may find it more advantageous to coalesce. In
the face o f an atomistic and fragmented interest group environment, scholars have
noted the tendency for groups to rely on coalition building as a tool for lobbying in
various policy arenas. Some scholars suggest that the rise in coalition formation
among groups is a necessary by-product o f changes in the political system, while
others argue that in the face of the dynamic policy environment, groups join
coalitions in order to achieve a variety o f policy and organizational goals for their
groups’ members.
The work o f Robert Salisbury (1992) has improved our understanding o f the
rise in coalition formation among groups in the policy process. He argues that
although there has been a sizable expansion in the interest group universe since the
1960s, interest groups have less clout than they enjoyed in the past. The cause o f this
change in interest group power is related, he argues, to institutional changes in the
10
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political system. In Congress, the breakdown o f the seniority system, as well as the
proliferation o f subcommittees as the workhorses o f Congress and incumbency
advantages, give an advantage to legislators. Salisbury's description o f the
fragmentation and dilution o f interest groups paints a different picture o f the interest
group society than the dominant view espoused by Lowi (1969) in the End o f
Liberalism and others who articulated the “iron triangle” model of interest group
involvement in the policy process 1 (see Griffith 1939). However, Salisbury notes that
changes in the political system yield a fragmented interest group universe, where no
one group dominates an issue or policy arena. Articulating this theme, Salisbury notes
that it is difficult even for political elites to identify which interest groups consistently
press their claims on the political system. Salisbury notes that “in a destabilized world
o f fragmented interests and multidimensional challenges from externality groups it
becomes impossible for policy makers to identify which interests, if any, they can
succumb to without grave political risk" (1992, 347). Interest groups adapt to this
changing environment through the use of coalitional activity; that is, they "build
bridges in a Balkanized state" (Loomis 1986, quoted in Salisbury 1992,353).
Moreover, in a crowded interest group universe, coalitions help to maximize the
amount o f resources available to groups’ collective interests. Coalitions also enhance
the credibility o f the groups involved and help to solidify the legitimacy o f the claims
being pressed (Evans 1991, 262).

1 Lowi observes that major policy changes reflect the demands of particular interests
and the strength o f particular interests is inimical to the production of coherent public
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Other scholars, such as Hula (1995), suggest that political scientists have put
forth little effort to understand why interest groups forge coalitions and instead, in an
Olson-like fashion, focus exclusively on why individuals do or do not join groups.
Hula examines interest group coalitions in the education and transportation policy
domains and argues that coalition membership and structure is a reflection o f the
goals o f the groups. For example, groups may seek to shape policy outcomes, obtain
selective benefits they would not otherwise have had (i.e., information, intelligence o f
policy matters), or as a symbolic gesture to their constituents or to another
organization, as it may help to foster solidarity. The founders and brokers of
coalitions form what Hula calls the "coalition core." Interest groups in this category
focus on broad-based policy outcomes and invest the most resources into coalitional
activity. "Players," on the other hand, are concerned with particular policy outcomes
and are the specialists o f the coalition. Core members and players both expend
considerable resources for the coalition effort. "Peripheral" or "tag-along" groups do
not commit a large amount o f resources to the coalition and often join a coalition as
an end in itself. These groups have non-policy goals and instead seek information and
group maintenance benefits.
Hula's analysis lays a foundation for understanding the various roles groups
play in a coalition. However, Hula only examines transportation and education groups
and does not address the dynamics o f "core members," "players," and "peripheral

policy.
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groups" over time. Also, Hula's analysis is confined to coalitional activity in
Congress.
Although these scholars have enhanced our knowledge o f how changes in the
political system facilitate coalitional activity, the aforementioned analyses are a
product o f research centered in congressional institutions. But research in this field
must also investigate coalition formation in the context o f the federal judiciary.
Looking at the dynamics o f coalitional activity in the courts will shed some light on
the nature o f coalitional activity, as more empirical examination is necessary to
understand coalition formation over time.
The Utility o f Coalitional Activity

What is the utility o f organized groups acting in concert with one another?
Schlozman and Tierney (1986, 279) argue that...
coalitions among private organizations seem to be not simply an
important, but an increasingly important, component o f Washington
politics. Sixty-seven percent o f our respondents indicated that their
organizations had increased their commitment to coalitional activity
over the past decade. In terms o f increasing use by Washington
organizations, entering into coalitions ranks second on the list o f 27
techniques o f influence.
Cultivating allies in the policy process is an instrumental way o f pressing
policy claims and some recent research has begun to explore the utility o f coalitional
formation between interest groups. This theme o f a rise o f coalitional activity among
organized interests challenges the view o f policy lobbying as a product of
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impermeable iron triangles.^ But scholars such as Heclo (1978) and Gais, Peterson,
and Walker (1991) found that the particular policy arenas were more permeable and
that the actors participating in policy arenas were more numerous and transient. A
number o f studies have shed some light on the scope o f interest group coalitions.
These scholars argue that groups do join coalitions, and do so to reduce their resource
expenditures or obtain selective benefits (Hula 1995). Hojnacki (1997) found a
greater likelihood for groups to form coalitions when organizations perceived as
“pivotal” to success are members of an alliance. Coalitions o f organized interests
“ .. .exist when several diverse groups or institutions informally agree to work together
on a specific public policy problem” (Browne 1990, 480). But Browne notes that
coalitional activity is not necessarily a new phenomenon. Hojnacki (1998, 441)
defines coalitions a s...
cooperative ventures that are forged between groups to take action on
a set o f policy issues. When groups act in coalition, they provide
public goods (or ‘bads’) that are enjoyed by coalition members and
non-members alike; groups enjoy any policy benefits (or costs) that
result from an alliance’s efforts regardless o f whether they are
members o f that alliance.
Two general perspectives in the literature have addressed the context o f the
political system within which interest groups make decisions about alliance
opportunities. The traditional view of coalitional activity among organized interest
groups assumes that groups forgo alliances in order to preserve their autonomy. That

2 The iron triangles included a peak interest group, a congressional committee, and an
executive branch agency charged with overseeing and implementing the particular
policy area (see McCool 1995 for a good survey o f this literature).
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is, as Berry (1977) suggests, groups, in order to survive, will devote their resources to
efforts that enhance their own reputations rather than invest those resources in
coalitional activity that may diminish the group's distinctiveness. Further, Browne
(1990) suggests that organizations seek to create "issue niches" in order to establish
expertise and remain credible in the eyes of decision makers. This view assumes that
the cost of losing a group’s autonomy outweighs the likelihood o f success when
engaging in coalitional activity.
Another view o f coalitional activity suggests that changes in the political
system have made it advantageous for groups to form coalitions. As the power o f the
federal government has broadened in scope and as it has become more functionally
specialized, the number o f interest groups has increased (Berry 1989; Heclo 1978;
Loomis 1986; Salisbury 1992; Walker 1983). The crowded interest group community
lends itself to the interdependency o f interest groups. In a sense, these alliances
enable groups to enhance the prospects for success in an increasingly complex
political environment. Alliance relationships are also affected by the range and type
o f information organizations have about their allies, the scope o f their interests, and
the character o f their organizations. Loomis (1986) and Schlozman and Tierney
(1986) also show that the nature o f the issue o f interest to alliance members will
affect coalition formation. Hall (1969) suggests that groups' desires to magnify the
power of their interests also provide incentives for allied advocacy.
One reason they may coalesce is to pool resources. Hula (1995) shows that
some groups join coalitions to reduce their resource expenditures, while others join to
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obtain selective benefits. More recently, Hojnacki (1997) argues that the probability
o f coalition formation is more likely to arise when organizations perceived as
"pivotal" to success are members o f an alliance, and when groups represent
expressive interests or perceive a strong opposition. Additionally, some studies
suggest that groups are likely to engage in coalitions due to the potential political
capital the coalition can use as a bargaining chip in negotiations with politicians.
Blocs o f groups acting in concert pose a formidable and unavoidable coalition o f
potentially mobilized blocs o f voters, and as Costain (1992) shows, political leaders
pay considerable attention to the demands o f a potentially mobilized bloc o f voters.
Moreover, disadvantaged interests may have the most to gain from joining an
alliance. That is, groups with limited resources and political clout have a greater need
to advertise their interest’s claim (Browne 1992; Kuersten and Jagemann 2000).
Other scholars have instead examined coalitional activity in terms o f the
interest group environment. In general, all coalitions are characterized by organized
actors acting in concert to pursue policy goals. But coalitions are organized
differently; they can be formal, long-term alliances that are to some degree
indistinguishable from an interest group that has organizational membership (Hula
1999), while others can be short term and less formal enterprises. As Berry (1989)
and Schlozman and Tiemey (1986) suggest, coalitions tend to be “marriages o f
convenience,” sometimes lacking any organizational structure and staff committed to
the alliance effort.
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Hojnacki's (1997) model o f interest group coalitional activity is one o f first
attempts to empirically capture what factors groups take into consideration before
joining an alliance. She places considerable importance on issue-context in order to
determine the likelihood o f groups coalescing. According to Hojnacki, if there is
congressional opposition for a particular policy or cause, the probability o f joining a
coalition decreases as groups may find it futile to expend resources that will fall on
deaf ears. Under these circumstances, groups may be more inclined to work alone.
But this may not signal an end to the possibility o f coalition building. That is, groups
may seek alternative strategies and seek to access other points o f the federal system.
Presumably the Supreme Court would be one o f these points o f access, though
Hojnacki does not examine this possibility. Hojnacki suggests that the probability o f
coalitional activity decreases as a function o f the narrowness o f the issue in question.
That is, if organized interests seek distinct, group-specific benefits, the costs o f
joining a coalition are greater than if the interests seek broader interests to the benefit
o f more groups. As her analysis suggests, the forces that affect this estimate derive
from the context o f the policy issue in question, the group’s knowledge o f their
potential allies, and the group's concern for maintaining a distinct identity in the
interest group community.

Interest Groups and the Courts

Scholarly literature attempting to understand coalitions in the context o f the
federal judiciary remains in a nascent stage. To a large extent, this is because scholars
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at first largely ignored the potential effects o f organized interests on the courts
generally. Historically, scholars and citizens alike associated interest groups
enmeshed in the political fray o f the legislative and executive branches exclusively.
Indeed, the notion o f interest group lobbying conjures up a pejorative overtone o f
specialized interests seeking to influence the legislative process at the expense o f the
public good. But this is no longer the case. Judicial scholars and analysts since the
late 1940’s struck a blow to the myth o f the federal judiciary as a seemingly objective
institution insulated from the pressures o f outside influence (see Pritchett 1948;
Rhode and Spaeth 1976; Schubert 1965; Segal and Spaeth 1993). Scholars have made
considerable gains showing how the environment within which the courts operate, not
unlike their counterpart institutions in the legislative and executive branches of
government, is influenced by outside pressures like public opinion (Caldeira 1991;
Marshall 1989) and the interest group community (Caldeira and Wright 1988; Vose
1959). In their survey o f the interest group environment, Schlozman and Tierney
(1986, 150) find that 72 percent o f the groups surveyed relied on filing lawsuits or
engaging in litigation. They also find that more groups are using coalitions as a
technique for influencing policy outcomes

(6 8

percent).

Bentley (1908, 393) was one o f the first students o f politics to recognize the
extent to which groups influence litigation before the Supreme Court. Bentley
declared that
so far from being a sort o f legal machine, courts are a functioning part
o f this government, responsive to the group pressures within it,
representative o f all sorts o f pressures, and using their representative
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judgment to bring those pressures to balance, not indeed in just the
same way, but on just the same basis that any other agency does.
The mobilization and counter-mobilization o f organized interests is seen at
various stages in the judicial process, from the nomination stage o f judges to the
federal bench to organized efforts to support parties to a suit before the Court. Groups
can employ a variety o f strategies to try to shape the outcome o f judicial decision
making. Other forms o f organized participation include groups providing legal
representation to parties in the suit (sponsorship), as when the National Association
for the Advancement o f Colored People-Legal Defense Fund (NAACP-LDF)
provided legal representation and paid the costs associated with the litigation in
Brown v. Board o f Education o f Topeka

(1 9 5 4 )3

(for other examples and case studies

see Greenberg 1977; O ’Connor 1980; Vose 1959). Groups also organize to lobby for
and against nominations to the federal bench (Caldeira and Wright 1988) in order to
shape senators’ decisions. But perhaps the most common way for interest groups to
influence the court system is through amicus curiae briefs. Amicus curiae or friend of
the court participation is a legally sanctioned part of our judicial system in which an
interested party, with permission from the court, may file a brief in support o f either
party to a case. For organizations without considerable financing, submitting these
briefs, which are usually no longer than 25 pages, may be their only feasible avenue
to gain access to the judicial process.

3 Brown v. Board o f Education o f Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Group participation as amici has been a standard litigation tactic that groups
and interested parties have employed in the twentieth century. Amicus curiae has a
long pedigree in legal history, extending from Anglo-American common law
practices and as far back as the fourteenth century and Roman law (Lowman 1992).
Historically, the amicus curiae was not a party to the litigation but instead served as
an impartial interlocutor in the judicial process, both providing assistance to judges
and correcting legal errors in the adjudication process. Over time, the role o f amicus
has evolved concomitantly with the evolution o f the federal judiciary in the U.S.
Whereas the amicus historically participated in the judicial forum as a participant who
aided the shortcomings o f the adversarial process, the amicus has now evolved into a
participant who represents the interests o f a third party (Lowman 1992). Moreover,
the amicus, loosely translated as “friend o f the court,” has become an active lobbyist
“be-friending one o f the parties o f the litigation” (Lowman 1992).
Scholars have examined the effect o f interest group participation at both the
jurisdictional and merit stages o f the courts. In general, scholars agree that groups
influence the Court’s behavior. The success o f the NAACP-LDF in Brown (1954)
suggests that some groups can influence the Court (Vose 1955). Scholars have also
examined the extent o f interest group influence in certain policy domains. Epstein and
Kobylka (1992) find that group arguments in abortion and capital punishment cases
helped to frame the issues for the justices. S oraufs (1976) study o f church-state
litigation highlights the demands and pressures that groups placed on the Court and
that ultimately led it to change its doctrinal position. Sorauf contends that the Court
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cannot ignore these demands because they will run the risk o f alienating the activist
segment o f the public and thus place its legitimacy in jeopardy.
Perhaps the most accessible way to determine the potential influence of
groups on the Court’s behavior is to examine the amicus briefs filed by interest
groups. Caldeira and Wright (1988, 1990) and McGuire and Caldeira (1993) assess
group influence at the jurisdictional stage and conclude that briefs filed during this
stage give important cues to justices about which cases deserve plenary review. These
studies show that amicus support for the petitioner increase the likelihood o f the
Court granting certiorari. Amicus briefs also provide policy cues for justices at the
merits stage, as they provide information about which cases will help to advance the
justices’ ideological dispositions about the content o f legal policy (Caldeira and
Wright 1988; Spriggs and Wahlbeck 1997).
In sum, despite the expectations of the Federalist, specifically Alexander
Hamilton’s classic discussion o f the role to be played by the federal judiciary in
Federalist #78, where the Supreme Court should declare the sense o f law through
“that inflexible and uniform adherence to the rights o f the Constitution and...
[individuals]...,” (Publius, 470-471) the Court has become more political over time.
Interest groups have become an integral component o f the judicial process and these
groups have tapped into almost all aspects of the Court’s work and processes, from
the Senate confirmation hearings (Segal 1987), to the influence o f interest groups on
whether to grant a case plenary review' (Caldeira and Wright 1990), to shaping the
Court’s legal justification for the outcome of the case (Spriggs and Wahlbeck 1997).
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Although the architects o f pluralist theory (Bentley 1908; Truman 1951) noted
the propensity o f organized interests to exert the same pressure on the federal
judiciary as they did in the elected branches o f government, scholars, until recently,
have largely ignored the extent of organized interest group participation at the level o f
the Supreme Court. One reason for this lack o f inquiry may be that scholars followed
the tradition legal model (Kort 1957), where legal precedent and the facts of the case
were the driving forces influencing the Court’s decision-making. This focus on case
law and the facts o f the case leaves little room for interest groups to play a role in the
process. Also, the early behavioral approach to judicial outcomes, where the decision
making processes o f justices are driven by their own personal policy predilections,
also leaves little room for groups to have an impact on the Court’s decision-making
processes. The incorporation o f the “pluralist paradigm” most notably articulated by
Bentley and Truman opened a window o f opportunity for scholars to examine the role
organized interests play in the judicial arena. Bentley (1908, 338) saw “ ...numerous
instances o f the same group pressures which operate through executives and
legislatures, operating through supreme courts.” Truman (1951, 479) made the
following observation about the role of organized interests in the federal judiciary.
Relations between interest groups and judges are not identical with
those between groups and legislators or executive officials, but the
difference is rather one o f degree than o f kind. For various reasons
organized groups are not so continuously concerned with courts and
court decisions as they are with the functions o f the other branches of
government, but the impact of diverse interests upon judicial behavior
is no less marked.
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Hakman (1966) examined the extent o f organized interest group participation
in the Supreme Court between 1928 and 1966 and concluded that the interest group
presence in the Court was almost non-existent. O f the approximately 1,200 “non
commercial” cases explored by Hakman, interest groups filed amicus curiae briefs
only 18.8 percent o f the time.4 Hakman went so far as to call scholarly work
examining the role o f organized participation in the Court “scholarly folklore.” Since
Hakman, however, scholars began to unearth and substantiate the theoretical
framework o f pluralism working in the federal judiciary. Scholars challenged
Hakman’s claims about the impotency and lack o f participation o f organized interests
in the judiciary. Between 1953 and 1990, there has been a substantial increase in the
number o f interest groups filing amicus curiae briefs to the Supreme Court. O ’Connor
and Epstein (1981-1982, 317) reappraised Hakman’s thesis and found that groups are
filing amicus briefs in more than half o f all non-commercial cases receiving plenary
review by the Court. For example, between 1928 and 1966 the percentage o f racediscrimination cases accompanied by amicus briefs was 26.8 percent whereas
between 1970 and 1980, 62.9 percent o f race discrimination cases were accompanied
by at least one amicus brief (O ’Connor and Epstein 1981, 317). Between 1986 and
1992 all race discrimination cases were accompanied by amicus briefs (Epstein
1993). Others, using case study methods, showed high levels of involvement o f
organized interests in religious establishment cases (Sorauf 1976) and sex

4 O ’Connor and Epstein (1981-1982), find an error in Haknian’s table, correcting the
percentage from 18.6 to 18.8 percent.
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discrimination cases (O’Connor 1980). Analyses o f these commentators documented
the rise o f pluralism in the federal judiciary and began to debunk the myth o f the
Court as an institution insulated from outside pressures. Clearly, Hakman’s
conclusions are outmoded, as the extent o f amicus participation over time has steadily
increased. Table 1 displays the frequency o f amicus participation between 1950 and
1995, broken down by substantive issue and constitutional areas the Court has been
asked to judge.

The Surge o f Interest Group Activity in the Courts

The Rehnquist Court, on average, sees about 84.4 percent o f all plenary cases
accompanied by at least one amicus curiae brief, compared with only 28.6 percent
during the Warren Court era. Also, during the 1990 term more than 4.5 interest
groups cosigned the average amicus brief. A few cases during the Rehnquist Court
standout as exemplifying strong interest group participation. In Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services (1989)5,

73

amicus briefs were filed where 420

organizations participated, as well as thousands o f individuals. Other notable cases
include Regents o f University o f California v. Bakke (1978), where 58 briefs were
filed and Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department o f Health (1990)6, where the
justices received almost 60 briefs by 80 groups or corporations. In the latter case, over
50 percent o f the amici were organized interest groups.

5 Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
6 Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department o f Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
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Table 1
Frequency o f Amicus Participation, 1950-1995

1928-1940

1941-1952

1953-1966

1970-1980

Issue

%

%

N

%

%

N

Church-state
Free Speech
Obscenity
Due process

14.3

42

NC
1.7

59

21.4
33.3
NC
19.8

62.9
54.7
51.6
51.9

35
53
31
129

Race discrim.
Sex discrim.

0 .0

15

67.7
77.5

62
40

36.8

326

76.8 181
167
8 6 .2
45.5 2 2
100
32

86

90.5

Criminal
Economic
Taxation
Federalism
Labor Union
Privacy
Total %
With Amici

0 .0

N

7
4

NC
1 .0

92

NC
NC
NC
0 .0

NC
1.7

4

6

116

46.7
NC

45

0.7
NC
NC
NC

139

55.5
NC
18.2

20

44.4
59.1
NC
28.8
26.5
NC
9.4
NC
NC
NC
41.2
NC
23.8

N

18
22

243
102

224
55.0

2 0

NC
NC
17

87.2
64.4

59

53.4

1986-1992

%

N

100

21

100

41

100

11

76.6
100
100

100

47
28
14

42
43

87.7

Note: % indicates the percentage o f cases accompanied by amicus briefs; N indicates
the total number o f cases in each category; NC indicates that the author did not code
cases in that issue area. Source: Epstein, Lee. 1993. “Interest Group Litigation During
the Rehnquist Court Era.” The Journal o f Law and Politics 9:651. (permission to
reproduce table was granted by the author).
Epstein (1993) describes some o f the reasons that may account for this surge
of organized interest group participation before the Supreme Court. Epstein reports
that some groups formed for the purpose of using litigation. Schlozman and Tierney
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(1986, 388) note that the increase in organized group participation increased not
simply because

. .there are more organizations on the scene, but [because] these

organizations are active as well.” Epstein also notes that groups view litigation as a
fruitful political strategy. In their survey o f interest groups, Schlozman and Tierney
(1986, 431) find that between 55 and 75 percent o f groups use the courts to achieve
their policy goals. Epstein also notes that the Court has invited and even encouraged
groups to use the judicial forum to achieve policy-oriented goals. In NAACP v. Button
( 1 9 6 3 ) 7 , the Court wrote that “groups which find themselves unable to achieve their

objectives through the ballot frequently turn to the courts...” The Court goes on to
say that “under the conditions o f modem government, litigation may be the sole
practicable avenue open to a minority to petition for redress o f grievances” (371 U.S.
415, 429-30).^ O ’Connor and Epstein (1983) found that between 1969 and 1981, only
11 percent o f the 832 motions for leave to file as amicus curiae were denied. More
recently, Epstein (1993) reported that the Rehnquist Court in 1990 only denied one o f
the 115 motions. The extent o f organized group participation in the Court can also be
found in the efficacy of such efforts. O’Connor and Epstein (1983) found that justices
frequently cite the briefs filed by amici in their opinions. Epstein (1993) reports that
the percentage o f briefs cited by justices has increased considerably over time, with
the Warren Court citing amici approximately 42 percent o f the time,

6 6

percent for

NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
8 The Rules o f the Court facilitate interest groups to actively use the courts. Rule 37
invites groups to present information that has not already brought to the attention of
the Court by the parties to the suit.
7
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the Burger Court, and

6 8

percent for the Rehnquist Court. The percentage o f

decisions where the modem Supreme Court justices mentioned amicus briefs are
presented below in Table 2.
Hakman’s view that cases involve “immediate disputes between private
adversaries” (1960, 245) is an outdated thesis. In sum, groups are instrumental
players in the judicial process and cases are stages on which groups try to play out
their broader policy views.

Why Groups Mobilize the Courts

Epstein (1993) argues that the contemporary environment within which the
Court operates demonstrates pluralism at work and students o f politics who study the
federal judiciary demonstrate the rise o f pluralism in the courts. Some scholars,
including Richard Cortner, discussed the types o f participants engaged in lobbying
the court. Cortner concludes that certain types o f groups lobbied the judiciary more
than others. Cortner (1968, 287) held that marginalized groups could take refuge in
the courts. These groups...
are highly dependent upon the judicial process as a means o f pursuing
their policy interests usually because they are temporarily, or, even
permanently, disadvantaged in terms o f their ability to attain
successfully their goals in the electoral process, within the elected
institutions o f government or in the bureaucracy. If they are to succeed
at all in the pursuit o f their goals they are almost compelled to resort to
litigation.
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Table 2
Justices’ Citations o f Amicus Briefs

Justice

Black
Blackmun
Brennan
Burger
Burton
Clark
Douglas
Fortas
Frankfurter
Goldberg
Harlan
Jackson
Kennedy
Marshall
Minton
O ’Connor
Powell
Reed
Rehnquist
Scalia
Souter
Stevens
Stewart
Thomas
Warren
White
Whittaker

Number o f Citations to
Amicus Briefs

297
531
755
337
17
109
416
43
74
87
252
10

82
505
8

292
458
20

453
157
10

607
363
7
99
660
28

Number o f Citations
Divided by Total
Opinions Written

.53
.69
.65
.6 8
.2 1

.36
.45
.44
.29
.39
.37
.63
.65
.71
.2 0

.77
.77
.33
.53
.62
.29
.71
.51
.35
.40
.6 6

.25

Source: Epstein, Lee. 1993. “Interest Group Litigation During the Rehnquist Court
Era.” The Journal o f Law and Politics 9:685 (permission to reproduce table was
granted by the author).
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Caldeira and Wright (1990), however, point out that myriad groups ranging
from charitable organizations to corporations now regularly lobby the courts. That
conservative groups and corporations lobby the court regularly suggests that there is a
degree o f balancing in the interest group universe in the context of the courts. Not
surprisingly, the adversarial nature of the court system lends itself to a pluralistbalancing act. Epstein (1993) shows that the gap in participation between
“upperdogs” (advantaged interests) and “underdogs” (disadvantaged interests) closed
by the late 1970s. Moreover, Conner’s notion, or the disadvantaged thesis, needs to
be reexamined in the face o f this more contemporary pluralist balancing act between
advantaged and disadvantaged organized interests (Kuersten and Jagemann 2000;
Songer and Kuersten 1996). Epstein (1993, 657) calls this contemporary balancing
act the “new” pluralism and suggests that there exists a degree of parity in the rates of
participation between advantaged and more disadvantaged interests. However, the
notion o f “disadvantaged” needs to be further explored. That is to say, some
organizations that represent “disadvantaged” interests such as the NAACP are clearly
successful participants in the political system (Vose 1957). I examine disadvantaged
groups not so much in terms o f their being marginalized from the political system,
but, instead, in terms o f organizational resources.
Schattschneider’s observation that groups representing advantaged interests
were more influential in the policy making process have been echoed by Schlozman
and Tiemey (1986). They claim that “it is clear that Schattschneider’s
observations.. .about the shape o f the Washington pressure group community are apt
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today. Taken as a whole, the pressure group community is heavily weighted in favor
o f business organizations” (1986, 68). Epstein (1991) notes that this bias is also seen
in the participation o f groups in the Supreme Court. The pluralist balancing act, at
least as the literature has spelled it out, has tilted from the disadvantaged having the
upper hand in the 1960s-1970s, then advantaged and disadvantaged groups having
near parity in their rates o f participation during the late 1970s into the 1980s, and
today being tilted toward advantaged interests, particularly businesses and
corporations.
Scholars point out that cases have a better chance o f receiving full treatment
by the Court when accompanied by interest group support. In their discussion o f the
Court’s “discuss list,” Caldeira and Wright (1988) find that when a petition for
certiorari is accompanied by one or more amicus briefs, the chances o f the case
making the “discuss list” increase. Moreover, organized group participation plays a
pivotal role in the justices’ decision to grant a case plenary review. Also, a host o f
scholars point out that amicus briefs convey important information to the Court
(Behuniak-Long 1991; Caldeira and Wright 1988; Epstein 1993; Ivers and O ’Connor
1987; Spriggs and Wahlbeck 1997). One scholar even went so far as to say that
“Courts often rely on the factual information, cases or analytical approaches provided
only by an amicus” (Ennis 1984, 603). Indeed, the rules governing amicus
participation in the Supreme Court admonishes amici to present unique information to
the Court. Rule 37.1 o f the Court stipulates that “an amicus brief which brings
relevant matter to the attention o f the Court that has not already been brought to its
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attention by the parties is o f considerable help to the Court. An amicus brief which
does not serve this purpose simply burdens the staff and facilities o f the Court and its
filing is not favored.”

The Disadvantaged Litigant in Court

While money and other political resources are required to lobby Congress,
these are scarce commodities for groups with limited budgets and staffs that seek to
gain access to the greater policy process. In response, some scholars suggest that
these disadvantaged groups turn to the court system to achieve their policy goals
because the judiciary is the one governmental forum in which political resources are
not as necessary as are legal resources (e.g., legal expertise and accessibility to the
law, etc.). Legal resources are more easily obtainable than political resources; if a
disadvantaged group can form a coalition with an interest group who regularly
appears before the court (and would therefore presumably have more legal expertise
than a disadvantaged group), that disadvantaged group could offset their legal
resource deficit with the resources o f the more advantaged

g ro u p .9

Moreover, the

court system becomes the most efficient venue for disadvantaged groups to access the
governmental policy making process. It is in the other branches o f government that

9 On the whole, groups may find it easier to participate in the courts versus
congressional institutions. Presumably, groups will find it easier to file a brief versus
expending financial resources to lobby legislators. Although filing briefs can be
expensive and serve as a deterrent to group participation in this way (see BehuniakLong 1991), other groups may help to offset these costs by volunteering their services
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resources like political capital are needed; filing an amicus brief takes legal resources
that are more attainable than political capital. The costs for groups filing may
decrease more when these groups form coalitions and file briefs with other likeminded groups (Epstein 1985).
Further, these groups that file amicus briefs have the most to gain from
coalitional activity. While the judicial system helps to equalize the playing field,
giving groups with the least amount o f political capital greater access in court than in
other branches, various studies have suggested that repeat players are often the most
successful in court (Galanter 1974; McGuire 1993). The reason repeat players are so
successful is that they have several advantages including legal expertise, knowledge
o f the system and superior legal counsel. If coalitional behavior occurs in the
courtroom, then it would make sense that those groups who are the most
disadvantaged have the greatest incentives to pool their resources with repeat players
and sign onto amicus briefs as co-sponsors.
Scholars have identified “disadvantaged groups” who turn to the courts as the
most effective venue for getting their voices heard. In his case study o f apportionment
cases, Richard C. Cortner (1968, 1970) outlines a typology of litigants engaged in the
apportionment cases. Cortner finds two types o f litigants engaged in apportionment
cases and labels them as either “defensive” or “aggressive.” Defensive litigants seek
to preserve the status-quo, as they seek to uphold the prevailing constitutional
doctrine already favorable to the participants. Aggressive litigants seek to convince
and thereby reducing the costs for any particular group in the coalition (Songer and
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the court to change current doctrine by way o f encouraging innovative interpretation
of the Constitution from the courts. Cortner argues that litigants in the apportionment
cases showcase creative elements in constitutional development, where temporary
alliances coordinate their resources to change the status quo. Groups who are
marginalized from the electoral process because “they cannot attain their
goals.. .within the elected political institutions, or in the bureaucracy...” are compelled
to turn to the courts (Cortner 1968, 287). According to Cortner, disadvantaged groups
are those groups that if they are to succeed at all in the pursuit o f their goals they are
almost compelled to resort to litigation.
Some scholars suggest that the structures and processes o f the court system
may provide a more level playing field for interest groups, particularly groups that do
not have a large capital base, to press their claims on the state (rules o f evidence, lowcost o f filing fees, etc). The more level playing field o f the court system would attract
groups with meager resources simply because it may be their only option. The
relatively low cost o f filing briefs before the courts enables groups to coalesce, rather
than relying on political capital (i.e., lobbying Congress), which is a more costly
activity.

Coalitional Activity o f Groups in the Courts

Probably the most dramatic reason for these groups to coalesce their agendas
centers on the political capital both groups could potentially press on politicians.

Kuersten 1995).
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Groups are potential mobilized voters, and if these groups mobilize themselves as a
powerful voting bloc then political leaders would find it advantageous to pay
attention to their demands (Costain 1992). Various scholars have demonstrated that
groups succeed in magnifying the power of their own group when they coalesce (Hall
1969) and that magnifying their power helps get the immediate attention of political
leaders.
Costain (1992) demonstrates the success o f women’s groups using this
approach. In what she calls the “political process model,” successful groups are those
that provide information and ideas to political leaders on highly conflictual and
partisan issues. Legislators will always have an incentive to pay attention to
potentially mobilized voters on conflictual issues. What the group needs is the
cognitive liberation that they can affect change. It is only the organizational
structure, Costain explains, that will cause the greatest barriers to group success. Yet
if groups do not possess a significant resource base, they are forced to pool their
meager resources with other groups in order to share the financial or legal burden o f
the fight. Then they magnify their power and political leaders should be more likely
to hear their voice.
Therefore, the least advantaged groups in society will have the most incentive
to coalesce with like-minded groups who have more resources. In the judicial forum
this is even more the case since groups with the highest levels o f resources are
consistently the most successful in the judicial forum (Epstein and Rowland 1991;
Galanter 1974). However, it is not just financial advantage that makes these groups
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more successful. Several authors attribute the success to the advantages enjoyed by
litigants in a "repeat player" status. With greater litigious experience, these
participants develop optimal litigation strategies that enable them to know where to
cut costs and how to utilize expensive but superior legal firms. Their knowledge o f
specific cases, as well their in-depth understanding o f the judicial process itself,
allows them to select cases and tactics that have the best prospects for success.
Disadvantaged groups have an enormous incentive, then, to coalesce their
activities with groups that already have the advantages o f greater organizational skills
and superior legal counsel through optimal litigious experience. In fact, coalitions
between disadvantaged groups and repeat players may serve to improve the balance
o f resources within the court system (Kuersten and Jagemann 2000). Repeat player
status does not assure groups o f judicial success against less advantaged groups when
those less advantaged litigants can supplement their own meager resources with the
resources and expertise o f repeat player amici. In other words, underdogs supported
by repeat player amici can probably neutralize the normal advantage of the
upperdogs.
Given the asymmetric balance o f power between more advantaged interest
group participants and their more disadvantaged counterparts, coalitional activity
between them may not only be more likely, but it is also preferable in equalizing the
judicial playing field. This would ensure that the court system is the most egalitarian
branch o f government, and most open to various interests.
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Forming coalitions would be financially wise for groups with a limited
resource base in terms o f budget and staff as well. The enormous expense involved in
filing amicus briefs before the Supreme Court presents quite a problem for
disadvantaged groups with little money. Using the courts is costly in terms o f both
time and resources. Filing amicus curiae briefs, however, is much cheaper in terms of
organization resources relative to litigation in a suit. Although filing a brief is much
less expensive, the average cost o f filing a brief is about S8,000, with costs ranging
from S500 to 550,000 per brief (Caldeira and Wright 1990). Coalition building would
allow groups to defray the costs o f filing, presumably with like-minded groups that
would share their ideological predispositions.
Disadvantaged groups presumably seek to broaden their access to the political
system at the lowest possible cost and scholars argue that coalitions are the most
realistic way to do this (Costain 1981). By using the capabilities and resources of
each group within the coalition cooperatively, groups with meager resources can
achieve access to the political system. This is especially true if disadvantaged groups
can cooperatively pool their resources with those o f more advantaged groups. In that
way, a disadvantaged group could equalize their weaknesses (e.g., money, limited
staff) by coalescing with a group that has more assets, and the advantaged group
gains the image o f a large potentially mobilized voting bloc to give their position
more punch to the political elites. This research argues that coalitional activity may be
a litigation strategy used not only to express a certain policy position but may also be
a means to balance the judicial playing field.
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Before I examine when interest groups join coalitions and whether groups’
involvement and coalition activity make any difference in terms o f the Court’s
decision making, I provide an overview o f the affirmative action landscape and the
manner in which organized interest groups fit into it.
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CHAPTER m
ORGANIZED PARTICIPATION EN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CASES
ARGUED BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT
This chapter surveys the landscape o f affirmative action as a constitutional
policy arena in order to understand the context within which we would expect certain
types o f groups to participate before the Supreme Court. I spell out a classification
scheme for capturing the different types o f organizations. Also, I lay out expectations
about which groups lobby the courts and explore the extent o f participation both
across and within all affirmative action cases. Finally, I identify the general trends o f
organized participation over time.

Data and Methods

The data used in the analysis include all affirmative action cases granted
plenary review before the Supreme Court from 1971 (Griggs v. Duke Power
Company) to 1995 (Adarand Constructors v. Pena) A® I chose affirmative action as a
policy arena because the substantive content o f this arena focuses on access o f
traditionally marginalized and disadvantaged groups. This issue area should provide

10 I do, however, include one case that was decided by the Court per curium: Defunis
v. Odegaard (1974). I include this case in the analysis due to the fact that a flurry o f
organizations participated in this case as amici. Although the Court rendered this case
moot, I treat Defunis as a con affirmative action decision throughout the analysis.
38
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fruitful data on coalitional behavior o f disadvantaged interests. Also, as a policy
issue, affirmative action is a highly polarizing issue (Edsall and Edsall 1991) within
which I expect to find a flurry o f organizations participating. Further, affirmative
action cases before the Court span a time frame long enough to confidently assess the
dynamics o f group participation. I exclude per curium opinions because not all amici
participating are documented in the U.S. Reports. The U.S. Supreme Court Judicial
Database (1995) was consulted in order to identify all affirmative action cases given
plenary review by the Court. The Records and Briefs o f the U.S. Supreme Court
(herein referred to as Records and Briefs) were used to identify all amicus
participants for each case. The analysis excludes individuals participating as both
filers and co-filers. The cases used in the following analyses are listed below in Table
3.
Generalizing about the extent o f organized participation before the Supreme
Court is confounded by the methodology employed by various scholars assessing
organized participation. Epstein (1993) discusses the variety o f methodological tactics
scholars use to study interest groups and the Court. Epstein points out four distinct
approaches: the case study method, success ratings, control designs, and contextual
designs. Most o f the major studies cited in the literature (for example see Vose 1957)
use the “case study method” to unearth the efficacy and impact o f organized group
participation in the context o f the federal judiciary. Yet, case studies o f particular
court cases or particular groups do not allow us to reach generalizations. In an effort
to assess the efficacy of group participation, scholars employing “success ratings” use
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success scores to determine the extent o f group success in terms o f wins. Yet these
studies generally fail to control for important and recognized factors that shape case
Table 3
Affirmative Action Cases Argued Before the Supreme Court, 1971-1995

Case

Citation

Griggs v. Duke Power Company
Defunis et al. v. Odegaard et al.
Morton Secretary o f the Interior et al. v.
Mancari et al.
Albemarle Paper Company v. Moody
Franks v. Bowman Transportation Company
University o f California Regents v. Bakke
Furnco Construction Corporation v. Waters
United Steel Workers o f America v. Weber
Fullilove v. Klutznick
General Building Contractors Association v. PA
United Building & Construction Trades v. Mayor
Firefighters v. Stotts
Wygant v. Jackson Board o f Education
Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers ’ v. EEOC et al.
Local 93, International Association o f Firefighters,
AFL-CIO v. City o f Cleveland et al.
United States v. Paradise
Johnson v. Transportation Agency
City o f Richmond v. J.A. Croson Company
Wards Cove Packing Company v. Antonio
Martin v. Wilks
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC et al.
Adarand Constructors v. Pena

401 U.S. 424(1971)
416 U.S. 312(1974)
417 U.S. 535(1974)
422 U.S. 405 (1975)
424 U.S. 747 (1976)
438 U.S. 265 (1978)
438 U.S. 567(1978)
443 U.S. 193 (1979)
448 U.S. 448(1980)
458 U.S. 375 (1982)
465 U.S. 208 (1984)
467 U.S. 561 (1984)
476 U.S. 267 (1986)
478 U.S. 421 (1986)
478 U.S. 501 (1986)
480 U.S. 149(1987)
480 U.S. 616 (1987)
488 U.S. 469 (1989)
490 U.S. 642(1989)
490 U.S. 755(1989)
497 U.S. 547(1990)
515 U.S. 200 (1995)

N=22, The affirmative action cases were selected from the U.S. Supreme Court
Judicial Database, Phase 1 (1995).
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outcomes (Epstein 1993). The assumption in this method is that only group
participation effects the outcomes o f cases, neglecting factors such as precedent, the
facts o f the case, and the justices’ ideological dispositions. “Control designs” attempt
to “assess the effect o f interest groups only i f we control for other factors that may be
influencing the judicial decision, such as partisanship, legal facts, and ideology”
(Epstein 1993, 693). Epstein suggests that control designs show a marginal impact o f
groups on case outcomes. “Contextual approaches” attempt to assess the extent to
which justices incorporate the content o f amicus briefs into their legal reasoning. We
already know that justices frequently cite amicus briefs in their opinions, but it is
more difficult to assess the extent to which these briefs impact the justices. Scholars
have found that amici add new insights into the cases at hand, and justices often adopt
the language and legal reasoning of amici, as opposed to the framework set-out by the
briefs filed by the parties to the suit. I now move to a discussion o f affirmative action
as a policy arena and from there I present findings about organized group
participation in these cases.

Affirmative Action as a Policy Arena
Affirmative action refers to government policies that seek to directly or
indirectly award social goods such as jobs, academic positions, and resources, to
individuals on the basis o f their membership in a designated protected group in order
to compensate for past discrimination. These programs have largely been viewed in
terms o f addressing issues o f social justice. Government services and income
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supplements distributed to individuals and groups seemingly provide a means through
which disadvantaged groups can be better equipped to enjoy a more level playing
field in sectors o f economic and social life. Affirmative action policies establish a
pattern o f rewards and benefits to minorities and women in order to increase their
representation in various public and private sectors. Such rewards and benefits seek to
rectify past discrimination against minorities and women. Michel Rosenfeld (1991,
47) provides a more explicit working definition o f affirmative action. He writes that
affirmative action refers to the
.. .preferential hiring, promotion, and laying off o f minorities or
women, to the preferential admission o f minorities and women to
universities, or to the preferential selection o f businesses owned by
minorities or women to perform government public contracting work
for purposes o f remedying a wrong act or o f increasing the proportion
o f minorities and women in the relevant labor force, entrepreneurial
class, or university student population.
Debate centering on affirmative action is usually coined in terms o f social
justice. That is, proponents o f such programs argue that enacting affirmative action
provides “equality o f opportunity.” Although affirmative action policies seem to be
antithetical to the principle o f equal protection o f the laws (the basis o f equal
opportunity), these rewards and benefits are designed to assist people who have been
marginalized from the political, economic, and social arenas. To a considerable
degree, these programs focus on the equality o f result rather than equality o f
opportunity.
Affirmative action reflects the disparate impact theory o f discrimination. This
theory holds that there is a statistical racial and gender disparity resulting from
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employment practices and forms o f discrimination in the workplace. In other words,
this theory o f discrimination says that discrimination is based not so much on
prejudice than it is based on the disproportionate representation o f ethnic and racial
minorities in social and economic sectors.
Affirmative action was first defined in an executive order issued by President
Lyndon Johnson in 1965. It required employers to recruit minority candidates to be
considered equally with other applicants in the hiring pool. 1* This Executive Order
banned discrimination of minorities by the federal government and its contractors. A
later order in 1965 prohibited discrimination by the government and its contractors,
and required that affirmative action be taken “to ensure that applicants are employed,
and that employees are treated during employment, without regard to their race,
creed, color, or national o r i g i n . ” 12 While the first order was primarily aimed at
blacks, the latter expanded the focus o f affirmative action to include Hispanics,
Native Americans, and other minorities. And although originally couched in terms of
employment policy, affirmative action programs have grown to include any policy
that grants preferences based on membership in a specific group (Eastland 1992).
Today, affirmative action programs target not only racial and ethnic-minority groups
but women as well. Through the years, affirmative action programs have varied

11 As Vice-President to John F. Kennedy, Johnson first attempted to achieve equal
opportunity for African Americans in 1961 by playing a major role in enacting
Executive Order 10,925, which is commonly referred to as the “Affirmative Action
Order.”
12 Executive Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R 339 (1964-1965).
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extensively, from “soft” forms that include having business establishments recruit
minorities, to “hard” forms that involve reserving a specific quantity o f openings for
designated minority groups.
The varieties of affirmative action programs have been challenged in the
courts on a number of fronts. On its face, affirmative action programs contradict the
notion o f a “color-blind” Constitution.

Affirmative action polices invite debate

about the legal norms articulated in Brown (1954) to the extent that supporters o f
affirmative action programs believe that the “color blind” constitutional doctrine is
not sufficient to remedy the pervasive impact o f disparate treatment. As Blackmun
asserted in his dissent in Bakke (1978), “in order to get beyond racism we must first
take account o f race.” Moreover, part o f the debate over affirmative action includes
the extent to which race is to be taken into account when enacting economic and
social policies to remedy past discrimination. More specifically, in dealing with
affirmative action cases, the Court has treated the issue on the basis o f competing
standards o f scrutiny. On the whole, the Court has employed three levels o f review to
scrutinize legislation. These standards of review the Court has utilized for equal
protection challenges have changed over the years. The first level is the “rational
relationship test,” which is met when the classification is “rationally related to a
legitimate legislative end.” Under this standard o f review the government need only

13 As Justice Harlan spelled out his dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896), “our constitution is color blind.” Later in Brown (1954), the Court declared
the “separate but equal” doctrine unconstitutional and blessed the notion o f a “color
blind” constitution.
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establish that there is a rational relationship between the governmental objective and
the legislation in question. Classifications involving gender have been held to the
more rigorous “intermediate level” o f scrutiny, which requires that the classification
serve an “important governmental objective” and that the classification be
“substantially related” to the governmental policy. “Strict scrutiny” is the most
difficult standard and is used when classifications are said to alter a fundamental right
or when they are based on racial and/or ethnic classifications. Under this type o f
scrutiny the challenged classification must be “necessary” to achieve a “compelling”
governmental objective. This doctrinal dictate was spelled out by the Court in Wygant
(1986). Legislation will be deemed unconstitutional unless “the means chosen to
accomplish the State’s asserted purpose [is] specifically and narrowly framed to
accomplish that purpose” ( Wygant v. Jackson Bd. o f Education (1986)). In race-based
affirmative action cases over time, the Court has imposed stricter standards o f review
to all levels o f government.
Attempts to remedy past discrimination in the form o f affirmative action
policies raise important constitutional questions. Since classifications based on race
must be examined under the lens o f “strict scrutiny,” should the same standard o f
review be required o f affirmative action policies based on

g e n d er? *4 a

difficulty

arises because the beneficiaries o f such polices include both women and racial/ethnic

14 O f the 22 cases examined in this study, 20 cases involved race-based affirmative
action policies and two cases ( Wygant (1986) and Johnson (1987)) dealt with
affirmative action policies based along the lines o f gender.
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minorities. That is, sexual classifications that disadvantage women are held to
“intermediate-level” scrutiny, whereas classifications based on race are to meet the
standards o f strict scrutiny. The legal history o f affirmative action cases reveals
disagreement between the justices concerning the proper way to evaluate these
policies; over the past 20 years or so, the Court has been unclear on what standards
should be used. Indeed, the Court has been sharply divided in its decisions and has
produced a variety o f conflicting opinions. This discord between members o f the
Court may lend itself to high levels o f interest group and intergovernmental
participation. Table 4 presents some o f the legal and doctrinal highlights o f
affirmative action cases in order to showcase the dynamics o f the Court’s
interpretation o f legal precedent.
The selection o f affirmative action cases to be used in this project comes from
Supreme Court cases granted plenary review and coded as “affirmative action” cases
in the U.S. Supreme Court Judicial Database, 1953-1993 Terms (Sixth ICPSR
Version, February 1995). Since the publication o f this edition o f the database, the
Court granted plenary review to Adarand (1995). This case is included in the
analysis.
Table 5 lists all affirmative action cases granted plenary review by the
Supreme Court from 1971 (Griggs) to 1995 {Adarand). The table highlights the legal
combatants before the Court in each case. Also listed in this table is the vote in the
case, the outcome, whether the Court decided in favor o f affirmative action policies
and procedures, as well as the law being addressed by the Court.
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Table 4
Treatment of Precedent and Level o f Scrutiny Applied for the Major Affirmative
Action Cases o f the Rehnquist Court, 1986-1995

Case

Outcome/Interpretation

U.S. v. Paradise (1987)

Liberal Interpretation of
Precedent
(intermediate level scrutiny)

Richmond v. Croson (1989)

New Conservative Precedent
(strict scrutiny)

Martin v. Wilks {1989)

Conservative Interpretation of
Precedent
(strict scrutiny)

Metro Broadcasting v. FCC (1990)

Liberal Interpretation of
Precedent
(intermediate level scrutiny)

Adarand Constructors v. Pena (1995)

New Conservative Precedent
(strict scrutiny)

Note: All cases listed above are race-based affirmative action cases.

The data on the outcome o f the cases and the law in question come from the
coding o f all decisions, as well as validation from the codes for each case from the
U.S. Supreme Court Judicial Database, Phase / (1995). The cases can be segregated
into categories based on the interests represented by the petitioner and respondent.
Some cases deal with school admissions procedures (Defunis and Bakke), employee
and employer relationship with regard to hiring and promotion in the private sector
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Table 5
Summary o f Affirmative Action Cases Argued Before the Supreme Court
1971-1995

Case

Petitioner

Griggs (1971)

Racial/Ethnic Employer
Employee

Defunis (1974)

Student

University

5-4 moot

Standing

Morton (1974)

DOI

Government
Employee

9-0 pro

5A=P

Albemarle (1975)

Employer

Racial/Ethnic
Applicant

7-1 pro

Title VH

Franks (1976)

Racial/Ethnic Employer
Applicant

5-3 pro

Title VH

Bakke (1978)

University

Student

5-4

pro

14A=

Furnco (1978)

Employer

Racial/Ethnic 9-0
Applicant

con

Title VH

Weber( 1979)

Union

Employee

5-2

pro

Title VI

FullHove (1980)

Government
Contractor

COMM

6-3

pro

Title VI

Gen. Build (1982)

Government
Contractor

Pennsylvania 7-2

con

CRA1981

Mayor (1984)

Union

NJ City

8-1

pro

PRTV/
IMM

Stotts (1984)

Union

TN Minority 6-3

con

Title VH

Wygant(1986)

MI Govt.
Employee

con

14A=

Respondent

MI School
District

Vote

Outcome

8-0

pro

5-4
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Title VH
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Table 5—Continued

Case

Petitioner

Respondent

Vote

Outcome

Local 28 (1986)

Union

EEOC

5-4

pro

Title VH

Local 93 (1986)

Union

OH City

6-3

pro

Title VH

Paradise (1987)

U.S.

AL Minority 5-4
Government
Employee

pro

14A=

Johnson (1987)

CA Govt.
Employee

CA County

6-3

pro

Title VH

Richmond (1989)

VA City

Government

6-3

con

14A=

Wards Cove (1989)

Employer

Racial Job
Applicant

5-4

con

Title VH

Martin (1989)

AL Minority
Employee

AL Govt.
Employee

5-4

con

CIVP

Metro (1990)

Business (TV) FCC

5-4

pro

5A=P

Adarand (1995)

Government
Contractor

5-4

con

5A=P

DOT

Law

Note: Pro: pro-affirmative action decision; Con: opposite; moot: case or controversy
(no decision on the merits). Title VII: Civil Rights Act o f 1964, Title VII; Title VI:
Civil Rights Act o f 1964, Title VI; CRA 1981: Civil Rights Act o f 1981; Standing:
case or controversy requirements; 5A=P: equal protection; 14A=: equal protection;
CIVP: federal rules o f civil procedure; PRIV/IMM: privileges and immunities clause
(Codes come from U.S. Supreme Court Judicial Database, 1995).
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{Griggs, Albemarle, Furnco, and Wards Cove), employee and employer relationship
with regard to government departments and the like {Morton, Wygant, Paradise, and
Martin), relationships between unions and union members ( Weber, Mayor, Stotts,
Local 28, and Local 93), and relationships between government contractors and
contractees {Fullilove, General Building, Richmond, Metro Broadcasting, and
Adarand). Among all o f the affirmative action cases granted plenary review, the
Court rendered 13 decisions broadly interpreted as being in favor o f affirmative
action policies and procedures and nine against. However, if the substantive
conclusions the Court has made about affirmative action over time are examined, we
find that the Court has applied stricter standards o f review for all governmental levels
(federal, state, local), as well as private attempts to either remedy past discrimination
or promote diversity with the procedures and practices o f affirmative action.
It is difficult to assess the extent to which the Court has ruled decidedly either
in favor or against affirmative action. Each case presents a unique set o f facts that the
Court had to consider. However, despite the uniqueness o f the plight o f the parties to
the suits at hand, the implications o f these decisions of the Court on these cases
extend far beyond the immediate outcome for the litigants. Moreover, because some
o f the cases deal with affirmative action policies and procedures regarding unions,
school admissions, or awarding public contracts, all issues that illicit public
controversy, I expect that the broad-based implications of these decisions would
invite myriad groups to participate as amici, while at the same time attracting
organizational types that reflect the interests o f the parties to the suit.
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Classification o f Organizations

In order to capture the diversity o f groups who filed briefs, I classify all amici
according to their bases o f membership. I include 13 out of the 14 categories used by
Caldeira and Wright ( 1 9 9 0 ). 15 i exclude “individuals” as a category, while at the
same time, I add educational organizations and institutions given the participants that
we expect to see lobbying in affirmative action litigation. Scholars since Truman
(1951) have used classification schemes to describe and analyze interest group
activity. 16 Because the number o f amicus participants is overwhelming and
encompasses a host o f types o f organizations, a classification scheme is needed that
captures the diversity of organizations. I use the phrase “organized interests” rather
broadly and understand them as a “variety o f organizations that seek joint ends
through political action” (Schlozman and Tiemey 1986, 11). By classifying amici
according to the bases of their membership characteristics we can identify the myriad
groups participating at this stage in the judicial process. The organizational
classification o f amici is a slightly modified version o f the type offered by Caldeira
and Wright (1990). Table 6 displays the classification scheme used in the analysis.

15 The organizations that Caldeira and Wright (1990) included in their classification
scheme were as follows: Individuals, Corporations, U.S. Government, States,
Counties, Municipalities, Other Government Groups, Charitable/Community, Public
Interest Law Firms, Citizen/Public Interest/Advocacy, Business/Trade/Professional
Associations, Unions, Peak Associations, and Other Groups.
16 For examples see Bradley and Gardner 1985; Olson 1965; O’Neill 1985; Salisbury
1969, 1984, 1987; Schattschneider 1960; Schlozman and Tiemey 1986; and Walker
1983.
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Table 6
Organizational Classification o f Groups

Type o f Organization

Examples

1. Corporation
2.
United States
3.
State
4.
County
5.
Municipality
6.
Other
7. Charitable or community’ organization

Mobile Oil
U.S. Solicitor General
State o f Alaska
Kalamazoo County, MI
City of Azusa, California
Congress. Black Caucus
March o f Dimes, Girl
Scouts o f America
Pension Rights Center,
Pacific Legal Foundation
Americans for
Democratic Action,
National Gay Rights
Advocates, NAACP
Americans Bankers
Association, Associated
General Contractors,
American Federation o f
Teachers, United Mine
Workers,
AFL-CIO, Chamber o f
Commerce
Hills College, UCLA
Baptist Church, Ute
Indian Tribe

8. Public interest law firm or policy/research group
9. Citizen/public interest/advocacy group

10. Business, trade, or professional organization

11. Union

12. Peak Association
13. Educational Groups, Institutions
14. Other

Note: Table as presented by Caldeira and Wright (1990, 791). My classification
scheme, however, is modified as follows: I excluded individuals from the analysis
and added a category for educational groups and institutions given the nature o f the
affirmative action policy domain.
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A variety o f typologies could have been used. Some o f the typological
schemes in the literature would either not provide a refined enough basis to capture
the diversity o f interests, or they would oversimplify what seems to be diverse
interests lobbying the court. For example, I could have classified groups according to
types o f benefits they provide to members. Organizing groups in this way would
cloud the analysis, as groups provide a mix o f incentives for their members (Moe
1980). Classifying groups according to the types o f policies they pursue or their
ideological orientation would be difficult as well because such a scheme may be too
sensitive to particular years and particular courts (Caldeira and Wright 1990). Also, if
we wish to make any generalizations about the behavior o f organized participation
before the Court, we want to construct a classification scheme as broadly as possible.
Dividing groups according to their purpose (e.g., religious, educational, etc.) may not
be refined enough to capture the diversity o f organized participants. And dividing
groups according to their issue-niches does not provide mutually exclusive categories.
Further, dividing groups into liberal and conservative camps would split generally
into amici supporting the respondent versus the petitioner (see O ’Connor and Epstein
1983).
Caldeira and Wright hypothesized that institutional groups (i.e., corporations
and public interest law firms) are more likely to be active during the merit stage than
“position-taking” citizen/advocacy groups because the latter is more concerned with
organizational membership than the former types o f groups. Since institutional groups
do not have to satisfy the diverse membership o f their organizations, they also have
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greater flexibility in choosing coalitional partners. However, they do not take into
account the organizational characteristics (such as staff size and organizational
vitality, measured in years active) that may lend themselves to engaging in coalitional
activity. This will be explored more systematically in subsequent chapters. However,
I will briefly summarize the frequency rates o f participation as either solo filers or in
coalitions below. Since cases are more visible when the Court decides to grant
plenary review and since groups have more time to prepare briefs once cases are on
the Court’s docket, not to mention that the stakes are much higher, I expect a diverse
lot of organizations to participate as amici.
The analysis o f amicus participation is based on data collected on all
affirmative action cases granted plenary review between 1971 and 1995. The data
come from the Records and Briefs on microfiche (Griggs to Weber) and housed on
the Lexis-Nexis website 17 (from Fullilove to Adarand). The sample consists o f 22
cases and 884 amicus filers representing groups of all organizational stripes. 18 For all
cases I coded whether the amicus participants filed solo briefs or participated in a
coalition. Also, I coded all amicus participants according to their base of membership.
The groups are divided into the number o f distinct organizations participating as
amici, as well as the total number of amici across all cases. 19 Table 7 displays the

17 <http ://www. lexis-nexis.com/universe>
18 a host of groups filed amicus briefs in more than one case. Later in this chapter I
will address these “repeat players.”
19 Of course, that the total number o f amici within an organizational category will be
greater than the total number o f distinct organizations because numerous groups
participated in multiple cases.
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Table 7
Frequency o f Types o f Groups Participating in All Affirmative Action Cases*

Type

Corporation
Government**
U.S.
State
County
Municipality
Other Govt. Group

Frequency

9
(170)
12
118
2
21
17

Percent

1.1
(21-2)
1.5
14.7
0.2
3.0
2.0

Charitable

37

5.0

Public Law

119

14.8

Citizen

249

31.0

Business, Professional

81

10.1

Union

39

4.9

Peak Association

10

1.2

Educational

57

7.1

Other

31

3.9

Totals

802

100.5

Note: *82 individuals filed amicus briefs either as solo filers or in coalitions with
other groups. Individuals participating as amici are excluded from the subsequent
analyses. ** The category “Government” is an aggregation o f all national, state, local,
and other types o f governmental groups. Total percentage is not equal to 100 due to
rounding.
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frequencies o f participation for all amici across the 14 categories o f participants. In an
examination o f the distributions for total amici and distinct organizations across all of
the 14 categories, as expected, groups o f all stripes participated as amici throughout
all the cases. Citizen and public interest groups participated more frequently than any
other organizational type. Nearly a third (31 percent) o f all distinct participants in the
affirmative action cases come from citizen and public interest organizations. Public
interest law firms are the second highest group of participants (nearly 15 percent).
Aggregating all government level organizations, we find that about 21 percent
o f the participants represented various governmental interests. Standing alone,
however, state governments participated in greater numbers (14.7 percent) than their
counterparts in the federal government (1.5 percent), and other local and county
governments. Business, trade, and professional organizations accounted for 10.1
percent o f all amicus participants. Corporations (1.1 percent), unions (4.9 percent),
and peak associations (1.2 percent) had surprisingly low levels o f amicus
participation vis-a-vis citizen and public interest law firms.
General Overview of Group Participation

At this point I turn my attention to an examination o f the frequency o f groups
participating and the number o f briefs filed in each case, as well as frequency o f
coalitional activity. Table 8 showcases this sketch of the groups participating as amici
in affirmative action cases. The table includes the number o f amicus curiae briefs
filed within each case, as well as the number o f amicus filers and coalitions. What
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Table 8
Frequencies o f Organizational Participation for All Affirmative Action Cases

Case

Outcome

Briefs

Groups

Griggs (1971)
Defunis (1974)
Morton (1974)
Albemarle (1975)
Franks (1976)
Bakke{ 1978)
Furnco (1978)
Weber(\91%)
Fullilove (1980)
Gen. Building (1982)
Mayor (1984)
Stotts (1984)
Wygant (1986)
Local 28 (1986)
Local 93 (1986)
Paradise (1987)
Johnson (1987)
Richmond (1989)
Wards Cove (1989)
Martin (1989)
Metro (1990)
Adarand (1995)

pro
moot
pro
pro
pro
pro
con
pro
pro
con
pro
con
con
pro
pro
pro
pro
con
con
con
pro
con

5
24
2
4
3
44
2
29
16
5
2
15
23
12
16
6
11
19
9
7
20
20

5
60
4
4
3
117
3
97
29
5
2
65
71
45
57
23
43
65
14
52
34
58

0
7
1
0
0
19
1
12
7
0
0
5
7
6
7
3
6
8
2
4
4
9

.00
.88
.50
.00
.00
.84
.67
.88
.76
.00
.00
.92
.90
.87
.90
.87
.86
.88
.86
.92
.88
.84

294

802

108

.87

Totals (13 pro; 8 con;; 1 moot)

Coalitions

Index

does the picture o f coalitional activity among organizations look like over time? The
last column reports a coalition index, which is an index based on the number o f briefs
and groups participating in each case. This index is calculated by dividing the number
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o f coalitions for each case by the number o f organizations participating. From there I
subtracted this number from one. This index helps to showcase the over time trends
o f the proportion o f groups that engage in coalitional activity.
In some cases (Griggs, Albemarle, General Building, and Mayor) all o f the
amicus participants were solo filers, with no groups participating in a coalition. Other
cases enlisted a considerable number o f coalitions relevant to the number o f groups
and briefs filed. Stotts (.92), Wygant (.90), and Martin (.92) had the highest
proportion of coalitional activity. The coalition index tells us that in affirmative
action cases where more then five amici participated, amici are more likely to engage
in coalitional activity. That is, in 15 out o f 22 cases where more than five filers
participated as amicus curiae, the coalition index ranged from .76 to .92. Also, since
the Stotts case of 1984, there seems to be a general trend o f both high and consistent
levels o f coalitional participation among organized interests. Moreover, when
organized groups get involved in affirmative action cases, they more likely to join
coalitions. The cases that have the highest level o f coalitional participation come from
the “major” and more high profile affirmative action cases, which form the corpus o f
constitutional doctrine regarding affirmative action. The general trend o f group
activity suggests that they are participating in coalitions with more consistency and
frequency over time. A total of 294 amicus briefs were filed across all affirmative
action cases and there were a total o f 802 amicus filers, excluding individuals.
Table 9 displays the frequency o f amicus participation by organization type
and displays the percentage o f participation (in parentheses) as both solo filer and as
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Table 9
Frequency o f Amicus Participation by Organization Type

Type

Solo Filer

Coalition

Corporation

4 (44.4)

5 (55.6)

9

Government
U.S.

9 (75.0)

3 (25.0)

12

112(94.9)

118

Total

State

6(5.1)

County

0 (0.0)

Municipality

7 (33.3)

14(66.7)

21

Other Govt. Group

6(35.3)

11 (64.7)

17

Charitable

2 (5.4)

35 (94.6)

37

Public Law

28 (23.5)

91 (76.5)

119

Citizen

44(17.7)

205 (82.3)

249

Business, Professional

25 (30.9)

56 (69.1)

81

Union

11 (28.2)

28 (71.8)

39

7 (70.0)

3 (30.0)

10

17(29.8)

40 (70.2)

57

Other

3 (9.7)

28 (90.3)

31

Totals

169 (21.0)

Peak Association
Educational

2 (100.0)

633 (79.0)

2

802(100)

Note: Chi-square (13 d.f.) = 75.845; prob. = .000 (2-tailed);
Solo Filers = 169 (21 percent); Filers Participating in Coalitions = 633 (79 percent).
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part o f a coalition. Out o f the 802 amicus filers participating across all affirmative
action cases, 169 (21 percent) participated as solo filers, while 633 (79 percent)
participated in concert with other groups in the form o f a coalition. The first column,
labeled “solo filer,” presents the frequency o f group participation acting alone, while
the second column showcases the number of times these groups participated as amici
in a coalition with other groups. O f the most active participants before the Court on
affirmative action cases, citizen groups participated in coalitions approximately 82
percent o f the time, while public law groups and business and professional groups
participated in coalitions approximately 77 percent and 69 percent o f the time,
respectively. Corporations (56 percent) and peak associations (30 percent)
participated in coalitions with less frequency than all organizational types, excluding
some government groups. Among governmental groups, states almost uniformly
participated in coalitional efforts (approximately 95 percent o f the time). Some o f the
high percentages o f either solo filer participation or coalitional activity (county
governments, U.S. government, and peak associations) may be artifacts o f the lower
frequency o f participation across all cases. Is organizational type significantly related
to coalitional behavior? The large chi-square statistic indicates that there is a
significant difference in the kind o f participation (either as a solo filer or in a
coalition) between the organizational types. The very low probability indicates that it
is quite unlikely that the kind of participation before the Court and organizational
type are independent in the population.
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Table 10 lists the frequency o f support for the petitioners and respondents by
organizational type. To simplify this scheme, I coded whether groups supported
affirmative action or whether they filed briefs in opposition to affirmative action. On
the whole, 81.3 percent (631 groups) supported the affirmative action policies being
addressed by the Court, while 18.7 percent (145 groups) participated in filing briefs
against affirmative action. Aggregating all o f the governmental groups together, we
find that about 89 percent o f the participation on behalf o f national, state, and local
governments were in support o f affirmative action. Most o f the participation by
government groups was on behalf of state governments in support o f affirmative
action policies brought before the Court. Interestingly enough, participation by the
national government fell on the side o f opposition to affirmative action policies and
practices argued before the Court. To a considerable extent this reflects the position
articulated by the respective presidential administration’s solicitor general, who not
only submitted briefs to the Court but who also participated in oral arguments before
the Court in some cases. Upon a closer inspection o f participation mounted by
presidential administrations over time, through the mouthpiece o f the solicitor
general, we find that all Democratic administrations lobbied pro affirmative action
(Carter and Clinton) while all Republican administrations participated in opposition
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Table 10
Frequency o f Support for Affirmative Action by Organizational Type

Type

Pro AA

Con AA

Total

Corporation

6 (75.0)

2 (25.0)

8

Government

148 (89.2)

18 (11.8)

166

2(16.7)

10(83.3)

12

U.S.

7 (5.9)

118

2 (100.0)

0 (0.0)

2

Municipal

2 0 (100.0)

0 (0.0)

20

Other Govt.

13 (92.9)

1(7-1)

14

Charitable

25 (67.6)

12(32.4)

37

Public Law

87 (75.0)

29 (25.0)

116

2 1 0 (86.1)

34(13.9)

244

Business, Professional

57 (80.3)

14(19.7)

71

Union

24 (63.2)

14 (36.8)

38

3 (30.0)

7 (70.0)

10

Educational

55 (96.5)

2 (3.5)

57

Other

16 (55.2)

13 (44.8)

29

Totals

631 (81.3)

145 (18.7)

776

State
County

Citizen

Peak Association

111 (94.1)

Chi-square (13 d.f.) =108.860; prob. = .000 (2-tailed).
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to affirmative action (Nixon, Ford, Reagan, and Bush).20 O f the non-governmental
groups, educational and citizen-based groups participated with the most frequency in
support o f affirmative action programs being challenged in the Court. Aside from the
category o f “Other” groups in the classification scheme, which is a hodge-podge of
groups representing churches and fraternal organizations, peak associations and
unions garnered the most in terms o f opposition to affirmative action policies being
argued before the Court. Peak associations opposed affirmative action 70 percent of
the time, while unions were virtually identical to charitable organizations in their
opposition to affirmative action.
Although there seems to be an overwhelming difference in the aggregate for
groups supporting and opposing affirmative action programs, it is important to
examine the extent o f group participation within each case argued before the Court. Is
organizational type significantly related to supporting affirmative action policies
being argued before the Court? The large chi-square statistic listed in the table
indicates that there is a significant difference in the aggregate for organizations
supporting affirmative action (labeled “Pro AA”).
Moreover, the aggregate summary o f support for affirmative action policies
argued before the Court is lopsided in favor o f affirmative action policies (81.3

20 In Chapter V I will more thoroughly explore solicitor general participation before
the Court across all affirmative action cases.
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percent to 18.7 percent), indicating that organizational groups are more likely to
support affirmative action in the cases presented before the Court.21

Summary o f Affirmative Action Law in Selected Cases

We now turn to a brief description o f some o f the major affirmative action
cases, the legal questions the Court has been asked to address, as well as a summary
of group participation within these cases. I elect to discuss these particular cases due
to the fact that within these cases we find the most active participation mounted by
organized groups. What does affirmative action law look like? What types o f groups
participate in these cases? Since the outcomes of Supreme Court cases have
implications beyond the petitioners and the respondents, we should expect to see
diverse participation as measured by the organization classification outlined earlier.
Below I briefly describe some o f the major affirmative action cases. The following
cases form the corpus o f affirmative action case law. After the description is spelled
out, I summarize the extent o f group participation within each o f the cases where
there was a noticeable concentration o f participation on the part o f organized groups.

2 1 Although the chi-square statistic is significant we must remember that larger
sample sizes tend to conflate the differences between categories, even when those
differences appear to be small. Moreover, small differences between the groups can
be statistically significant.
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Defunis et al. v. Odegaard et al. (1974)

The first major affirmative action case to reach the Court was Defunis.
Despite having received higher test scores than some o f the minority admittees at the
University o f Washington Law School, Defunis was denied admission to the law
school. Upon challenging the university’s admission policy, Defunis asked a trial
court to require the school to admit him. On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court
reversed the trial court’s decision and upheld the university’s decision to deny
Defunis admission. The U.S. Supreme Court considered the case as Defunis was
entering his final year of school. In a 5-4 per curiam opinion, the Court held that the
case in question was moot because the University o f Washington Law School had
agreed to allow Defunis to enroll and to earn a diploma. Although the Court did not
spell out the jurisprudential contours o f affirmative action in this case, the deeply
divided Court (5-4) in Defunis later set the stage and opened the floodgates for
subsequent affirmative action cases.
University o f California Regents v. Bakke (1978)
Perhaps the most well known affirmative action case is Bakke (1978). The
Bakke case presented to the Court the question o f whether or not the University o f
California violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause and the Civil
Rights Act o f 1964, by practicing an affirmative action policy that resulted in the
rejection o f Bakke’s application for admission to its medical school. Bakke, a white
medical school applicant, sued the University o f California Davis Medical School,
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even though his GPA, MCAT scores and benchmark scores were significantly higher
than the minority and non-minority admittees. He filed a request for an injunction,
claiming he was denied admission on the basis o f race, which was in violation o f the
equal protection clause. The Court ruled that the University had the burden o f proof,
and thus failing, ordered Bakke’s admission to the program.
The decision was divisive and while there was no single majority opinion for
the Court, four o f the justices (Burger, Rehnquist, Stewart, and Stevens) argued that
any racial quota system supported by the government violated the Civil Rights Act of
1964, and four justices (White, Blackmun, Marshall, and Brennan) held that the use
of race as a criterion in admissions decisions was constitutionally permissible. In the
final analysis, Powell cast the deciding vote and joined Burger, Rehnquist, Stewart,
and Stevens. The Court ruled that since there was no previous racial discrimination by
the University, the University’s special admissions program violated the equal
protection clause o f the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as the Civil Rights Act o f
1964. The Court also held that it is constitutionally permissible for universities to
consider race in their admissions policies in order to promote diversity, so long as
individual rights are protected. Powell cautioned, however, that promoting diversity
through affirmative action is a double-edged sword. That is, it may further remedial
purposes but it may also fuel racial hostility by promoting improper racial
stereotypes.
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United Steel Workers o f America v. Weber (19791

The United Steelworkers of America and the Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical
Corporation implemented an affirmative action-based training program in an effort to
increase the number o f the company’s black skilled craft workers. Through this
program, half o f the eligible positions were reserved for blacks. Weber, a white
employee, was passed over for the program and claimed that he was a victim o f
reverse discrimination. In Weber the Court addressed whether the United and Kaiser
Aluminum’s training schedule violated Title VII. The Court held that the training
scheme was legitimate because the 1964 Act “did not intend to prohibit the private
sector from taking effective steps” in order to implement its goals. The Court
reasoned the training program was consistent with the intent o f the act since the
intention o f the affirmative action-based training program was to eliminate old
patterns o f racial segregation in the hierarchy o f the company’s positions, while at the
same time not prohibiting white employees from advancing in the company.

Fullilove v. Klutznick (1980)

The facts o f the case in Fullilove centered around a statute Congress enacted
in 1977 requiring that at least ten percent o f federal funds granted for public works
projects be used to obtain services or supplies from minority owned businesses.
Fullilove and other contractors filed suit, claiming that they had been economically
harmed by the enforcement of the statute. The Court examined whether the provision
o f the statute for minority business enterprises violated the Equal Protection Clause.
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The Court held that the minority set-aside was a legitimate exercise o f congressional
power and that Congress could pursue the objectives of the minority business
enterprise program under the Spending Power. In the remedial context, the Court
argued that Congress did not have to act “in a wholly ‘color-blind’ fashion.”
Firefighters v. Stotts (19841

In Stotts, the Court addressed an employment conflict between the Memphis
City affirmative action policy and its seniority system. African American firefighters
filed a class-action suit claiming discrimination on the part of the city of Memphis in
its hiring and promotion practices and the city subsequently signed a consent decree
in an effort to increase the proportion o f African Americans in the city’s firefighters
department. However, in the face of a fiscal crisis, the city needed to lay off workers
and based its decision on who to lay off on its seniority system (the so-called “first
hired, first fired principle”). This practice would have a negative effect on the newly
hired African American firefighters. A federal district court modified the city’s
seniority system in an effort to preserve the affirmative action program. However, the
Supreme Court, by a 6-3 vote, held that the federal district court judge exceeded his
powers under Title VO. Justice White said that seniority systems are valid even if
they go against the grain o f affirmative action policies.
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Wygant v. Jackson Board o f Education (1986'): Local 28. Sheet Metal Workers’ v.
EEOC et al. (1986) and Local 93. International Association o f Firefighters.
AFL-CIO v. City o f Cleveland et al. (1986)

In 1986 the Court heard arguments in three affirmative action cases. Wygant
involved a collective-bargaining provision for race-based layoffs. Under the
collective-bargaining agreement between the Board of Education and a teacher’s
union, teachers with the most seniority would not be laid off. The agreement also
stipulated that it would not lay-off a percentage o f minority personnel that exceeded
the percentage o f minority personnel employed at the time o f a layoff. When the
school laid off some nonminority teachers, while keeping other minority teachers
with less seniority, Wendy Wygant, a laid off nonminority teacher, challenged the
layoff. In a 5-4 decision, the Court argued that Wygant’s layoff stemmed from her
race and therefore violated the Equal Protection Clause. The Court argued that when
the government embarked on affirmative action it had to justify racial classification
with a compelling state interest and to demonstrate that its chosen means were
tailored narrowly to its purpose. The Court also rejected the school’s layoff
preferences; the school incorrectly addressed injurious prior discriminatory hiring
practices since “denial o f a future employment opportunity [was] not as intrusive as
loss of an existing job.”
In Local 28 v. EEOC the Court held that Title VII did not prohibit courts from
ordering affirmative action race-conscious relief as a remedy for past discrimination.
Where employers or unions engaged in “persistent or egregious discrimination, or
where necessary to dissipate the lingering effects o f pervasive discrimination,” the
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Court noted that such relief was appropriate. The Court also entertained another case
involving a hiring and promotion scheme o f a union. In Local 93, the Court held that
a federal court could enforce a voluntary agreement to give minorities preferences in
hiring and promotion. The Court argued that under Title VII, a voluntary public
sector affirmative action plan is valid when it was issued by a consent decree from a
lower federal court. The same set o f state governments filed an amicus brief in a
coalition in both cases. The general trend o f organizational participation by public
interest law, citizen, and business and professional groups is evident in these cases.
Citizen groups participated with the most frequency (40 percent in Local 28 and 36.8
percent in Local 93).

United States v. Paradise (19871

In U.S. v. Paradise, the Court dealt with the issue o f whether an Alabama
Department o f Public Safety “one-black-for-one-white” promotion scheme violated
the Equal Protection Clause. In light o f a series o f NAACP-initiated lawsuits in the
1970s, the Alabama Department o f Public Safety was ordered to implement a
promotion scheme in which half o f the departm ent’s promotions would go to
qualified black officers. The Court upheld the promotion plan because it was
narrowly tailored promotion policy and did not bar whites from advancing to higher
positions within the department. Looking at the department’s record o f complying
with past judicial decisions, the Court noted that this promotion policy was required
“in light o f the Department’s long and shameful record of delay and resistance.”
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Johnson v. Transportation Agency (1987)

In Johnson the Court examined a case based on gender. Two candidates were
qualified and the Agency hired the woman. Was the Agency impermissibly taking
account o f gender o f the applicants? In a 6-3 decision, the Court affirmed the
promotion plan arguing that it was not unreasonable to consider gender as one factor
among many in making promotion decisions, and that the promotion scheme did not
erect an absolute barrier to the promotion o f men.

City o f Richmond v. J.A. Croson Company (1989)

Striking a blow to affirmative action procedures in the arena of awarding
contracts to minority business enterprises, the Court in Richmond argued that
generalizations o f past racial discrimination could not justify “rigid” racial quotas for
awarding public contracts. In her opinion for the Court, O ’Connor argued that the 30
percent quota adopted by the City Council o f Richmond, Virginia could not be tied to
“any injury suffered by anyone” and was an impermissible employment o f a suspect
classification. O ’Connor also reasoned that allowing claims o f past discrimination to
serve as a basis for racial quotas would subvert constitutional values. “The dream o f a
Nation o f equal citizens in a society where race is irrelevant to personal opportunity
and achievement would be lost in a mosaic o f shifting preferences based on
inherently unmeasurable claims o f past wrongs.”
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Martin v. Wilks 119891

Martin v. Wilks examined whether employees could challenge consent decrees
regarding affirmative action by a federal district court. The ruling made it easier for
employees to challenge the constitutional basis o f affirmative action promotion
schemes instituted by employers. As a result o f a lawsuit in 1974, the Jefferson
County Personnel Board o f Birmingham, Alabama entered into consent decrees that
included hiring and promoting blacks as firefighters. A white firefighter, Robert K.
Wilks, challenged the decrees and claimed that whites were being denied promotions
in favor of less qualified blacks. Wilks argued that these practices violated Title VII.
The Board argued that although it was making race-conscious decisions it was acting
on the basis o f the court ordered decrees. The Court sided with Wilks and held that he
had a right to challenge the previously established decrees. Because “a person cannot
be deprived o f his legal rights in a proceeding to which he is not a party,” the white
firefighters were not prevented from challenging employment decisions instituted on
the basis of consent decrees. Further, the Court reasoned that no one “can seriously
contend that an employer might successfully defend against a Title VII claim by one
group of employees on the ground that its actions were required by an earlier decree
entered in a suit brought against it by another, if the later group did not have adequate
notice or knowledge o f the earlier suit.”
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Metro Broadcasting. Inc. v. FCC et al. (1990)
The case o f Metro (decided concurrently with Astroline Communications Co.
v. Shurberg Broadcasting)^2 challenged the constitutionality o f two minority
preference policies o f the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). The first
policy centered on preferences given to minority applicants for broadcast licenses, all
other things being equal. Shurberg Broadcasting o f Hartford Incorporated challenged
the second policy, referred to as the “distress sale.” This policy allowed broadcasters
in danger of losing their licenses to sell their stations to minority buyers before the
FCC formally ruled on the violation o f the troubled stations. The Faith Center Inc.
made a “distress sale” o f its television license to a minority owned company owned
by Astroline. Shurberg, a non-minority applicant for a similar license, challenged the
FCC’s approval o f Faith Center’s sale to Astroline. The Court examined the FCC’s
minority preference policies. In a 5-4 decision, they said that the FCC’s minority
preference policies were constitutional because they provided appropriate remedies
for discrimination victims and were aimed at the advancement o f legitimate
congressional efforts to promote diversity in the broadcasting industry. More
specifically, the Court reasoned that the FCC’s polices were narrowly tailored to meet
the legitimate congressional demands o f fostering diversity in this industry. Also, the
availability of program diversity sales served the interests not only o f minorities, who

- - Astroline Communication Co. v. Shurberg, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
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have historically been victims of discrimination in this industry, but also of the
viewing and listening public. Finally, the Court argued that the minority-based
preference policies did not unduly burden non-minority broadcast businesses.
Undeniably the facts o f this case would seem to elicit participation on the part o f
corporate interests.
Adarand Constructors v. Pena (1995)

The last case in the analysis is Adarand (1995). In a deeply divided decision,
the Court in Adarand overruled its decision in Metro. In this case Adarand, a
contractor specializing in highway guardrail work, submitted the lowest bid as a
subcontractor for part o f a project funded by the U.S. Department o f Transportation.
Under the federal contract, the primary contractor would receive additional
compensation if it hired small businesses controlled by “socially and economically
disadvantaged individuals.” The clause stipulated that “the contractor shall presume
that socially and economically disadvantaged individuals include Black Americans,
Hispanic American, Native Americans, Asian Pacific Americans, and other
minorities...” However, another subcontractor, Gonzales Construction Company, was
awarded the work because it was certified as a minority business while Adarand was
not. The Court was asked to consider whether the presumption o f disadvantage based
on race alone and subsequent allocation o f favored treatment on that basis was a
discriminatory practice violating the Fifth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. In
its response the Court ruled that this presumption did violate the Equal Protection
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Clause o f the Fifth Amendment. The Court held that all racial classifications, whether
imposed by federal, state, or local authorities, must pass “strict scrutiny review.” That
is, they “must serve a compelling government interest, and must be narrowly tailored
to further that interest.” The Court reasoned that race is not a sufficient condition for a
presumption o f disadvantage and the award o f favored treatment, all race-based
classifications must be judged under the strict scrutiny standard. Even more strictly,
the Court announced that proof o f past injury does not in and o f itself establish the
suffering o f present or future injury.

Summary o f Group Participation in Selected Affirmative Action Cases
In this section I summarize group participation within the major affirmative
action cases. Table 11 displays the frequency o f amicus participation by type of
organization within each case.

Organized Participation in Defunis et al. v. Odegaard et al. (1974)

Although the Defunis case was rendered moot, it received considerable
attention in both support and opposition to affirmative action by a host o f organized
interests. A total o f 60 amici participated in this case and 24 amicus briefs were filed.
In this case we see a diversity o f interests participating in filing amicus briefs. State,
charitable, public law, citizen, business and professional, unions, peak associations,
educational, and “other” groups all filed briefs. Citizen and educational groups led the
way in participation, constituting just over half o f the participants by organizational
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Table 11
Frequency o f A m icus Participation by Type o f O rganization in Selected Cases

Bakke
Type
Defunis
C orp.
U.S.
3.4(4)
State
1.7(1)
C ounty
0.9(1)
O ther
11.7(7) 8.5 (10)
Charity
Pub. Law
10.0 (6) 12.0(14)
33.3 (20) 24.8(29)
Citizen
Business
5.0 (3) 13.7(16)
6.7 (4)
6.8 (8)
Union
Peak
3.3 (2)
0.9(1)
Educ.
21.7(13) 22.2 (26)

Weber Fullilove

Stotts
1.5(1)

1.0(1)
3.1 (3)
5.2 (5)
16.5 (16)
47.4 (46)
10.3(10)
12.4(12)

3-4(1)
10.3 (3)
24.1 (7)
31.0 (9)
20.7(6)
3-4(1)

3-1 (3)

3-4(1)

1-5(1)
1.5(1)
4.6 (3)
21.5 (14)
40.0 (26)
15.4(10)
3.2 (2)
15(1)
7.7 (5)

Type
Local 93 Paradise Johnson Richmond
Martin
Corp.
4.6 (3)
2.3(1)
1.5(1)
U.S.
State
17.5 (10) 39.1 (9) 23.3 (10) 26.2(17) 63.5 (33)
C ounty
7.0 (3)
1.9(1)
5-3 (3) 17.4 (4)
3-1 (2)
4.7 (2)
O ther
1.9(1)
1.5(1)
C harity
3.1 (2)
Pub. Law 26.3 (15)
13.0 (3) 18.6 (8) 15.4(11) 19.2(10)
Citizen
36.8(21) 30.4 (7) 34.9(15) 23.1 (15) 11.5 (6)
Business
8.8 (5)
7.7 (5)
Union
5.3 (3)
2.3 (1)
1.9(1)
Peak
2.3 (1)
3.1 (2)
Educ.

Wygant

Local 28

1.4(1)
9-9 (7) 22.2(10)
1.4(1)
8.8 (4)
2.8 (2)
4.2 (3)
11.3 (8)
13.3 (6)
35.2 (25) 40.0(18)
4.2 (3)
11.1(5)
4.2 (3)
4.4(2)
12.7 (9)
Metro
14.7 (5)
5.9 (2)

5.9 (2)
8.8 (3)
29.4 (10)
26.5 (9)
8.8 (3)

Adarand
1.7(1)
27.6 (16)
1.7(1)
3.4 (2)
1.7(1)
10.3 (6)
17.2(10)
34.5 (20)

Note: C ounty includes county and municipal governm ents. T he category “O ther” is
excluded from this table due to the sm all number o f these organizations participating
across the cases.
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type. Here we start to see the diversity thesis come into play. That is, we find
participation before the Court on the part o f groups not necessarily associated with
the groups that the parties to the suit represent.

Organized Participation in University o f California Regents v. Bakke (1978)

In Bakke we see a flood o f groups attempting to influence the Court. O f all the
affirmative action cases surveyed in this analysis, Bakke saw the highest frequency o f
participation in all the measures o f group activity outlined earlier. The number o f
briefs filed (44), as well as the number o f groups participating (117) and coalitions
(19), is the highest number across all cases. Approximately 25 percent o f all amici in
this case came from citizen and public interest groups, most o f which lobbied the
Court in favor o f affirmative action. Business, trade, and professional groups made up
13.7 percent, and public interest law firms constituted 12 percent o f all amici.
Governmental participation rates were rather low in this case compared to other
similar cases. Noticeably absent from the list o f all organization types are
corporations. Undoubtedly, we would expect to see participation mounted on the part
o f educational groups, and the data bear this out (22.2 percent o f the amicus
participants was on the part of groups representing the educational community).
However, we also see participation on the part o f state governments (3.4 percent),
county and municipal governments (0.9 percent), charitable groups (8.5 percent),
public law groups (12 percent), citizen groups (24.8 percent), business and

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

78
professional groups (13.7 percent), unions and peak associations (7.7 percent), and
“other” miscellaneous groups (6.8 percent).

Organized Participation in United Steel Workers o f America v. Weber (1979)
Not unlike Bakke, in terms o f the extent o f group participation, we see a
concerted effort on the part o f groups o f all organizational stripes to attempt to
influence the outcome o f the decision. A total of 29 briefs were filed in this case and
upward o f about 100 groups participated in the form o f amici. In Weber, A l A percent
o f all amici come from citizen and public interest organizations. Public interest law
firms accounted for nearly 17 percent o f all participating amici. In line with the
expectation that the organizational nature o f the parties to the suit will structure the
types o f groups pressing their claims on the Court as amici, we find that in Weber
there is a higher rate o f participation by unions (12.4 percent) when compared to the
aggregate participation by unions across all cases (4.5 percent).
Interestingly, we see very little participation on the part o f governmental
groups. In subsequent cases, however, we will find a growing trend o f governmental
groups at all levels to be a staple o f participants in affirmative action cases. Among
non-govemmental types o f organizations, all types participated in this case with the
exception o f peak associations.
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Organized Participation in Fullilove v. Klutznick (1980)

In Fullilove, we find that 29 amicus filers participated and 16 briefs were
filed. Citizen/public interest groups and public interest law firms account for
approximately 55 percent o f all amicus participants. Business and professional groups
also figured prominently in their rate o f participation among all organized groups,
making up about 19 percent o f all amicus filers.

Organized Participation in Firefighters v. Stotts (1984)

In Stotts amici participated from 111 out o f the 14 categories. In this case
there were 65 filers and 15 briefs. Citizen based organizations netted the most
participation in this case (40 percent) and public interest law firms made up almost 22
percent o f all amici in this case. Ten business and professional filers participated in
this case making up about 15 percent o f all amici filed and educational groups made
up almost 8 percent o f all amici. Although we would expect a higher frequency of
union participation in this case, only two union amici participated in this case along
with only one filer representing a peak association.

Organized Participation in Wygant v. Jackson Board o f Education (1986): Local 28.
Sheet Metal Workers’ v. EEOC et al. (1986) and Local 93. International Association
of Firefighters. AFL-CIO v. City of Cleveland et al. (1986)

In Wygant we find that 71 filers lobbied the Court as amicus curiae and a total
of 71 briefs were filed. Participation in Wygant was widespread among the different
organizational types. Among non-govemmental groups, all but peak associations

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

80
participated as amici, with citizen groups mounting the most frequent rate of
participation (35.2 percent). Not surprisingly, given the nature o f the dispute before
the Court, educational groups participated with the second most frequency among
non-governmental types o f groups (approximately 13 percent). Seven state attorney
generals participated in this case as a coalition.
In the three cases o f 1986 we start to see a trend in the consistency o f
participation among state and municipal governments. Public law and citizen groups
continue to be a staple o f the groups participating in affirmative action cases. Citizen
groups constituted approximately 35 percent o f the organizational participants in
Wygant, 40 percent in Local 28, and approximately 37 percent in Local 93. O f all
non-governmental groups, all organizational types, with the exception o f peak
associations, participated in these three cases.
Organized Participation in United States v. Paradise (1987)

In Paradise, six amicus briefs were filed and 23 amicus filers participated.
Paradise did not elicit the diversity o f participation on the part o f different
organizational types. However, state participation garnered the bulk o f participation at
about 38 percent, with citizen groups (approximately 39 percent) and county and
municipalities (about 17 percent) rounding out the second and third most active types
of organizations.
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Organized Participation in Johnson v. Transportation Agency (19871

A total o f 43 amicus filers participated in Johnson and 11 amicus briefs were
filed. A flurry o f organizations participated in this case. Once again, citizen groups
accounted for the highest rate of participation among all groups at approximately 35
percent. Public law groups netted the second highest rate o f participation among non
governmental groups (approximately 19 percent). Business and professional groups
did not file any briefs in this case, which seems to be the exception to the general
trend o f consistent participation before the Court in affirmative action cases. Among
governmental groups, a total of ten states participated in this case as a coalition.

Organized Participation in City o f Richmond v. J.A. Croson Company (1989)

Upwards o f 65 amicus filers participated in this case, which contributed to a
total o f 19 amicus curiae briefs. Groups o f all organizational stripes, with the
exception o f unions and peak associations, participated in this case in some capacity.
State governments accounted for the highest rate o f participation among all organized
groups (26.2 percent) with 15 states filing as one coalition, along with the
Corporation Counsel o f the District o f Columbia, and both Michigan and Maryland
Attorney Generals filing individual briefs on the same side as the larger coalition o f
states. Among non-governmental groups citizen groups (23.1 percent) and public law
groups (15.4 percent) were the most frequent participants filing briefs. Also in this
case we see that a few corporations filed briefs and all o f them filed on the pro
affirmative action side. However, after having surveyed the landscape o f participation
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across all affirmative action cases, corporate interests hardly mounted any concerted
participation insofar as filing amicus briefs. Not since 1975, in the Albemarle case,
did we see even a hint o f participation on the part o f any corporations. However,
participation by corporations in this case amounted to only three briefs for a total o f
only 4.6 percent o f amicus participation.

Organized Participation in Martin v. Wilks (1989)

In this case, only seven briefs were filed but over 52 amicus filers participated
in four coalitions. In Martin we do not see the diversity o f participation that we see in
most o f the affirmative action cases since Stotts. Thirty-three state governments,
which constitute over 60 percent o f the participation in this case, participated as
amici, all o f whom participated in a coalition in support o f the affirmative action
policy being challenged before the Court. Among non-governmental groups, public
law groups participated with the most frequency (19.2 percent), while citizen groups
constituted 11.5 percent of the total amicus participation. Interestingly, given the facts
o f the case, we do not see any concerted efforts on the part o f unions or peak
associations to shape the constitutional landscape on this case.
Organized Participation in Metro Broadcasting. Inc. v. FCC et al. (1990)

In this case a total o f 34 amicus filers participated and 20 briefs were filed. As
the data show, corporate interests play a larger role in this case than the previous
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cases.

23 Corporations amounted to almost 15 percent of the amicus participants.

Again we see the prominence of participation on the part of public law groups (29.4
percent) and citizen groups (26.5 percent). The diversity of participation in this case
was relatively slim, with no participation on the part o f states, counties, and
municipalities, for governmental organizations, and no participation from unions,
peak associations, and educational groups.
Organized Participation in Adarand Constructors v. Pena C19951

Participation in this case reflects the general trend o f both diverse and
concentrated participation among most o f the organizations. A total o f 58 filers
participated as amici in this case and 20 amicus briefs were filed. Business and
professional groups scored the highest rate o f participation among all groups (34.5
percent), while among governmental groups, states accounted for the highest
percentage o f participation (almost 30 p e r c e n t ) . 24

23 Although in Albemarle (1975) 25 percent o f the amicus participants represented
corporate interests, only 1 group participated and seems to conflate the concentration
o f group participation based on a small number o f filers (a total o f only four
participants).
24 The following is a brief breakdown o f participation in other affirmative action
cases. In contrast to the cases summarized previously, other cases did not elicit
diverse and concentrated participation o f organizational groups. In Griggs (1971),
Morton (1974), Albemarle (1975), Franks (1976), Furnco (1978), General Building
Contractors (1982), and Mayor (1984), only a total o f 22 briefs combined were filed.
In these cases we see few groups participating and the number o f groups and
concentration o f coalitional activity (measured by the coalition index discussed
earlier) is quite low. The relative scarcity o f groups participating as amici in these
cases, as well as the lack o f diversity in participation across the board relative to the
other cases, goes against the grain o f the trend toward concentrated and diverse
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Table 12 provides an example o f the organizations participating in Adarand.
In this particular case, those groups supporting the petitioner are against the
affirmative action policy the Court is being asked to address, while those supporting
the respondent are in favor o f the policy. The last group o f organizations participating
in this case filed an amicus brief but did not indicate a particular preference for the
outcome o f the case. In fact, this pro affirmative action coalition o f women’s business
organizations filed for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae. The
Court denied their petition. In the opinion o f the Court, these groups are simply listed
as having filed amicus briefs.25
The participation mounted by organizations in Adarand (1995) is a good
example o f the trends in the types o f groups participating as well as the extent o f
participation in general and coalitional activity in particular. For one, 15 states along
with the Acting Corporation Counsel for the District o f Columbia filed together in a
coalition. This coalitional activity reflects the general trend o f states acting in concert.
Also, we see a diverse lot o f organizations participating in this case and a high
proportion o f filers participating together through coalitions.

participation established in cases like Defunis (1974) and Bakke (1978) but
subsequently more consistent since Stotts (1984).
25 I have included an appendix that displays a breakdown o f all organizational
participants within each affirmative action case.
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Table 12
Organizations Participating in Adarand Constructors v. Pena (1995)

Briefs in Support o f Petitioner
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Coalition

Associated General Contractors o f America, Inc.
Atlantic Legal Foundation
Federalist Society, Ohio State University College o f Law Chapter
Pacific Legal Foundation
Washington Legal Foundation
Equality in Enterprise Opportunities Association, Inc.

Briefs in Support o f Respondent
Coalition

Coalition
Coalition
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Coalition

Attorney General of Maryland
Attorney General of Arizona
Attorney General of Connecticut
Attorney General of Hawaii
Attorney General of Illinois
Attorney General of Indiana
Attorney General of Massachusetts
Attorney General of Minnesota
Attorney General of New Mexico
Attorney General of New York
Attorney General of North Carolina
Attorney General of Ohio
Attorney General of Oregon
Attorney General of Washington
Attorney General of Wisconsin
Acting Corporation Counsel for the District o f Columbia
Coalition for Economic Equity
Mid-Peninsula Minority Contractors Association
Congressional Asian Pacific American Caucus
National Urban League
Congressional Black Caucus
Equality in Enterprise Opportunities Association, Inc.
Latin American Management Association
Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law
American Civil Liberties Union
Women's Legal Defense Fund
National Women's Law Center
National Council of La Raza
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Table 12— Continued

Briefs in Support of Respondent
Coalition

Coalition

Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Coalition

Minority Business Enterprise Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc.
National Minority Supplier Development Council, Inc.
National Black Chamber o f Commerce, Inc.
National Association o f Minority Contractors
Minority Media and Telecommunications Council
League o f United Latin American Citizens
Office o f Communication o f the United Church of Christ
National Hispanic Media Coalition
Communications Task Force
National Association o f Black Owned Broadcasters
American Hispanic Owned Radio Association
Emerging Telecommunications Entrepreneurs Association
National Association for the Advancement o f Colored People
National Coalition o f Minority Businesses
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.
National Association o f Minority Businesses
National Bar Association et al.
Council o f 100-An Organization o f Black Republicans, Inc.

Briefs o f Amici Curiae Taking No Position for the Petitioner or Respondent
Coalition

Maryland Women Business Entrepreneurs Association
National Association o f Women Business Owners
Illinois Association o f Women Contractors and Entrepreneurs
WBE Line, Inc.
Federation o f Women Contractors & Women’s Business Development
Center

Repeat Player Status o f Amici
Do certain types o f organizations participate more frequently in affirmative
action cases than others? Is there any pattern to organizational participation over
time? A variety o f scholars have examined “repeat players” before the Court
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(Dolbeare 1978; Epstein 1985; Galanter 1974, 1978; Yamold 1995). These studies
typically explore the success o f repeat players in litigation. Repeat players enjoy such
a high rate o f success vis-a-vis individuals or groups who are represented by private
attorneys due to the fact that they have more experience and expertise than private
attorneys (O’Connor 1980; Vose 1959). Although it is beyond the scope o f this
project to more formally examine the efficacy o f the efforts o f repeat players on the
Court’s decisions, it is important to note whether certain types o f organizations
continue to participate in the affirmative action policy arena or whether their
participation is short-lived. Examining this will shed some light on the general debate
in the interest group literature about whether certain groups dominate certain policy
arenas, that is, they focus on an “issue niche” (Browne 1990), or whether the
proliferation o f a host of groups playing on the political field dissolves the potential
influence o f any particular group (Salisbury 1992).
Table 13 displays the frequency o f cases within which non-governmental
organizations filed at least two solo amicus curiae briefs. O f the 169 solo amicus
briefs filed by organizations, 66.3 percent (112 out o f 169) were filed by repeat
players. Among the 141 non-government organizations, 15 percent were repeat
players (21 out o f 141), having filed solo briefs in at least two cases. Also, only 9.2
percent o f the non-governmental solo filers were repeat players at least three times.
Public interest law firms and business and trade organizations have the most frequent
repeat players across all organizational categories.
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Table 13
Repeat Player Status: Frequency of Non-governmental Organizational Participation
as Solo Filers

Organization by Type

Number o f Cases

Charitable or Community Organization
None
Public Interest Law Firm or Policy/Research Group
Equal Employment Advisory Council
Pacific Legal Foundation
Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights Under Law
NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund
Washington Legal Foundation
Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund
Southeastern Legal Foundation, Inc.
Council on Legal Education Opportunity
Citizen/Public Interest/Advocacy Group
NAACP
Anti-Defamation League o f B'nai B’rith
American Jewish Congress
Business, Trade, or Professional
Chamber o f Commerce o f the U.S.
American Society for Personnel Administration
Associated General Contractors o f America, Inc.
Association o f American Law Schools
Association o f American Medical Colleges
National Conference o f Black Lawyers
North Carolina Association of Black Lawyers
Union
International Association o f Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO
American Federation o f Teachers, AFL-CIO
Peak Association
AFL-CIO
Educational Groups, Institutions
None
Other
None

—

13
12
8
7
5
3
3
2
6
5
2
6
3
2
2
2
2
2
3
2
2
—
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Table 14 lists the frequencies o f non-government repeat players that co-filed amicus
briefs in coalitions. Among the 491 non-govemment organizations, approximately 64

Table 14
Repeat Player Status: Frequency o f Participation as Co-filers

Charitable or Community Organization
Office o f Communication o f the United Church
o f Christ
Public Interest Law Firm or Policy/Research Group
Women's Legal Defense Fund
NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund
National Women's Law Center
Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund
Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund
Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund
Center for Constitutional Rights
Employment Law Center
Northwest Women's Law Center
Women's Law Project
Women's Law Fund
Minority Business Enterprise Legal Defense and
Education Fund, Inc.
Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund
American Indian Law Students Association
La Raza National Lawyers Association
Washington Legal Foundation
Citizen/Public Interest/Advocacy Group
American Civil Liberties Union
NAACP
National Urban League
Women Employed
League of Women Voters o f the United States
Affirmative Action Coordinating Center
American G. I. Forum
Equal Rights Advocates
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10
8
8
7
7
6
6
4
4
4
4
3
3
3
2
2
2
14
9
7
7
6
5
5
5
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Table 14— Continued

Organization by Type

Number o f Cases

League o f United Latin American Citizens
National Organization for Women
Anti-Defamation League o f B'nai B'rith
IMAGE
Wider Opportunities for Women
Women's Equity Action League
American Jewish Committee
National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs
Unico National
American Jewish Congress
Americans for Democratic Action
Asian Law Caucus
Aspira o f America
Coalition for Economic Equity
Japanese American Citizens League
League o f Martin
National Council of La Raza
New Jewish Agenda
Polish American Congress
Ukrainian Congress Committee o f America
(Chicago Division)
Women's Coalition, Inc.
Business, Trade, or Professional
National Bar Association
National Conference o f Black Lawyers
National Lawyers Guild
International City Management Association
California Women Lawyers
National Bar Association, Women Lawyer's Division
National Black Police Association
American Association o f University Women
Federally Employed Women Legal and Education Fund
Hellenic Bar Association o f Illinois
Society o f American Law Teachers Board o f Governors
Union
International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and
United Farm Workers o f America
United Mine Workers o f America
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5
5
4
4
4
4
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
7
6
6
5
4
3
3
2
2
2
2
4
3
3
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Table 14— Continued

Organization by Type

Number o f Cases

Local 36, International Association o f Firefighters, AFL-CIO
Agricultural Implement Workers o f America (UAW)
International Union o f Electrical, Radio
and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO, CLC
Local 542, International Union o f Operating Engineers
Peak Associations
None
Educational Groups, Institutions
National Education Association
Board o f Governors o f Rutgers, State University of New Jersey
National Association for Equal Opportunity in Higher Education
Other
Kappa Alpha PSI Fraternity

3
2
2
2
—

4
2
2
2

percent were repeat players (312 out o f 491). Thirty-sex percent o f all organizations
that joined coalitions participated only once. Forty-seven percent o f non-govemment
organizations were repeat players at least three times. The most frequent participants
across all affirmative action cases were the ACLU (14 times), Women’s Legal
Defense Fund (ten times), NAACP (nine times), NOW-LDF and National Women’s
Law Center (eight times). With the exception o f peak associations, all non
governmental types o f organizations had repeat player groups acting in concert with
other groups. Citizen-based groups netted the most repeat players. The table also
shows that both public interest law firms and business and professional organizations
were active repeat players across all affirmative action
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cases. Moreover, although a majority o f groups that participated in coalitions were
repeat players, a considerable number o f organizations that filed amicus briefs forged
“temporary” coalitions and seemingly disappeared from the scene.
Since the 1960s, scholars have noted the proliferation o f interest groups
accessing the political process (Berry 1989; Schlozman and Tierney 1986). Scholars
have interpreted the consequences o f this “explosion” o f organized participation in
different ways. Some have suggested that one result o f this proliferation is that no
single group wields any stronghold on the policy process (Salisbury 1992). That is,
the proliferation of groups increases the competitive spirit o f pluralism (Baumgartner
and Leech 1998). Others, on the other hand, have argued that despite the explosion o f
organized participation in the Washington community, some groups concentrate their
lobbying efforts on a particular issue or find an “issue niche” (Browne 1990). Browne
suggested that since groups understand that their impact on policy is negligible in the
face o f increased competition, groups focus on a particular piece o f the policy puzzle
where they have a better chance o f influencing the policy process. As Baumgartner
and Leech (1998, 2000) argue scholars do not have a comprehensive picture o f what
the interest group universe looks like. And although some scholars have surveyed
interest groups for this purpose (Schlozman and Tierney 1986), Baumgartner and
Leech argue that scholars do not have an idea o f whether issue domains are
characterized by competitiveness (a la Salisbury 1992) or whether groups find issue
niches (a la Browne 1990) in order to have a better chance at influencing the policy
process. My findings indicate that while there is a considerable degree o f competition,
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indicated by the diversity o f participation across all affirmative action cases argued
before the Court, a majority o f the organized efforts o f groups is temporary in nature.
My findings o f the repeat player status o f both solo filers and co-filers also support
the notion that the policy process is characterized by “issue networks” (Heclo 1978)
rather than the domination o f a particular set o f actors or groups.

Conclusions

This chapter has surveyed the landscape o f organized group participation
before the Court in all affirmative action cases from 1971 to 1995. Spelling out the
facts of the cases, as well as the constitutional questions argued before the Court, help
us to understand the context within which a variety o f organizational groups engage
the Court through amicus participation. The facts of the case notwithstanding, we
expect that since the outcome o f cases granted plenary review by the Court will have
consequences beyond the immediate scope o f the petitioners and respondents that a
diversity of interests will press the Court for a favorable outcome. The data on group
participation over time suggests that groups of all organizational stripes have been
lobbying the Court in the form o f coalitions. The data displayed in Table 8 suggests
that there has been an almost steady and concerted effort on the part o f groups to form
coalitions when lobbying the Court. Since Stotts (1984), participation before the
Supreme Court on affirmative action cases has been almost overwhelmingly in the
form o f coalitions.
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Another significant observation is that participation has become more diverse
over time, especially since Stotts. While no single case netted participation among all
o f the organization types, there has been a concerted effort on the part o f both
governmental and non-govemmental groups to shape the boundaries o f these
important constitutional questions and affirmative action policies presented to the
Court. Among non-govemmental groups, citizen, public interest law, and business
and professional groups are the most frequent participants before the Court in these
cases. Among governmental groups, states are clearly the most active participants and
most state participation is in the form o f coalitional activity (94.9 percent). State
attorneys general since Wygant have participated with the most frequency and most
consistency among all o f the governmental types o f organizations. This trend within
this one policy-arena reflects the general trend for states to mount their efforts in the
face o f substantial federal questions that will shape the landscape o f policies within
state governments. It reflects the more general rise o f the “inter-govemmental lobby”
in the broader political arena (Berry 1977, 1989). Corporations, which undoubtedly
have a stake in the outcome of how affirmative action hiring and promotion schemes
are judged, constituted only a fraction o f the overall participation (1.1 percent). I also
found that a majority o f organizations are repeat players that continue to file both solo
briefs, as well as co-filing briefs in concert with other groups over time. However,
only a small proportion o f organized participants filed more than three briefs across
the 22 cases examined in this study.
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Now that we have visited in a summary fashion an overview o f organized
participation in affirmative action cases, I turn my attention to examining coalitional
activity o f these groups. Do certain organizational factors shape the probability o f
groups filing together in a coalition? In the next chapter, I look more closely at the
organizational characteristics o f non-govemmental organization and present a model
that assesses the probability that groups will act in concert with one another, insofar
as they file amicus briefs, based on these organizational characteristics.
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CHAPTER IV
ASSESSING THE FILER STATUS OF AMICI BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT
IN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CASES
The previous chapter described the participation o f organized interests before
the Supreme Court in affirmative action cases. In this chapter I turn m y attention to a
more sophisticated model, which assesses the characteristics o f groups participating
as amici in all affirmative action cases argued before the Court. I assess the
probability o f groups filing solo briefs versus filing briefs in coalitions as a function
o f organizational characteristics such as staff size and organizational vitality. In what
follows I provide some background on the data and the dependent and independent
variables used in the following analyses. Later, I test hypotheses about the nature o f
coalition formation or filer status and the potential influence o f organized
participation on the outcome o f the Court’s decisions on affirmative action cases.

Model 1: Assessing the Relationship Between Organizational Characteristics
and Filer Status

What do we know about coalitional activity in the political process generally?
Scholars have only recently examined the nature o f coalitions in the context o f
accessing the political environment. This is due, in part, to the fact that scholars focus
on the macro view of the interest community at large. A number o f scholars,
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however, have looked at coalitions as an important institutional link between interest
groups.
Schlozman and Tierney (1986) documented the rise o f coalitional activity as a
lobbying technique among organized interests. From their list o f 27 lobbying
techniques, the strategy o f engaging in coalitions ranked second, as they found that 90
percent o f the organizations in their sample used coalition-building as a lobbying tool.
Also, they found that 65 percent of the surveyed organized groups reported that they
would seek to cooperate with allies in other organizations when planning strategies
for influencing policy (1986, 278-279). According to Schlozman and Tierney (1986)
and Salisbury, Heinz, Laumann, and Nelson (1987), groups are more likely to
coalesce with other groups within a particular issue area or economic sector and these
studies document the stability o f coalitions with a given policy arena.
Others have attempted to examine the nature o f coalition formation in the face
o f Olson’s (1965) “free-rider problem.” Does the free-rider problem also plague
coalitions? Hula (1999) downplays the free-rider problem for the formation of
political coalitions. He argues that while political entrepreneurs must offer selective
benefits to potential group members, coalition brokers operate in a different context.
Hula (1999, 38) states that...
the task for the coalition broker is not to provide incentives for people
to get involved on an issue, but rather to convince these already active
Washington representatives that they could be more effective at what
they are doing by pursuing their goals in cooperation with other
Washington representatives.
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Groups join coalitions not only to receive selective benefits such as
information but also to receive symbolic benefits, which aid in the task o f maintaining
group membership. Hula suggests that brokers o f coalitions play a dominant role in
organizing the coalition’s effort and maintaining relative control on the flow o f
political information. For coalitions, potential free-riders are asked to participate as
peripheral groups that do not have to supply material resources. Moreover, while the
contributions o f groups to an alliance effort may not be equitable, the “logic” o f
coalitions suggests that groups can bring different resources to the alliance table. The
results o f Hula’s recent survey of Washington lobbyists in the transportation,
education, and civil rights policy domains show that lobbyists overwhelmingly agree
that coalitions are the way to be effective in politics.
What do we know about organized participation and access to the judicial
playing field? Scholars have spelled out a variety o f reasons why groups consider
filing amicus briefs or using other litigation strategies. As the number o f players on
the field has increased considerably, so, too, have the motivations for participating in
the Courts. Caldeira and Wright (1988) showcased this point and showed that groups
organize in order to satisfy the economic, political, and social goals o f the group and
utilize the courts to this end. Also, groups access the Court for organizational
maintenance. Also, we know that a number of amici are repeat players (Galanter
1974) that appear regularly before the Court. Caldeira and Wright (1989, 15) suggest
that...
a group’s legal credibility and reputation depend considerably on the
kinds o f cases in which it chooses to participate. Once an organization
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establishes a reputation for participating in cases o f good legal quality,
its presence as an amicus may receive greater attention from the clerks
and Justices.
Scholars have also examined why some groups participate in litigation while
others do not. Bruer (1987) attempted to understand why groups chose to litigate or
not. He found that budget and organizational vitality do not successfully predict the
probability that groups will engage the judicial process using various litigation
strategies. Scheppele and Walker (1991) also attempted to explain differences among
the groups they surveyed as to why they participated in various forms o f litigation.
They found, contra Bruer’s conclusions, that organizational factors such as staff size
and age o f the group, as well as support from patron groups, are significant
determinants o f whether groups utilized litigation strategies.
Caldeira and Wright (1988) show that filing amicus briefs are rather
expensive costs for an organization to bear, with some groups shelling out as much as
S60,000. Further, being able to access the Court through amicus participation would
run a group about 5128,000 a year, an amount that exceeded the budgetary foundation
o f more than half o f all organized that they surveyed. They concluded, moreover, that
groups can only afford to participate in important cases. But coalitions may serve as
an important avenue through which groups can share the costs o f filing a brief.
Although this study does not document which groups contributed to the cost o f filing
an amicus brief, I hypothesize that groups with a smaller base o f organizational
resources can gain easier access to the judicial stage in the form o f amici in coalitions.
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Do organizational characteristics influence the probability that groups act
alone or act in concert with one another? In what follows I describe the data used in
the analysis, as well as the dependent and independent variables to be utilized in the
logistic regression model.
The Data

The unit o f analysis is the filer status o f all amici (excluding individuals)
participating across all affirmative action cases. These data come from the U.S.
Reports and the Records and Briefs o f the United States Supreme Court, which are
housed both on the Lexis-Nexis

w e b s it e 2 6

(from 1980-current) and on microfiche.

I

include only those briefs listed in the U.S. Reports and the Records and Briefs,
excluding individual interests but including briefs filed by the U.S. Solicitor
G e n e r a l.2 7

The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable delineating whether the
amicus participant is a solo-filer or a co-filer o f the amicus curiae brief. Solo-filers
are those groups that individually filed an amicus brief on behalf o f their organization
and co-filers are those groups listed as “et al” in the U.S. Reports and subsequently

26 <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/universe>
27 Although I collected data on government groups and reported on their frequency
o f participation in affirmative action cases earlier, my primary focus for the rest o f the
dissertation centers on non-govemmental organized groups. Although governmental
groups are undoubtedly important forces to deal with on the judicial playing field, my
analysis in this and subsequent chapters focuses on the sea o f interest groups outside
o f the governmental apparatus. I do, however, use the participation o f the U.S.
Solicitor General as a control variable in the next chapter.
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detailed in the amicus brief presented by the co-filers. These data are detailed in The
Records and Briefs o f the United States Supreme Court. This variable is a
dichotomous variable where solo filers are coded as zero and groups filing together in
a coalition as co-filers are coded as one. Out o f the 300 amicus filers used in the
analysis, a total o f 28 percent were solo filers and 72 percent filed as part o f a
coalition.
The independent variables used in the analysis capture the organizational
resources of the amicus filers. The Encyclopedia o f Associations (Gale Research
Group 1970-1995, volumes 4 through 27) is used to code the organizational
characteristics o f the amicus participants such as staff size, type o f group, and years
active in order to assess how these organizational characteristics influence the
probability of an amicus participant being a solo-filer or a co-filer. The data come
from The Encyclopedia o f Associations (EOA) for the respective year each group filed
their amicus briefs. Although the EOA generously lists a host o f groups covering a
wide spectrum o f organizational types, it does not contain detailed organizational
information on all groups. Out of the 645 non-govemmental filers to be used in the
subsequent analysis, organizational information was found for only about 300
groups.28 In particular, I code each group for the following:

28 Since the Encyclopedia o f Associations does not generously list detailed
organization information on all groups participating in affirmative action cases over
time, my sample size has decreased somewhat. The lower number o f cases to be used
in the model does not significantly differ from the data presented in the last chapter:
22.2 percent v. 27.7 filing solo briefs and 77.8 percent versus 72.2 filing in coalitions.
Also, information on the ten corporations was also difficult to obtain. Nonetheless, it
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Organizational Staff Size

Organizational staff size is used to measure the organizational resources of
each organization. Originally, data on the budget and staff were coded from the EOA.
Consistent with the findings o f Scheppele and Walker (1991), many groups do not
report their budgets. Nonetheless, Scheppele and Walker report a correlation o f .9
between budget and staff size in their survey o f interest groups. Including budget and
staff size in the model may conflate two problems. First, we may lose a good portion
o f the sample size for those groups that do not provide budgetary information.
Second, there may be high multicollinearity between budget and staff size, thus
biasing the parameter e s t i m

a tio n .2 9

Instead o f losing sample size, on account o f the

scarcity o f organizations’ budgetary data, I use staff size as a proxy for organization
resources. Scheppele and Walker also report that the impact o f each additional staff
member is likely to decrease as the total staff size increases, so they use the log of
staff size as a measure of organizational resources. Consistent with their
methodology, which was also employed by Gais and Walker (1991) and King and
Walker (1991), I also use the log o f staff size as the final measure o f organizational
resources and incorporate this measure into the model. The data on filer status and
staff size confirm my expectations that groups participating in coalitions, on the

would be difficult to decipher out o f a corporation’s budget how much o f its resources
went to litigation.
29 Consistent with Scheppele and Walker (1991), I found a high correlation between
organizational budget and staff size (r=. 85).
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average, have smaller staff sizes. The raw average staff size for solo filers is 164.25
and the raw average for groups participating in coalitions is 157.40. In the aggregate,
these differences are statistically significant.^® Moreover, I expect that groups with
larger staffs will be more likely to participate as solo-filers and less likely to be co
filers.

Organizational Vitality Measured in Years

I also include a variable that captures the degree o f organizational vitality,
which is measured by the number o f years each group participating as amici has been
active. The data on the year that each group was founded was easy to find in The
Encyclopedia o f Associations. Careful attention had to be paid to the year that each
group filed an amicus brief, as not all groups filed briefs in the same year as the
others. My expectation is that groups that are newer on the scene will seek to unify
their efforts in concert with other groups. Upon inspecting the descriptive data on the
number o f years the organizations have been active vis-a-vis their filer status, we find
a slight difference in the mean years o f solo filers versus co-filers (solo filers = 40.58
versus co-filers = 39.87). Across all affirmative action cases we find filers
participating that range from one year to 135 years on the scene. On a purely
descriptive level, this finding confirms my expectation about the relationship between
filer status and organizational vitality. However, these differences are not statistically

30 T-test statistic = -5.37; p = .000 (2-tailed test).
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significant.^ 1 I hypothesize that groups that have been organized longer are more

likely to participate as solo-filers and less likely to be co-filers.
The model proposed below attempts to explain whether interest group
characteristics such as staff size and organizational vitality increase the probability of
whether groups participate as solo-filers or co-filers. The statistical model is
conceptualized as follows:

Yi = P0 + p ix il + P2xi2 + ei, where:

Yi = probability of group participating as a solo-filer (coded as one) or co-filer (coded
as zero);
P0 = intercept term;
Group Characteristics:
XI = staff size (log of staff in numbers)
X2 = number o f years group has been active (in years)

Model With Dummy Variables for Type o f Organization

I also include in the model dummy variables for the types o f organizations
participating as amici in order to tease out the statistically significant differences
between different types o f organizations and their proclivity to participate as solo
filers or in the form of coalitions. I exclude governmental organizations from the
model and focus exclusively on participation on the part o f non-govemmental

T-test statistic = .191; p = .85 (2-tailed test).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

105
g ro u p s.

32 Governmental organizations are excluded due to the fountain o f resources

they command. Is there a statistically significant relationship between filer status and
organizational type on the aggregate? In the bivariate case, I find that there is a
statistically significant difference between filer status and organizational type among
non-govemmental

o r g a n iz a tio n s .3 3

Citizen groups serve as the reference category in

the model. Dummy variables are included for public law, business and professional,
peak associations, and other g r o u p s . 3 4 Not unlike the results from the descriptive
statistics listed in the last chapter, I expect to find significant difference in the filer
status of citizen groups vis-a-vis business and professional and peak associations but
not between citizen-based groups and public law organizations.
Model 2 is conceptualized as follows:

Yi = P0 + (31xil + P2xi2 + P3xi3 + p4xi4 + P5xi5 + P6xi6 + ei, where:
Yi = probability o f organization participating as a solo-filer (coded as one) or co-filer
(coded as zero);
P0 = intercept term (citizen-based organizations as the reference group)

32 The following is a breakdown of the groups to be included in the analysis:
Charitable groups (14); Public Law (74); Citizen (155); Business (35); Peak
Associations (10); Educational (1) and Other (10). The percentage of participation by
each type o f group here does not stray too far from the percentages discussed in the
last chapter. The following compares the percentages of each type o f group:
Charitable (4.7 v. 5 percent); Public Law (24.8 v. 20 percent); Citizen (51.8 v. 40
percent); Business and Professional (11.7 v. 13 percent); Peak Associations (3.3 v. 1
percent); Educational (8 percent v. .33 percent); Other (3.3 v. 6 percent).
33 Chi-square statistic = 35.10 (6 d.f); p = -000 (2-tailed test)
34 Not all types o f organizations are included in the analysis as dummy variables due
to the fact that there was not enough sufficient data on them.
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XI = staff size (log o f staff in numbers)
X2 = number o f years group has been active (in years)
X3 = dummy variable for public law organizations
X4 = dummy variable for business and professional organizations
X5 = dummy variable for peak associations
X6 = dummy variable for other groups
Findings
Table 15 displays the logistic regression results o f model 1. Although my
expectations about the significance o f staff size and years active are confirmed by the
results o f the model, the direction of the coefficient for years active goes against the
grain o f my expectations. That is, I expected that organizations will be more likely to
participate as solo filers the more years they have been on the scene. The results from
the analysis, however, do not confirm my expectations about the effect that
organizational vitality has on the filer status o f amici. As the data from the table
show, every additional year a group has been active, the predicted probability o f a
group filing in a coalition increases by .01 when staff size is controlled. An
alternative explanation may be that organizations that have been on the scene longer
understand the virtue and utility of coalescing with other groups. This may reflect the
more general trend that groups are increasingly more likely to engage in coalitional
behavior, as proposed by Schlozman and Tierney (1986). Also, groups that have been
organized longer on the scene may be viewed by other groups as valuable coalition
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Table 15
Logistic Regression Coefficients for the Probability of Organizational Characteristics
Influencing Filer Status

Independent Variable

Estimate

Staff

-0.90*
(.26)

Years Active

0.01*
(.01)

Constant

1.93*
(36)

Number o f cases
Log Likelihood
Log Likelihood Ratio
Percent Correctly Predicted
Pseudo R-square

299
-169.95
13.31*
70.23
.04

Note: Results obtained using Intercooled Stata v. 6.0; * indicates significance at the p
<.05 level (two-tailed); Standard errors are in parentheses below each coefficient.

partners. The significance and the directionality o f the coefficient for staff goes hand
in hand with my expectation that organizations that have large staffs increase the
probability that they will participate as solo filers. As the table shows, for a unit
increase change in the log o f staff size, the predicted probability o f a group filing in a
coalition decreases by .90, holding all other variables constant.35 Both staff and years

35 The values for log of staff size ranges from .00 for I staff member to 3.85 for 7000
staff members.
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active are statistically significant at p <.

05.

The model test statistic (likelihood ratio

o f 13.31) displayed in the notes o f the table is significant at p <.

05

and this model

correctly predicts the filer status o f organized groups at a rate o f 7 0 . 2 3

p e r c e n t.3 6

The

data in this table demonstrate that organizational characteristics, measured in staff
size and years active, significantly affect the filer status of organizational interests.
Table 16 displays the results o f model 2, which attempts to capture the
differences in filer status for the different types o f organizations filing amicus briefs.
Although the magnitude o f staff size and years active changes only slightly, the
directionality and significance o f these variables remain consistent with the results

36 Here, I break down more thoroughly the number o f cases that were positively and
negatively classified.
True
Classified

Co-filer

Solo-filer

Total

Co-filer
Solo-filer

208
8

81
2

289
10

Total

216

83

299

Classified + is predicted Pr(Co-filer) >.5
True D defined as coalition ~=0.
Reduction in Error = -7.23 percent
The reduction o f error statistic indicates the proportion o f correct guesses beyond the
number that would be correctly guessed by choosing the largest marginal. We can
interpret the reduction in error statistic as our knowledge of the independent variables
compared to basing our prediction only on the marginal distributions. The formula for
calculating this statistic is:
Percentage reduction o f error = 100 X (% correctly classified - % in the modal
category) / (100% - % in modal category) (Hagle and Mitchell 1992).
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Table 16
Logistic Regression Coefficients for the Probability of Organizational Characteristics
Influencing Filer Status (With Dummy Variables for Organizational Type)

Independent Variable

Estimate

Staff

-1.14*
(.31)

Years Active

0.02*
(.01)

Public Law

-0.60
(.33)

Business/Professional

-2.35*
(.46)

Peak Associations

-1.66*
(.79)

Other Organizations

0.14
(0.87)

Constant (Citizen Organizations)

2.48*
(.46)

Number o f Cases
Log Likelihood
Likelihood Ratio
Percent Correctly Predicted
Pseudo R-squared

283
-150.79
40.88*
74.91
.12

Note: Results obtained using Intercooled Stata v. 6.0; * indicates significance at the p
<.05 level (two-tailed); Standard errors are in parentheses below each coefficient.

For a discussion o f this and other goodness o f fit measures for logit and probit see
Hagle and Mitchell (1992).
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reported in the table listed above. The reference category (included in the constant in
the table) in this model is citizen-based organizations. Consistent with the findings
reported in chapter three, the data demonstrate that there is a statistically significant
difference in the filer status o f citizen-based organizations and business/professional
organizations and peak associations. The negative direction o f the coefficient for
business/professional organizations and peak associations confirms the expectation
that these groups are more likely to engage in solo-filer activity than citizen-based
organizations that have a proclivity to participate in coalitions. This model predicts a
slightly higher percentage of filer status at a rate o f 74.91 p e rc e n t^ and the
likelihood ratio test statistic (40.88) for this model is significant at p <. 05.

Discussion

What do the characteristics o f coalition members tell us about group access to
the Court within the pluralist system? As I pointed out earlier, literature regarding

37 Here, I break down more thoroughly the number o f cases that were positively and
negatively classified.
True
Classified

Co-filer

Solo-filer

Total

Co-filer
Solo-filer

204
11

57
26

261
37

Total

215

83

299

Classified + is predicted Pr(Co-filer) >.5
True D defined as coalition ~=0.
Reduction in error = 17.9 percent
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pluralism in the Courts is in a nascent stage. Some scholars (see Caldeira and Wright
1990 and Epstein 1993) have found that a wide range o f groups and organizations
regularly use litigation strategies to lobby the Court. Epstein (1993) has likened the
contemporary judicial playing field to a balancing act. That is, whereas the
“underdogs” or “disadvantaged” interests flooded the courts during the 1950s and
1960s, the flurry o f organized participation by business and corporate interests (the
so-called “upperdogs”) mounted since the 1970s provided a counter-weight to the
imbalance on the judicial playing field. Also, these analyses examine whether there is
a balance in terms o f the percentage o f amicus cases with participation on both sides.
This type o f analysis is undoubtedly important in order to gauge the extent of
organizational involvement in the courts.
My analysis o f all affirmative action cases over time adds an important piece
o f the puzzle to this new judicial pluralist outlook. The pluralist outlook regarding the
courts should also examine the extent to which groups without a large fountain o f
resources from which to draw can access the courts. My results show that
organizations that are not heavily endowed with resources can access the Court
through acting in concert with other organizations. Organizations that have a larger
base o f resources are better equipped to go it alone and file solo briefs. Moreover,
coalitions seem to be an important conduit through which “disadvantaged”
organizations (at least in terms o f organizational characteristics) can access the
judicial arena. The findings presented above are commensurate with the literature
presented by Hojnacki (1998) and Scheppele and W alker on the organizational
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incentives groups find necessary to participate in the political system. Scheppele and
Walker (1991) reported that staff size is significantly related to the importance o f
litigation efforts on the part of organized interests. Hojnacki (1998) found that
resource availability significantly affects the incentives that organizations have to
contribute to an advocacy alliance effort. Generally speaking, my findings fit into the
literature regarding the utility of coalitions due to the ability o f groups to pool their
resources (Berry 1977, 1989; Hula 1995, 1999; Schlozman and Tiemey 1986). My
findings add an important dimension to this discussion. That is, organizational
resources may not only help to determine whether groups will participate but, more
importantly, the manner o f participation as either a solo filer or as a co-filer in a
coalition with other organizations.
In the next chapter I test hypotheses about the nature o f coalition formation or
filer status and the potential influence o f organized participation on the outcome o f
the Court’s decisions on affirmative action cases. The model in the next chapter will
control for relevant variables that could influence the Court’s decisions such as the
ideological disposition o f the justices, as well as the role o f the U.S. Solicitor
General’s participation.
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CHAPTER V
ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF COALITIONAL EFFORTS
Does participation mounted by organizations influence the decisions o f the
Supreme Court in the aggregate and the individual justices on affirmative action
cases? In what follows, I present two models that assess the influence o f organized
participation on the outcome o f the Court’s decisions in affirmative action cases.
The information detailed in chapter three regarding the frequency o f
participation and the types o f groups participating tells us a considerable amount o f
information about organized participation in affirmative action cases. However, the
picture seems to be somewhat incomplete. That is, we need to assess the extent to
which amici have an effect on judicial decision making. Does group participation
make any difference in the outcome o f the Court's decisions in affirmative action
cases?
What do we know about the success o f litigation efforts mounted by organized
groups? The literature addressing the efficacy o f group participation on the outcome
o f the Court’s decisions is mixed. Caldeira and Wright (1988) examined the effect of
group participation at the jurisdictional stage and found that indeed litigants have a
better chance o f having the case heard on the merits when they are backed or
sponsored by interest groups. More specifically, they found that if groups back a
litigant at the jurisdictional stage it increased the probability of the Court granting
113
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review in the face of conflict in lower court rulings from .39 to .74. They concluded
that “[t]he U.S. Supreme C ourt...is quite responsive to the demands and preferences
o f organized interests when choosing its plenary docket” (1988, 1122).
At the merits stage, scholars have employed a variety o f analyses to test the
efficacy o f group participation. Vose’s (1959) classic study showed the influence of
the NAACP on the outcome o f restrictive covenant cases. Others have followed
Vose’s lead and found that group-backed litigants tend to be victorious (Cortner
1988). Others have used success ratings or scores that target specific groups (such as
the ACLU or the NAACP-LDF) and assess the success o f these groups. For example,
Lawrence (1989) examined the Legal Services Program (LSP) and found that their
attorneys won 62 percent o f the cases. She concludes that the LSP’s advocacy
“ .. .gave the poor a voice in the Supreme Court’s policy-making and doctrinal
development”( 1989, 270).
Still others have tried to determine the actual effect that amicus briefs have on
the legal doctrine that the Court announces in its decisions. Justices regularly cite
amicus briefs in their opinions (see Table 2 in Chapter A). Ivers and O ’Connor (1987)
examined criminal law and procedure cases in the Burger Court and found that the
Court adopted some of the language of the main groups that backed the litigants in
the case (the ACLU and the American for Effective Law Enforcement (AELE)). They
found that the Court adopted only 29 percent o f the ACLU’s arguments and over 60
percent o f the arguments o f the AELE. However, this study did not compare the
briefs filed on behalf o f the litigants with the flurry o f amicus briefs filed by other
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interested parties. Regarding the influence o f amici, Ivers and O ’Connor (1987, 172)
stated that the “extent [amicus] briefs influenced the opinions we compared to the
briefs o f other litigants is a question that must be left for later research.”
Perhaps a more effective approach to assessing the impact o f organized
participation before the Court attempts to assess the outcome o f cases in light o f
controlling for relevant factors that may influence judicial decision making such as
ideology and partisanship. Songer and Sheehan (1990) examined the impact of
amicus briefs filed on all written Court decisions from 1967 through 1987 controlling
for the Court’s ideology. They found that
briefs filed by state and local governments appear to have little effect
on the outcome o f cases heard by the Court. Briefs filed by other
amicus parties have the potential for a moderate impact on the chances
for litigant success as long as they are not opposed by the United
States as either a direct party or as amicus curiae. In contrast briefs
filed for the United States by the solicitor general were shown to have
a major impact on Court decisions even after the effects o f [other
variables] were taken into account (Songer and Sheehan 1990, 12,
quoted in Epstein 1993, 693).
Also, Segal and Reedy (1988) found that the solicitor general had a significant
impact on the outcome o f sex discrimination cases. Moreover, these studies have had
mixed results regarding the effect o f organized participation on the Court’s decisions
at the merits stage. I seek to add to this literature by gauging organized participation,
while controlling for relevant variables. Incorporating variables that tap into the
composition o f organized participation (in the form o f groups, briefs, and coalitions)
will help to clarify the effect o f group participation in the Court. I believe that the
issue of organized participation and efficacy has not been adequately addressed at the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

116
plenary stage in the decision-making process and I seek to supplement this literature
through modeling the outcome o f the Court’s decision in affirmative action cases.
Model 3: Assessing the Success o f Coalitional Efforts
The Data

The data used in the following analyses come from a careful coding o f the 22
affirmative action cases decided by the Supreme Court from 1969 to 1 9 9 5 .1 verified
my coding o f these cases against the codes made available by the U.S. Supreme Court
Judicial Database (Spaeth 1995) from Griggs (1971) to Adarand (1995). In what
follows I provide a more detailed sketch o f the variables used in the analyses, as well
as the statistical methodology employed.

Outcome o f the Decision

I measure the outcome of the Court’s decision in two ways. The first measure
of the dependent variable reflects the outcome o f the each decision handed-down by
the Supreme Court in the aggregate. There are 22 cases and, along the lines o f this
dependent variable, 22 outcomes. The outcomes o f the cases are coded as zero for a
“con” affirmative action decision and one for a “pro” affirmative action decision. I
also recode the dependent variable along the lines o f the proportion o f pro affirmative
action votes in each case and I used ordinary least squares regression in order to
estimate the results. The second dependent variable disaggregates the decision of the
Court in each case in order to capture the individual justice’s vote in each case. This
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variable is coded as zero for a justice that voted “con” affirmative action and coded as
one if the justice cast a “pro” affirmative action vote.
There are some methodological issues I had to sort through upon coming to
the conclusion that I should test the effects o f organized participation on the Court on
the aggregate level and on the micro level o f each justice’s vote. The first issue I was
confronted with was the small number o f cases (n=22) I had to work with. Using
logistic regression with a small number o f cases tends to produce inaccurate results,
especially with regard to the standard errors o f the coefficients. However, advances in
computing power, as well as new methodological approaches, have allowed social
scientists to confidently estimate parameters in the face of a small sample size. Later,
I will spell out in more detail some o f the statistical techniques utilized for estimating
my models (e.g., the use o f a specialized program called LogXact and a statistical
technique called “bootstrapping”). Examining the impact o f organized participation
on the level o f the individual justice has its practical merits. That is, disaggregating
the Court’s votes boosts the sample size from 22 to 157 and lends itself to more
accurate parameters. Disaggregating the Court’s votes also has the merit o f adding
important information about the outcomes o f the cases given some o f the deeply
divided decisions by the Court on these cases.38

38 For a more detailed portrait o f the outcomes o f all affirmative action cases, refer to
Table 6 in Chapter III.
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Group. Brief, and Coalition Indices

In order to assess the effect of organized participation as amici on the
aggregate level o f the Court and on the micro-level o f the individual justices, I
devised three indices o f organized participation. I include all non-govemment amicus
briefs with the exception o f amicus participation on the part of the solicitor general.
These indices measure the proportion of groups, briefs, and coalitions^ in support o f
affirmative action. Construction o f these variables was a rather simple task, which
involved dividing the number o f pro affirmative action groups, briefs, and coalitions
by the total number o f groups, briefs, and coalitions for each respective case. These
indices can be read as continuous variables, ranging from zero (participation
overwhelmingly against affirmative action) to one (participation overwhelmingly in
support o f affirmative action). Upon running diagnostics on these variables, I found
no multicollinearity between them and I am confident that these measures can
accurately estimate the effects o f the different measures o f organized participation on
the Court’s

d e c is io n s .^

Some driving questions that justify the use o f these variables

center around whether or not the Court or individual justices may be influenced by
the organized efforts before them in the form o f either groups, briefs, or coalitions.

39 In Chapter III I used a different coalition index, which measured the proportion o f
groups respective to the number o f coalitions in each case.
40 The correlation coefficients between these indices are as follows:
Group Index Coalition Index
Coalition Index
Brief Index

.70
.72

.49
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This theme o f understanding group participation before the Court has a long and
distinguished pedigree among scholars (for example see Behuniak-Long 1991;
Caldeira 1991; Caldeira and Wright 1988, 1990; Hakman 1966; McGuire 1994; Vose
1955, 1957, 1958, 1959). I expect that a concerted effort on the part o f groups
overwhelming in support o f a specific outcome in a case will shape the decisions of
both the Court as a whole and the individual justices. Moreover, I expect that the
proportion o f briefs, groups, and coalitions supporting affirmative action will increase
the probability o f a successful outcome for the pro-affirmative action litigant.

Ideology

I include measures o f ideology for both the Court as a whole and for the
individual justices participating in the affirmative cases. The justification for
including ideology as a control variable stems from the fountain o f research
indicating that the driving force behind the justice’s decisions is their policy
predilections. Scholars who articulated this thesis can be traced to Pritchett (1948)
who can be considered a progenitor to what is commonly referred to as the
“attitudinal model.” The attitudinal model stems from two bodies o f research
conducted since the late 1940s. The classic studies employed by Pritchett (1948) used
dimensional analysis o f votes, as he tried to determine interaction agreement and
patterns o f voting behavior through block analysis and Gutmann scaling techniques.
In The Roosevelt Court (1948), Pritchett set the foundation o f behaviorism to public
law. He found ideological patterns within the Court and challenged the myth that
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judges were only the mouthpieces o f law and exercised judgm ent and not will. Rhode
and Spaeth (1976) and Segal and Spaeth (1993) presented a more mature and
comprehensive attitudinal model. They argue that Supreme Court justices are situated
in an institutional context that allows them to be guided by their policy predilections.
That is, justices lack electoral accountability and ambition for higher office. These
conditions free justices to focus on the content o f legal policy.
I use the ideological scores compiled by Segal and Cover (1989) and updated
by Segal, Epstein, Cameron, and Spaeth (1995) to control for the effect o f the
individual justice’s ideology. Segal and Cover devised a measure o f the justices’
ideological positions from sources independent o f their votes. I use Segal and Cover’s
composite index o f the Court’s ideology for the respective years within which the 22
affirmative action cases were decided. This index serves as an acceptable independent
measure o f the justice’s ideological dispositions. Segal and Cover (1989) analyzed the
relationship between justices’ policy preferences and their voting behavior between
1953 and 1988. They construct an independent measure o f ideology (thus avoiding
the circularity problem o f using the justices’ votes to predict votes, which plagued
previous research) employing content analysis o f newspaper editorials about the
justices after a justice was nominated to the bench by the president. A subsequent
analysis by Segal, Epstein, Cameron, and Spaeth (1995) extended Segal and Cover’s
analysis to cover earlier and later appointees. Both studies find a strong, significant
statistical relationship between the justice’s ideology and their voting behavior. The
measure ranges from negative one (unanimously conservative) to zero (moderate) to
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positive one (unanimously liberal). The correlations between the outcome o f cases
and the justices’ ideological positions in civil liberties cases ranged from r=. 47 for
civil liberties cases during the Roosevelt-Truman administrations to r=.80 for the
Eisenhower-Reagan appointees (Segal and Cover 1989). In order to capture the
ideological tenor o f the Court as a whole, I aggregated the individual justice’s scores
and divided them by the total number of justices participating in each case. The
continuum o f ideology for each justice and for the Court as a whole range from -1
(most conservative) to 1 (most liberal). Commensurate with the literature on the
influence o f ideology on the outcome o f the C ourt’s decisions, I expect to find
significant relationship between ideology and the outcome o f affirmative action cases.
More specifically, I expect that the probability o f the Court deciding in favor o f the
pro-affirmative action litigant is positively related to ideology. Table 17 presents the
ideology scores for each justice as well as for the Court as a whole in each affirmative
action case.
Looking at the ideology scores for the Court for all the affirmative action
cases we should notice the relative lack o f variation in scores, especially if we look at
the scores from Franks (1976) to Full Hove (1980) and from General Building (1982)
to Local 93 (1986). However, if we read down the column we find that the Court has
become more conservative as a whole from 1971 to 1995. This may undoubtedly
account for the Court’s stricter standard o f scrutiny for affirmative action policies at
all levels o f government. Nonetheless, we find considerably more variation if we look
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Table 17
Ideology Scores for Individual Justices Participating in Affirmative Action Cases and
for the Court as a Whole in Each Case

Justice

Black
Douglas
Warren
Harlan
Brennan
Stewart
White
Marshall
Burger
Blackmun
Powell
Rehnquistl
O ’Connor
Rehnquist2
Scalia
Kennedy
Souter
Thomas
Ginsburg
Breyer

Score

.75
.46
.50
.75
1.00
.50
.00
1.00
-.77
-.77
-.67
-.91
-.17
-.91
-1.00
-.27
-.34
-.68
.36
-.05

Case

Court Score

Griggs
Defunis
Morton
Albemarle
Franks
Bakke
Furnco
Weber
Fullilove
General Build.
Mayor
Stotts
Wygant
Local 28
Local 93
Paradise
Johnson
Richmond
Wards Cove
Martin
Metro
Adarand

0.07
-0.02
-0.02
0.06
-0.12
-0.12
-0.12
-0.12
-0.12
-0.20
-0.20
-0.20
-0.20
-0.20
-0.20
-0.22
-0.22
-0.18
-0.18
-0.18
-0.18
-0.40

Note: The data listed in the first column come from Segal and Cover (1989) and
Segal, Epstein, Cameron, and Spaeth (1995). The data listed in the second column is
an aggregation of the justices’ ideology scores in each case.

at the individual justices’ scores. These two measures o f ideology should serve as
legitimate indicators to be factored into the models detailed below.
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Solicitor General Participation

Another control variable introduced into each model is the role of the U.S.
Solicitor General in the affirmative action cases. There is empirical and theoretical
justification for adding the role of the solicitor general as a control variable. As a
representative o f the executive branch, the solicitor general is rather successful in
getting cases heard before the Supreme Court (Segal and Spaeth 1993), especially
when the case is decided on the merits. Tanenhaus et al (1963) found that the Court
granted certiorari in 47 percent o f the cases where the U.S. favored review versus 5.8
percent when it did not. As a voice o f the administration’s position on various issues,
the solicitor general plays a pivotal role in shaping judicial policy-making (see
O ’Connor 1983; Puro 1981; Segal and Reedy 1988), as the solicitor general has used
its authority to voice the administration's position in important cases such as Brown
(1954) and Bakke (1978). A host o f other scholars have documented the success o f
the U.S. Solicitor General (Caldeira and Wright 1988; Caplan 1987; Epstein 1993;
O’Connor 1983; Scigliano 1971; Segal 1984, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1991; Segal and
Reedy 1988; Puro 1981). On the whole, there is a wealth o f empirical evidence that
parties supported by the solicitor general are more successful than those parties that
are not backed by the solicitor general.
Why does the solicitor general enjoy so much success before the Court as
amicus? Some scholars argue that the government is successful in the Court because,
acting through the solicitor general as its liaison, it is a repeat player (Galanter 1974).
Others argue that the government is successful because o f its high degree of
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credibility (Salokar 1992) and because the solicitor general usually makes the best
arguments (Segal 1988) based to a large extent on the experience o f those working in
the solicitor general’s office (McGuire 1998). Still, other scholars suggest that
because the executive branch has powerful checks on the Court, such as choosing not
to enforce the Court’s decisions, the justices are more likely to support the position of
the administration (Epstein and Knight 1998). The empirical evidence seems to bear
this theoretical justification out. When the executive branch signals the Court to adopt
its position, the justices usually do so. The literature on the impact o f the solicitor
general poses a challenge to those who articulate the attitudinal approach. That is, if
the solicitor general enjoys considerable success before the Court does that not
suggest that the Court is influenced by exogenous forces? In other words, justices
may not be simply guided by their own policy preferences but instead they pay
attention to the preferences o f outside forces. Justices may do this, according to
Epstein and Knight (1998, 138), because in order to “ .. .create efficacious law - that
is, policy that the other branches will respect and with which they will comply justices must take into account the preferences and expected action o f these
government actors.” If the Court does not comply with the wishes o f the presidential
administration, the Court’s legitimacy may be called into question as the final arbiter
o f the law. Baum (1995, 43) suggests that the president can throw his weight behind
“anti-Court action in Congress,” as well as to publicly lambaste the Court if he
disagrees with its decision. Moreover, the Court does not simply operate in the kind
o f contextual vacuum depicted by attitudinal theorists but instead acts strategically.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

125
As Epstein and Knight (1998, 43) note, members o f the Court "act strategically,
anticipating the wishes o f the executive branch, and responding accordingly to avoid
a confrontation that could threaten its legitimacy."
I devised a measure o f solicitor general participation according to whether the
solicitor general participated in support or in opposition to the affirmative action
policy being argued before the Court and whether the solicitor general participated as
either an amicus curiae participant or before the Court in oral arguments.^ 1 The
indictor ranges from negative one (argued against affirmative action in the form o f
amicus or oral argument), to zero (no participation in the case), to one (argued for
affirmative action on behalf o f the respective presidential administration in the form
o f amicus or in the form o f oral argum ent).^ From 1971 to 1995 the solicitor general
participated in 15 out o f the 22 cases argued before the Court. The solicitor general
participated in six cases supporting affirmative action and in nine cases against
affirmative action. I use solicitor general participation in the model in two ways. First,
I include the solicitor general index as a semi-continuous variable to assess the
potential influence his participation has on the outcome o f the Court and on the

41 Out o f the 14 cases where the solicitor general participated, he both filed an
amicus brief and participated in oral arguments in six cases {Albemarle, Bakke, Stotts,
Local 93, Paradise, and Adarand). In Griggs, Franks, Furnco, Wygant, Johnson,
Richmond, and Metro, the solicitor general participated through only filing and
amicus brief. In Weber the solicitor general participated only in oral arguments.
42 This measure is somewhat similar to Johnson’s (1999) measure o f solicitor general
participation, where he measures whether the solicitor general participated on behalf
o f the respondent or the petitioner or whether the solicitor general did not
participation in the case.
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individual justices. Second, I create a pair of dummy variables, with no solicitor
general participation as the reference category in order to assess any significant
differences between participation mounted by the Solicitor General on behalf o f the
respective presidential administration and no participation whatsoever on his part. I
include the dummy variable in the analysis this way because it is important to assess
the discrete outcomes o f solicitor general participation given the manner in which the
variable was coded. I hypothesize that solicitor general participation as an amicus
and/or as a participant in oral argument will increase the probability o f a successful
outcome in his favor.

Expression of the Models

In order to generate logit estimates for the first model, which assesses the
influence o f the aforementioned variables on the probability o f the outcome o f the
Court’s decisions, I utilize two statistical techniques to correct for the small sample
size o f only 22 cases. The base model is conceptualized as follows:

Yi = (30 + (31xil + P2xi2 + P3xi3 + p4xi4 + P5xi5 + ei, where:
Yi —outcome o f the Court’s decision on each affirmative action case
(against affirmative action coded 0 and pro affirmative action coded 1)
P0 = intercept term
Coalition/Group Characteristics
XI =

coalition index =
percentage o f coalitions in support of pro-affirmative action petitioner

X2 =

group index =
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percentage o f groups in support o f pro-affirmative action petitioner
X3 =

brief index =
percentage o f briefs in support o f pro-affirmative action petitioner

Control Variables
X4 = ideological tenor o f the Court (composite index o f respective Court, % liberal)
X5 = Solicitor General (SG) participation (coded 1 if SG participated in oral
argument or filed a brief in favor o f the pro-affirmative action petitioner, 0 if no SG
participation, and -1 if SG participated in oral argument or filed a brief in favor of the
anti-affirmative action petitioner)

In what follows, I briefly spell out the expression of the model and describe
the two statistical modeling approaches.

LogXact Parameter Estimation for a Small Sample Size

In order to attempt to estimate the parameters for the variables with a small
sample size o f 2 2 ,1 use a statistical package called LogXact.43 This program is
relatively new and most published studies using this program come from the medical
community and biostatisticians trying to assess the influence o f medications and the
like with a small sample size o f p a t i e n t s . 4 4 This program boasts the estimation of
exact parameters when working with small sample sizes. Whereas the usual method
of estimating logistic regression parameters is maximum likelihood, this method is
often inaccurate or unable to produce estimates at all in the face o f a small sample

43 LogXact. Version 4, Cytel Software Corporation.
44 For an excellent and rich description o f the exact conditional inference method,
see Metha and Patel (1995).
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size o f about fifty or

le s s .4 5

Cox (1970) was one o f the first to propose an alternative

method based on exact permutation distributions (Metha and Patel 1993, 4). LogXact
yields exact p-values and confidence intervals regardless o f the sample size. The
program utilizes sophisticated algorithms made possible by the exponentially
increasing computational power o f computers.
Using this program, the conditional test statistic has a degenerate probability
distribution; that is, it has only a single value with a probability o f one. Despite the
program’s strength, in such situations no conditional maximum likelihood estimation
and other exact estimates are p o ssib le .^ Although the program could not produce
exact p values for my dataset, I attempted to compensate for this failure to estimate by
regrouping and recoding each o f the covariates in the model.47 Table 18 shows the
distributions for the covariates used in the model. I regrouped each of the variables,
with the exception o f solicitor general participation, by quartiles.
The results o f the model are listed below in Table 19. The table lists the odds
ratios and the exact p-values for the independent variables. As the data show, the odds
o f impacting the outcome o f the case in favor o f affirmative action decrease by a
factor o f .10 when coalitions file an amicus brief supporting the pro-affirmative

45 i was unable to produce estimates for this model using SPSS version 7.5.
46 Email correspondence with Kannappan from the Technical Support Group
Department o f Cytel Software <kannappan@cvtel.com > (January 20, 2000).
47 The technical staff at Cytel Software Corporation informed me that in this case I
should recode the covariates and re-run the analysis.
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action litigant. In other words, coalitional activity has a negative effect when other
variables are controlled. For the strength o f group participation in favor o f affirmative
Table 18
Distributions o f Covariates

NG

Group

NB

Brief

NC

Coalition

NI

Ideology

1

.40
.50
.57
.64
.67

1

.40
.44
.50
.53

1

.00 (4)
.69
.71
.75
.78

1

-0.40
-0.22 (2)

2

-0.20 (6)

3

-0.18 (4)

4

-0.12(6)
-0.02 (2)
0.07

2
2

3

.70
.76
.80
.85
.86

3

.87
.88
.89
4

4

.91
.93
.94
.96 (2)
1-0 (2)

.58 (2)
.65 (2)
.67(2)
.68
.71
.72
.73
.74

2

.80
.83 (2)

3

.86 (2)
.88 (2)
.90

4

1.0 (6)

.75
.80
.83
.88
1-0 (2)

Note: All frequencies are equal to 1 unless otherwise noted in parentheses. N for each
variable is 22. NG = recoded group index; NB = recoded brief index; NC = recoded
coalition index; NI = recoded ideology index.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

130
action, the odds increase by a factor of 6.63. This finding indicates that the Court is
more likely to favor the pro affirmative action litigant when more groups file amicus

Table 19
Exact P-values Using Condition Maximum Likelihood Estimation With LogXact

Independent Variable

Odds Ratio

Exact P-value

Brief Index

1.67

0.44

Group Index

6.63*

0.03

Coalition Index

0.10*

0.01

Ideology

1.53

0.25

Solicitor General Participation

1.22

0.57

Number o f cases
Likelihood Ratio Statistic (6 d.f.)

22
12.36*

Note: * indicates significance at the p <.05 level (one-tailed test). Results obtained
with LogXact version 4, Cytel Software Corporation, Cambridge, MA.

briefs in favor o f affirmative action relative to the number o f groups that file against
the pro affirmative action litigant. The data show that the brief index has a negligible
effect on the outcome o f affirmative action cases, as well as the control variables used
in the model. That is, ideology and solicitor general participation are not significant
covariates in this model. At the aggregate level o f the Court’s affirmative action
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decisions, one o f the group indices statistically increases the odds that the Court will
vote pro affirmative action (Group Index), while another group index (Coalition
Index) decreases the odds that the Court will side in favor o f the pro affirmative
action litigant. Why is there a discrepancy between the direction o f the change in
odds between these two indices? The findings presented here suggest that the success
o f coalitional efforts is negligible before the Court across all affirmative action cases.
While coalitions are useful devices for accessing the Court for groups with a smaller
base o f organizational resources, the utility o f these efforts may be confounded by the
fact that coalescing may dilute the influence o f the effort.

Bootstrap Estimates

Since I could not get exact estimates before collapsing the continuous
measures of the group indices and ideology, I utilize the bootstrap technique in order
to more confidently estimate the standard errors. Bootstrapping is a method o f
estimating the standard error o f a statistic using repeated samples from the original
data set. This is done by sampling (with replacement) to get many samples o f the
same size as the original data set. The standard error o f each parameter estimate is
then calculated as the standard deviation o f the bootstrapped estimates. Bootstrap
methodology is used here to obtain confidence regions in circumstances where
consistent normal theory confidence bounds are unreliable, as well as difficult to
obtain. Parameter values from the original data are used as starting values for each
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bootstrap

s a m p le .

48 Using this method I draw 1100 samples o f the 22 cases in order

to estimate the confidence intervals.
Table 20 lists the standard errors and point estimates falling within the 95%
confidence intervals, as well as the significance o f the variables used in this model.
As the data in table 20 show, all of the organizational participation indices are
significant at the p < .05 level. Also, all three coefficients are pointed in the expected
direction. Ideology and Solicitor General participation are not statistically significant
predictors o f the Court’s vote on affirmative action cases.
On the aggregate level of the Court’s affirmative action decisions, these two
models (the results are displayed in Tables 19 and 20) show that the group and
coalition indices are statistically significant predictors o f the Court’s decisions in
affirmative action cases. Ideology and solicitor general participation, however, are not
significant in either model. However, across these two models there exist
discrepancies in the impact of coalitions on the outcome o f the Court’s affirmative
action decisions. Why is this the case? One reason to account for this difference could
be an artifact o f the bootstrap procedure which boosts the number o f permutations to
get the estimates from 22 (using the LogXact program), to 1100 (drawing 1100
samples o f the 22 cases). The bootstrap method, while a useful and appropriate
methodological tool given my small sample size o f 22 cases, may not produce reliable
estimates in the face o f the small sample size o f only 22 cases (Mooney 1996).

48 For more on the bootstrapping technique, see Chemick (1999) and Mooney and
Duval (1993).
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Table 20
Standard Errors and Confidence Intervals for Logistic Regression
Using the Bootstrap Procedure

Variable

Estimate

95% Confidence
Interval

Brief Index

0.75*
(.13)

0.49

1.00

Group Index

0.85*
(.15)

0.56

1.14

Coalition Index

0.86*
(.34)

0.19

1.53

Ideology

-0.02
(.08)

-0.18

.14

Solicitor General Participation

0.00
(.84)

-1.67

1.67

Note: The coefficients listed in the first column are the observed estimates with
bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. The entries under the confidence interval
column show the bounds where the point estimate falls 95% o f the time. * Indicates
statistical significance at the p <. 05 level.
OLS Regression
Since the outcomes o f the affirmative action cases decided by the Court have
been rather close,49 the dependent variable must be recoded to capture the outcome
of the Court’s decisions with more precision. To this end I devise a measure that

49 Sixteen o f the 22 cases have been decided by a margin o f 6-3, 5-4, or 5-3.
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captures the percentage o f the Court’s vote in each case as pro-affirmative action. To
devise this variable I divide the number of justices voting pro-affirmative action by
the total number o f votes in each case. I use ordinary least squares regression (OLS)
utilizing the same model specifications used above. Table 21 displays the results of
the model using this technique.
As the data show, the brief and coalition indices have a statistically significant
effect on the Court’s decision measured in this manner. As the percentage o f liberal
briefs filed increases, the percentage o f the Court’s decisions being pro affirmative
action increases by 1.24 units, holding all other variables constant. However, while
the direction o f the coefficient for the brief index confirms my expectations, the
direction o f the coalition index does not. As the percentage o f coalitions that file pro
affirmative action briefs increases, the percentage o f the justices siding in favor o f the
affirmative action litigant decreases by -0.64 units, holding all other variables
constant. The model is statistically significant at the accepted level o f p <.05. At the
aggregate level o f the Court’s decisions on all affirmative action cases, ideology and
solicitor general participation do not have a statically significant effect.
Taking a step back from the results o f all three models, which assess the
outcome o f the Court’s affirmative action decisions on the aggregate level, we can see
some trends. In all three models, the group and coalition indices are statistically
significant predictors o f the outcome o f affirmative action cases. However, there is a
discrepancy in the direction o f the coefficients for the coalition index. This
discrepancy may be an artifact o f the different methods employed in order to estimate

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

135
Table 21
Assessing Organizational Participation, Ideology, and Solicitor General Participation
on the Outcome of the Court’s Affirmative Action Cases Using OLS Regression

Independent Variable

Estimate

Brief Index

1.24*
(-51)

Group Index

-3.60*
(.51)

Coalition Index

-0.64*
(.16)

Ideology

0.00
(.45)

Solicitor General Participation

-0.13
(.06)

Constant

0.22
(.23)

Number o f cases
R-square
Adjusted R-square
F-Statistic

22
.65
.54
5.85

Note: Values are unstandardized coefficients. The standard errors are listed in
parentheses. * Indicates statistical significance at the p <. 05 level.

the coefficients. Also, ideology and solicitor general participation, on the aggregate
level, did not have a statistically significant effect on the Court’s vote.
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The Efficacy o f Organized Participation at the Micro-Level o f the Individual Justice
At this point, I turn to modeling the individual justice’s votes on all
affirmative action cases as a function o f the same independent variables used in the
model presented earlier.
Model 4 focuses on the outcome o f the affirmative action cases using the
individual justice’s votes as the dependent variable (n = 157). The logistic regression
model is expressed as follows:

Yi = PO + pi xi l + P2xi2 + p3xi3 + p4xi4 + P5xi5 + P6xi6 + ei, where:
Yi = outcome o f each justice’s decision on each affirmative action case
(Against affirmative action coded 0 and pro affirmative action coded 1)
PO = intercept term (no S.G. participation as the reference group)
XI = group index
X2 = brief index
X3 = coalition index
X4 = ideology score for each justice
X5 = dummy variable for S.G. participation pro affirmative action
X6 = dummy variable for S.G. participation against affirmative action
Findings
The logit coefficients for the base model, with solicitor general participation
as a continuous variable, are displayed in the left-hand column of Table 22. Of the
three organizational indices, only the brief index is significant at a level o f p < .05.
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Table 22
Logistic Regression Estimates for the Probability o f Organized Participation,
Ideology, and Solicitor General Participation Influencing
the Individual Justice’s Vote

Variable

Estimates

Estimates (with Dummy Variables)

Brief Index

4.96*
(2.23)

5.17*
(2.29)

Group Index

-2.42
(2.77)

-3.31
(2.86)

Coalition Index

-1.97
(2.10)

-2.64
(2.15)

Ideology

1.62*
(0.31)

1.62*
(0.32)

Solicitor General

-0.55
(0.31)

S.G. Pro Affirmative
Action

-1.59*
(0.62)

S.G. Con Affirmative
Action

-0.20
(0.49)

Constant

0.65
(1.60)

2.42
(1.87)

Number of cases
Log Likelihood
Likelihood Ratio
Percent Correctly Predicted
Pseudo R-square

157
-86.47
43.27*
70.06
.20

157
-84.46
47.29*
68.15
.22

Note: Values are unstandardized coefficients. The standard errors are listed in
parentheses. * Indicates statistical significance at the p <. OS level.
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Also, the direction o f the coefficient for this variable is in the expected direction.
Ideology is statistically significant at p <. 05 and the coefficient o f this variable goes
in the expected direction. The continuous measure o f the participation on the part o f
the Solicitor General is not statistically significant, nor does the direction o f the
variable go in the expected direction.
These findings tell us that on the micro-level, the percentage o f briefs filed in
support o f affirmative action policies being argued before the Court has a statistically
significant affect on the probability o f the individual justice’s vote on the case.
However, not all o f the measures of organized participation before the Court,
measured in terms o f the coalition and group indices, significantly influence the
individual justice’s votes in these cases. Although it is troubling that the directionality
o f the coefficients for these two variables goes against the grain o f my expectations
about their direction, these variables are not statistically significant.
As the notes at the bottom of the table indicate, the model has a statistically
significant log-likelihood ratio at p <. 001. This model properly categorizes about 70
percent o f the justices’ votes on affirmative action. The m odel’s chi-squared test
reaches a level o f statistical significance at the level o f p <. 05. We can reject the null
hypothesis that the variables included in the model do not serve as robust predictive
The next model includes dummy variables for solicitor general participation,
with no solicitor general participation as the reference category. I run this model with
dummy variables for solicitor general participation in order to test whether there is a
significant difference in the type of participation mounted in each case. The results o f
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the logit estimation procedure are listed in right-hand column o f Table 22. As the data
reveal, the model has a statistically significant log-likelihood ratio (p <. 001). This
model properly categorizes about 68 percent o f the Court’s votes. Not unlike the base
model, the score for the brief index is statistically significant at the p < .05 level and
the other two organizational indices are not statistically significant. Ideology also
maintains its significance in this model at the p < .05 level. Looking at the dummy
variables for solicitor general participation, the data show that there is a statistically
significant difference in the influence on the individual justice’s vote when the
solicitor general participates as pro-affirmative action vis-a-vis no participation
whatsoever. However, the negative direction o f the coefficient goes against the grain
of my expectation that individual justices would side with the position o f the solicitor
general. In fact, this finding suggests that participation in support o f affirmative
action on the part o f the solicitor general has the reverse effect. Also, I find that there
is no significant difference between con affirmative action participation and no
participation mounted by the solicitor general. These findings are surprising given the
wealth o f empirical data that find such high success rates for the solicitor general.
In the face o f the wealth o f empirical validation o f the success rates o f
solicitor general participation, I find that there is no significant difference between no
solicitor general participation and solicitor general participation against affirmative
action in the form o f amicus curiae or in the form o f participation in oral arguments.
Further, I find that pro affirmative action solicitor general participation has a negative
and significant impact on the individual justices’ opinions.
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Do we find any commonalities between the aggregate and the individual-level
models? Across the aggregate and the individual-level models, the most noteworthy
finding is the statistical significance o f the percentage o f briefs filed in the direction
o f favoring affirmative action policies argued before the Court. While the percentage
o f groups participating before the Court pro affirmative action was statistically
significant using the bootstrap method for the aggregate model, it did not stand up to
statistical significance for any other model. On the aggregate level o f the Court’s
decisions, the impact o f coalitional activity was significant and negative for two o f
the three models. At the micro-level o f the individual justices’ decisions, coalitional
activity had a statistically significant negative effect on the probability o f the justices
voting pro affirmative action. Another important finding is the strength o f ideology at
the individual level. At the micro-level, ideology is the strongest predictor o f the
outcome o f the justices’ votes.
This finding is commensurate with the fountain o f research supporting the
attitudinal model, which purports that individual justices are driven by their policy
predilections when making decisions. However, the impact of ideology for the Court
as a whole did not significantly predict the outcome of the Court’s affirmative action
decisions.
One o f the most surprising findings o f the models was the statistically
negative effect that pro affirmative action solicitor general participation had on the
outcome o f the individual justices’ votes. Also, I found no significant difference
between no solicitor general participation and when the solicitor general participates
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against affirmative action. These findings go against the grain o f the literature on the
high success rates o f the solicitor general participating before the Court. On the
aggregate level, however, there is no indication that solicitor general participation has
an effect on the outcome o f the Court’s affirmative action decisions.
In general, the findings tell us about the importance o f briefs in general and
the utility o f coalitions in particular. Whereas the findings presented in chapter four
showcased the importance o f organizational resources and its relationship to the filer
status of organized groups, the finding presented here suggest that the utility of
coalitions has a negligible effect on the outcome o f the Court’s decision on
affirmative action cases.
Two o f the major findings from these models need further explanation. Does
there exist a theoretical explanation in the literature as to why the higher proportion of
coalitional activity have a negative impact on the individual justices’ votes? Also,
why is the participation mounted by the solicitor general unsuccessful across all
affirmative action cases?
In A Theory o f Political Coalitions, William R ik er(1962) attempted to
construct a theory o f coalitions based on the assumptions o f the rational-choice model
(e.g., participants have perfect information). Riker devised a set o f propositions from
his game-theoretical model o f coalitions and argued that with complete and perfect
information, coalitions that tend to win are of a relatively small size. Riker argued
that larger coalitions are o f little value to the extent that there is a diminishing return
for the effectiveness o f a coalition as the size o f the coalition increases. For Riker, the
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size o f the coalition is important for purposes o f effectiveness and utility. Riker
proposed that “in social situations similar to n-person, zero-sum games with sidepayments, participants create coalitions just as large as they believe will ensure
winning and no larger (1962, 32-33). That is to say, Riker argued that the number o f
participants in coalitions is conditioned by their subjective perception o f how many
participants they need to win. After that, participants in coalitions seek to minimize
the number o f participants entering into the coalition in order to maintain this winning
size. My results about the negative effect o f coalitions on the outcome o f the
individual justices’ votes support Riker’s theoretical considerations. That is, as the
proportion o f coalitions in favor of affirmative action increase, it has a negative effect
on the outcome o f the justices’ decisions.
Perhaps if we look more closely at the context o f solicitor general
participation across all affirmative action cases, paying particular attention to the
position o f the respective presidential administrations, it may lend clues to this unique
and interesting finding.
Looking across all o f the presidential administrations from Nixon to Clinton,
each administration lobbied the Court consistently either pro affirmative action or
against affirmative

a c t io n .^

Out of the 22 cases spanning these administrations,

50 The following is a breakdown of the respective presidential administration’s
participation across all affirmative action cases.

Nixon

Pro

None Con

Total

0

2

3

1

Success Rate (excluding no
participation)
0%
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solicitor generals for these administrations articulated positions 14 times, leaving
eight cases where there was no participation on the part o f the solicitor general for the
respective presidential administrations.
Although the Nixon and Ford administrations only participated in two
affirmative action cases (Griggs and Albemarle respectively), both lobbied against
affirmative action. In both cases the Court decided against the wishes o f their
administrations. Out o f the five affirmative action cases argued during the window o f
the Carter administration, the Carter administration’s solicitor general participated in
three cases. The success rate for the Carter administration in these three cases was 66
percent. Eight affirmative action cases were brought before the Court during the
Reagan administration. The solicitor general participated in five out of eight of these
cases and in all five, the solicitor general participated against affirmative action. On
the whole, the Court upheld the Reagan administration's affirmative action position in
40 percent o f the cases where the solicitor general took a position. Moreover, despite
the concerted effort on the part o f the Reagan administration lobbying the Court
against affirmative action, the Court sided with the Reagan administration’s position
only 40 percent o f the time (two out o f five cases). The Bush administration

Ford

0

0

I

1

0%

Carter

3

2

0

5

66%

Reagan

0

3

5

8

40%

Bush

0

1

3

4

66%

Clinton

1

0

0

1

0%
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participated in three out o f the four affirmative action cases during his tenure and was
successful 66 percent o f the time (two out o f three). Finally, the solicitor general
acting as a voice for the Clinton administration only participated in one case:
Adarand. Here the solicitor general argued pro affirmative action and the Court
decided against the grain o f the Clinton administration’s position.
Although the extant literature suggests that the solicitor general enjoys a high
success rate in the Courts, these findings could be the product o f the particular policy
arena at hand. That is, affirmative action is a divisive policy arena and perhaps
participation on the part of the respective administration’s is viewed by the Court as
more symbolic than substantive. Scholars have documented the extent to which
racially-based issues, such as affirmative action, are polarizing (Carmines and
Stimson 1989; Edsall and Edsall 1991). In Chain Reaction, Edsall and Edsall (1991)
documented the extent to which affirmative action as a policy arena serves as a
symbolic and polarizing issue among presidential administrations. According to
Edsall and Edsall, o f all the civil rights issues that have surfaced in the last few
decades, none is more polarizing and symbolic than affirmative action, especially
with regards to race-based affirmative action. Presidential administration may very
well capitalize on issues such as affirmative action to connote symbolic overtones on
these policies through their participation in the Court.
Also, one o f the reasons that the solicitor general enjoys such a high success
rate is due to the fact that he relays important information to the Court about the
administration's position (Johnson 1999; McGuire 1998; Spriggs and Wahlbeck
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1997). However, the Court must also entertain important jurisprudential arguments in
order to make constitutional sense out o f issues. Since all o f these administrations
mounted consistent and one-sided participation either for or against affirmative
action, perhaps the Court did not see this participation as adding anything to the
constitutional puzzles with which it confronted. And since the Court has been viewed
as a set of strategic actors that takes cues from organized participants (Epstein and
Knight 1998), the symbolic participation on the part o f the respective administration’s
may not aid in reducing the costs o f sorting through the landscape o f constitutional
issues.
In the next chapter, I summarize the findings o f my research and revisit the
theme articulated at the beginning o f the dissertation. That is, I assess the extent to
which the dynamics o f organized participation before the Supreme Court fit into the
larger and picture o f pluralist theory. Finally, I lay out some paths for future research
to be explored.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS
In an effort to understand the participation o f organized interests in the context
o f the Court, this dissertation research provides some empirical evidence that
coalitions are useful vehicles for groups to access the judicial playing field that do not
command, on average, a large base o f resources. However, I also find that there is not
strong evidence to suggest that these efforts in coalitions have a positive effect on the
outcome o f the Court’s affirmative action decisions.
In this final chapter, I summarize the major findings o f the research. Also, I
spell out some caveats given the findings o f this research. Also, I map out plans for
future research.

Summary o f Findings

First I examined the extent o f organized participation across all affirmative
action cases argued before the Supreme Court. I surveyed the landscape of organized
participation before the Court from 1971 (Griggs) to 1995 {Adarand). I found that
groups o f all organizational stripes have been lobbying the Court in the form o f
coalitions. I constructed a coalition index (dividing the total number o f amicus filers
by the total number o f coalitions for each case), that indicated that the proportion o f
organized groups relative to the number o f coalitions that filed amicus briefs in each
146
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case. I found that there has been an almost steady and concerted effort on the part o f
groups to form coalitions when lobbying the Court. Since Stotts (1984), participation
before the Supreme Court on affirmative action cases has been overwhelmingly in the
form o f coalitions. Based on the classification scheme used to code the different types
o f organizations lobbying the Court, I found that since Stotts (1984) participation has
become more diverse over time. That is to say, I found that almost all organization
types participated across all affirmative action cases since Stotts (1984).
And while I found that no single case netted participation among all o f the
organization types, there has been a concerted effort on the part o f both governmental
and non-governmental organizations to shape the outcomes o f affirmative action
cases through amicus participation. Among non-governmental groups, citizen, public
interest law, and business and professional groups were the most frequent participants
before the Court in these cases. Among governmental groups, I found that states were
the most active participants and most state participation was in the form o f coalitions
(94.9 percent o f the time). Since the Wygant case, state attorneys general participated
with the most frequency and most consistency among all o f the governmental types of
organizations. I also found that a majority o f organizations were repeat players that
filed both solo briefs, as well as co-filing briefs in coalitions with other groups.
Next, I turned my attention to examining the coalitional activity o f these
groups. The driving research question addressed in chapter four was whether
organizational factors shaped the probability o f groups filing together in a coalition.
Using logistic regression, I assessed the extent to which organizational characteristics
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such as staff size, as a proxy for organizational resources, as well as organizational
vitality (measured in years), affected the probability that organizations would
participate as either solo-filers or as co-filers in coalitions. I also examined whether
there were any significant differences between different organizational types of
groups and their propensity to participate as filers or co-filers.
The results confirmed my expectations about the significance o f staff size.
That is, larger staff sizes of organizations affected the probability that organizations
filed solo briefs. Although the number o f years a group has been active significantly
predicted the filer status o f organized participation before the Court, I found that the
direction o f the coefficient went against the grain o f my expectations. The results
indicated that groups that have been on the scene longer are more likely to engage in
coalitions than to file solo briefs.
As an alternative explanation, I posited that organizations that have been
around for longer periods of time could understand the virtue and utility o f coalescing
with other groups. This may reflect the more general trend that groups are
increasingly likely to engage in coalitional behavior, as proposed by Schlozman and
Tierney (1986) and others (Browne 1990; Hojnacki 1997, 1998; Hula 1995, 1999;
Salisbury 1992). The results of my model also demonstrated that there was a
statistically significant difference in the filer status o f citizen-based organizations and
business/professional organizations and peak associations. The directionality o f the
coefficient for citizen-based organizations suggested that these groups were more
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likely to engage in coalitional activity than business/professional organizations, and
peak associations.
In Chapter V I tested whether organized participation had an effect on the
outcome o f the Court’s affirmative action decisions. I assessed the efficacy o f group
participation at both the macro-level o f the Court’s decisions, as well as the micro
level o f the individual justices.
One o f the most significant findings o f these models was the statistical
significance o f the percentage o f briefs filed in the direction of favoring affirmative
action policies argued before the Court at the micro level o f the individual justices’
votes. Another significant finding was the strength o f the justice’s ideology at the
micro level. Perhaps the most interesting finding from this research is the statistically
significant and negative impact that coalitions have on the outcome o f the justices’
votes in affirmative action cases. This finding is consistent with Riker’s (1962)
theoretical formulation regarding minimum winning coalitions. That is, as the size o f
coalitions increase, the success rate become more negligible.
I also found that pro affirmative action participation mounted by the solicitor
general had a statistically negative effect on the probability o f the individual justices
voting in favor o f affirmative action. I proposed that affirmative action is a deeply
partisan and symbolic issue and that the Court may not be as receptive to presidential
administrations’ positions in this highly polarizing and symbolic issue area. In sum,
the findings tell us about the importance o f briefs in general and the utility o f
coalitions in particular. Whereas the findings presented in Chapter IV showcased the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

150

importance of organizational resources and its relationship to the filer status o f
organized groups, the finding presented here suggest that the utility o f coalitions has a
negligible effect on the outcome o f the Court’s decision on affirmative action cases.
At this juncture, I revisit some o f the major themes articulated earlier. What
do my findings tell us about the disadvantaged litigant in Court? What are the
consequences o f these findings for the broader picture o f pluralism?

The Disadvantaged Litigant Revisited
Political disadvantage theory holds that the courts are the most accessible
forum for groups that are politically and financially disadvantaged. Cortner (1968)
argued that disadvantaged groups turn to the courts because while other institutional
access points in the political system are difficult to access, the courts are guided by
the principle o f the rule o f law and impartiality. That is to say, Cortner argued that the
rules o f the game governing access to other governmental institutions is structured for
groups with a larger base o f political and financial capital compared to the judiciary
where access is governed by the rule o f law. Further, the Court itself, in NAACP v.
Button (1963), has acknowledged that it was a haven for marginalized groups in terms
o f political and financial muscle. Other studies have built upon the framework set up
by Cortner and have argued that organizations that are politically and financially
disadvantaged turn to the courts (Greenberg 1974; Sorauf 1976; Wenner 1984).
Others have found that amicus curiae participation is a relatively less costly way for
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groups to participate, compared to direct sponsorship o f cases (Caldeira and Wright
1988; O ’Connor 1980).
Recently, however, scholars have challenged and criticized this theory. For
example, Olson (1990) argued that a host of groups use litigation tactics that are
advantaged in terms o f resources and political muscle. This finding was documented
earlier by Epstein (1985) who showed that conservative and corporate interests have
concentrated their efforts on the courts. Still, others criticize this theory due to the fact
that advantaged interests (in terms o f political and financial resources) utilize the
courts just as extensively as disadvantaged interests (Bradley and Gardner 1985;
Dolbeare 1978; Epstein 1985; Olson 1990).
Although Cortner and others who examine participation under the rubric of
disadvantage theory focus on access to the Courts, the findings regarding the success
rates and effectiveness of disadvantaged groups are not as positive. That is, studies
show that groups with a larger base o f resources are more successful in the courts. As
Galanter (1974) notes, the “haves” usually come out ahead of the “have-nots.” Other
scholars have confirmed Galanter’s findings at different levels o f the judiciary.
Wheeler, Cartwright, Kagan, and Friedman (1987) found that the more financially
well-off groups enjoy higher success rates at the level o f state supreme courts and
Songer and Sheehan (1992) found higher rates o f success for the “haves” at the level
o f the U.S. Court o f Appeals. Also, Caldeira and Wright (1988) presented evidence
that business and professional organizations, that command a wealth o f resources
compared to other organizational types, significantly shape what cases are placed on
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the Court’s docket. In sum, these studies suggest that the “haves” do indeed come out
ahead for the same reason that these groups enjoy success in other institutional
forums such as the legislative and executive branches.
The research presented here adds to this corpus o f literature on disadvantage
theory by showing that coalitions are another vehicle through which groups with
limited resources can access the Court. Undoubtedly though, some disadvantaged
groups as identified by Cortner (1968) and others command a large base o f
organizational resources and to that extent they are not necessarily disadvantaged.
However, a flurry o f organized interests participating as amici do not enjoy such a
wealth o f resources and the data show that they are more likely to engage in
coalitional activity.
Moreover, participating in coalitions as co-filers seems to be a way that
groups can off-set the relatively high cost o f accessing the Court through filing
amicus curiae briefs. The findings presented here confirm some o f the scholarship on
disadvantage theory cited earlier in so far as access is concerned. That is, groups that
are not as organizationally well o ff in terms o f resources tend to access the Court
through co-filer participation as amici.
However, the effectiveness o f these efforts does not bode well for coalitional
activity. Whereas participation as amici in coalitions may off-set the costs o f filing an
amicus brief alone and enable groups to participate, these efforts have a negative
impact on the outcome o f the Court’s affirmative action cases.
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Mitigating the Defects o f Pluralism?
What do the characteristics o f coalition members tell us about group access to
the Court within the pluralist system? At the outset o f this project I laid out a
theoretical framework o f pluralism in general and the “new judicial pluralism” in
particular. The pluralist enterprise attempted to demonstrate how the democratic
process worked in the face of the inattentiveness o f citizens in the electoral process.
Truman (1951), building on the foundations set down by Bentley (1908), argued that
groups operated at a political equilibrium. That is, when their interests were
“disturbed,” groups would control and neutralize their surroundings. Dahl (1967)
articulated some o f these themes regarding pluralism and he suggested that no one
group would dominate the political process because o f the competitiveness that a free
society engenders. Kelso (1978) calls this “laissez-faire pluralism.” Under the rubric
o f this type o f pluralism, Kelso argues that the political system is responsive to a host
o f groups accessing the policy stage where politics is characterized by openness.
Others, however, have argued that the picture painted by pluralist theorists is
inaccurate. Recalling Schattschneider’s (1960) observation that the pluralist heaven
sings with an “upper class accent,” advantaged groups (read: business and corporate
interests) command a larger resource base and, consequently, were more influential in
the government process. Dahl (1982, 40) suggested that the organizational advantages
o f some groups over others leads to political inequality. Dahl argued that "...other
things being equal, the organized are more influential than an equivalent number o f
unorganized citizens. Further, for Dahl (1982, 47) resources are an integral part o f the
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success or failure o f groups and the extent to which the agenda is distorted. "The
unequal resources that allow organizations to stabilize injustice also enable them to
exercise unequal influence in determining what alternatives are seriously considered."
A more contemporary account of pluralism, echoed by Schlozman and Tiemey
(1986), suggested that Schattschneider’s observations are fitting today. Taken as a
whole, according to Schlozman and Tiemey (1986), the interest group community is
heavily weighted in favor o f business organizations.
In light o f the aforementioned criticisms o f the asymmetric balance o f power
in the interest group community, this study documented that business and
professional groups accounted for only about 10 percent o f the participation o f all
organized interested across all affirmative action cases. Citizen groups, on the other
hand, were the most active participants. But the overall findings across all affirmative
action cases are commensurate with Caldeira and Wright’s (1990) observations
insofar as we see a diverse lot of organized groups actively engaging the Court.
This finding is not too surprising, given that the general trend in amicus curiae
participation is extensive in civil rights cases (recall the findings presented in Table 1)
where briefs were filed in all race and gender-based civil rights cases during the
Rehnquist Court era. With regards to affirmative action cases, coalitions have become
a staple o f the lobbying process in the Supreme Court and coalitions serve as an
effective means for organized groups to access the judicial playing field. Since groups
with a smaller organizational resource base engage in coalitional activity moreso than
those with a large base o f organizational resources, coalitions serve to mitigate the
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potential defects o f pluralism insofar as access is concerned. However, accessing the
judicial playing field is only part o f the picture. As far as success is concerned, I
found that coalitions have a negative impact on the outcome o f the Court’s
affirmative action cases.
This finding regarding the interaction between groups filing amicus briefs
together in coalitions has significant implications for pluralism. Riker’s (1962)
assessment o f minimum winning coalitions set down an important foundation for
understanding the behavior o f organized interests. Although it was beyond the scope
o f this project to assess what constitutes a minimum winning coalition according to
Riker’s formulation, it is in order to at least speculate what effects this has on the
broader scope o f interest groups and pluralism.
At the core o f Riker’s theory o f coalitions, winning is everything. According
to Riker, rational actors in groups attempt not simply to access institutions but to
succeed in shaping policy. And while the findings presented above show that
coalitional activity has a negative impact on the outcome o f the individual justices’
decisions, there may be other incentives for groups to join coalitions beyond success
in the outcome o f the case. Riker’s assumptions fit into the corpus of literature that
suggests that groups act in concert for the strategic reason o f shaping policy
outcomes. For example Loomis (1986) and Salisbury (1992) suggest that coalitions
are more effective vehicles for shaping policy in the face o f a fragmented political
and interest group environment.
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There are, however, other incentives that groups have to join coalitions
beyond achieving specific policy goals. Another reason groups may unify and
coordinate their efforts may have to do with the benefit o f sharing information.
Laumann and Knoke (1987) and Heinz, Laumann, Salisbury, and Nelson (1990) show
that information sharing is a valued benefit among Washington lobbyists, as these
lobbyists often seek out allies in their effort to share information. Especially for
groups that have a small budget and staff, coalitions may be important avenues
through which groups can keep up with the complexity and deluge of information on
a policy arena.
Another incentive that groups have to coalesce beyond successful outcomes is
group maintenance. While success in a policy arena is undoubtedly important, some
groups may join in a coalition for the symbolic benefits that engaging in a coalition
offers. That is, participation in a coalition may be a way for groups to show their
members that they are engaging in important activity, even, in this case, if their
participation only amounts to signing onto an amicus brief. Moreover, participation
may be important for groups to satisfy their membership base. Hula (1999) suggests
that groups may sign onto a project without even knowing the substantive content o f
the issue at hand. Hula (1999, 37) argues that some groups sign onto a project in a
coalition “ .. .for the sake o f an audience—so they could tell their members that they
had worked on the project and could show the relevant committee staff that they were
active in the policy arena.”
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Although it was beyond the scope o f this project to assess the motivation
behind why groups filed amicus briefs together in coalitions, we can see that groups
join coalitions for different reasons. Perhaps the strategic incentive o f shaping the
policy outcome o f the affirmative action cases was not the only reason why these
groups participated in coalitions. More research needs to be done in order to assess
these incentives and why groups participated in coalitions as amici. A path for future
research could use Hula’s typology (1995, 1999) o f coalitional players (e.g., core
members, players, and tag-along groups) in order to meter out the manner of
participation in coalitions. That is, do some groups simply “tag-along” to a coalition
in order to satisfy their membership vase? Which groups in these affirmative action
coalitions brokered the coalition? Which groups provided the policy and legal
knowledge, as well as the financial resources, to mount participation as amici? Survey
research can aid in the task o f getting a more refined picture o f the motivations
behind why groups act together in coalitions.
In the following sections, I spell-out some caveats about the findings o f the
research presented earlier, as well as some paths for future research.

Some Caveats About Generalizability
Browne (1988) notes some methodological problems associated with interest
group research. Broad theoretical treatments, which attempt to understand interest
group behavior in the larger political environment, rely mostly on anecdotal evidence.
Case studies o f individual groups or organizations provide rich detail but leave the
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reader to wonder whether the findings at the micro-level are more the exception than
the rule. Macro-level analysis o f groups may lend itself to making generalizations but,
according to Browne (1988, 1-3), may miss the mark on the context within which
behavior and proclivities o f groups take place. Pratt (1976) argues that a sounder
methodological approach is to combine the elements o f the approaches listed earlier.
Moreover, studying a single policy domain over time, such as affirmative
action, may lend sounder insight into the behavior o f groups. Some have incorporated
the policy-domain focus beyond a single domain. Hula (1999) argues that scholars
should adopt a multi-domain approach. Hula’s work documents coalitional activity
among organized interest groups within three policy domains: transportation,
education, and civil rights. Although the results o f this research cannot necessarily be
generalized for all issue domains, the methodological design presented above can
serve as a springboard for future research.

Paths for Future Research
Survey Research
Recently, some scholars have tried to capture the nuances o f organized
participation and, more specifically, coalitional activity, through administering survey
instruments to a variety o f organized interest groups (Hojnacki 1997, 1998; Hula
1995, 1999). These studies have reinvigorated scholarship concerning coalitional
behavior.
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Another source of data for understanding the nuances o f group participation
before the Court comes from a recently issued U.S. Supreme Court rule. The Court
issued a new rule that requires amicus participants to disclose whether the counsel for
a party authors a brief “in whole or in part.” This rule was effective on May 1, 1997.
Before this rule was issued, it was difficult to ascertain which groups provided the
legal resources for writing the brief. Moreover, the list o f groups participating as
amici on a brief are listed alphabetically and scholars have pointed out that
researchers should not impute any significance to which group was listed first on the
brief (Spaeth 1995). This new rule issued by the Court requires the identification of
“every person or entity, other than the amicus curiae, its members, or its counsel, who
made a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission o f the brief.”
However, this disclosure rule does not apply to amicus briefs submitted on the part of
federal, state, and local governments. With this rule in effect, scholars may have more
data at their disposal in order to investigate the extent o f organized participation for
both solo filers as well as co-filers participating in coalitions.

Political Entrepreneurs and Coalition Brokers
Scholars also need to assess the role o f political entrepreneurs in the context
o f coalition formation. In “An Exchange Theory o f Interest Groups,” Salisbury
(1969) argues that interest group origins, as well as the growth, death, and success of
organizations, may be better explained if we look at them as “exchange relationships”
between entrepreneurs or key organizers and their members, who invest capital in a

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

160
set o f benefits which they offer to their prospective members at a price (membership).
Whereas scholars such as Truman (1951) and Bentley (1908) argued that the
proliferation o f groups was due to some disequilibrium in the sea o f potential interests
groups, Salisbury argues that we must understand the role o f interest groups in light
o f organizers who invest capital to create a system o f benefits which they offer to a
market o f potential customers at a price. If enough customers (read potential
members) buy (read join) to make a viable organization, the group will be in business.
If, on the other hand, the benefits fail, or the costs exceed the benefits, the group will
fail and collapse. The entrepreneur in this case is the initiator o f the enterprise and
bears the brunt o f costs to organize the group for collective action. Salisbury builds
on Clark and W ilson’s (1961) typology o f benefits and argues that political
entrepreneurs must maintain a satisfactory flow o f exchange o f benefits to keep the
group alive. Also, Moe (1980) argues that entrepreneurs play a managerial role. That
is, they offer both economic and noneconomic benefits to members and persuade
members that their individual contributions are indispensable to secure the collective
good.
Political entrepreneurs in both the eyes o f Salisbury and Moe must create a
surplus o f benefits to sustain the group’s cohesion and success. Scholars should
extend this theoretical formulation regarding the role o f the political entrepreneur to
coalitional behavior among organized interests.
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Organized Participation at the Jurisdictional Versus Plenary Stage
o f the Supreme Court

Do groups mount the same efforts lobbying the Court in the jurisdictional
stage (deciding whether or not to grant certiorari) than during the plenary stage of
full-blown oral arguments and opinion writing? Research in this area suggests that
among non-government groups, groups with larger resource bases, namely corporate
interests and governmental interests, have more o f an impact on setting the Court’s
agenda (Caldeira and Wright 1990). Caldeira and Wright also find that among
governmental groups, state governments file more amicus briefs at the jurisdictional
stage than any other type.
There are significant implications to these findings in light of the findings
presented here. Earlier I suggested that coalitional activity is an effective avenue
through which groups with a smaller base o f organizational resources can access the
Courts. The substantive conclusion of this finding is that coalitions serve as a
participatory device to mitigate the defects o f pluralism. However, since Caldeira and
Wright show that the participation o f states, as well as business and corporate
interests have a significant effect on whether the Court grants a case plenary review,
then there seems to be an imbalance in the types o f participation among groups at
different stages o f judicial decision making. Moreover, a path for future research
should more thoroughly assess the types o f organizations participating at the
jurisdictional and plenary stage and examine more thoroughly the effect that
coalitions have on accessing the Court at each stage in the process.
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Institutional Context and Choice

Do the rules o f the game governing access to institutions such as the Court
and Congress affect alliance strategies? How do institutional arrangements affect the
strategies groups employ to influence the political process, with particular attention
paid to coalition-building and alliance formation as a means to that end? Both
Hojnacki (1997, 1998) and Hula’s (1995, 1999) analyses have reinvigorated interest
group scholars to assess interest group coalitional formation and behavior. However,
these studies examine interest group coalitional activity in the institutional context of
Congress. A path for future research would be to attempt to understand the changing
shape in the context o f different institutional settings where the rules o f the game
governing access to the process is different. The following is a set o f interesting
questions that would be fruitful to understand the strategies groups employed to
participate in different institutional contexts: Do we expect to find increased
coalitional activity in the context o f one institutional setting versus another, or are
pressure mounted equally on both sides? Have certain institutional changes in the
Court/Congress facilitated increased coalitional activity?
Additionally, how can we empirically recognize coalitional activity in a
consistent and comprehensive manner for both institutional access points? How do
institutional factors affect coalitional activities? Do alliances persist across different
access points in the political system or do specific institutional rules o f the game
facilitate the probability o f coalitional activity where institutional barriers do not
encumber access? Studies that examine increasing interest group involvement need
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not only explain the rise o f interest group participation but more importantly need to
understand the changing shape o f these patterns. Also, one must understand the
changing shape in the context o f different institutional settings where the rules o f the
game governing access to the process is different.
Congressional hearings provide a consistent and comprehensive account of
the interaction between legislators and interest group participants (Hansen 1991). The
testimony of interest groups before committees and subcommittees provides a
detailed record o f which interest groups participated and more importantly for
purposes o f analysis on behalf o f whom the respective groups are speaking. Not
unlike the amicus briefs presented by interested parties before the Court, the written
testimony o f interest group participants lays-out a detailed picture o f the coalitions
involved and their stated interests. From these detailed records I may be able to gauge
coalitional behavior before congressional hearings.
Hearings are a stage show, and lawmakers are keenly aware o f their
role as actors. They curry the favor o f those who are important to
them; they feign interest in the testimony o f those who can be ignored;
and they pummel those they are expected to pummel (Hansen 1991,
23).
The most visible means o f influencing legislation is through participation in
congressional hearings. Here, groups establish themselves as players. The legislative
process is legitimized by virtue o f a variety o f groups participating in this process.
Although scholars agree that group testimony does not necessarily persuade
committee members of the group’s positions (Evans 1991,264), it is the most visible
forum through which we can assess the extent o f coalitional activity.
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One way to tease-out which groups not only participate in the affirmative
action policy arena but engage in coalitional behavior is to examine those groups who
participated together during congressional hearings. Here, we can gauge over time,
not unlike the Courts, which groups participated together, which groups acted in
concert with one another, which groups are repeat players, and whether
organizational resources affect coalitional activity in each institutional venue.
Moreover, the incentives to form a coalition may be a product o f institutionallysituated circumstances.
These paths for future research projects will lead scholars in the direction o f
understanding the nuances o f coalitional activity in a variety o f ways. Scholars should
examine not only the incentives that groups have to join coalitions but also how
different institutional contexts shape organized participation in coalitions.
This dissertation explored the extent o f organized participation before the
Supreme Court in all affirmative action cases from 1971 to 1995.1 surveyed the
landscape o f organized participation across all affirmative action cases argued before
the Court and found that a flurry o f different types o f organizations mounted
participation in the form o f amici. One research question I asked was whether
coalitions enable organizations with a smaller base o f resources to access the judicial
playing field through amicus curiae participation. I found that organizations with
smaller staffs are more likely to participate in coalitions, and, contrary to my
expectation, organizations that have been on the scene longer are more likely to
engage in coalitional activity. Another question addressed in the dissertation was
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whether participation mounted by organizations influenced the decisions of the Court
at both the macro (the Court as a whole) and micro levels (individual justices). I
found that at the macro level, the proportion o f briefs filed on the side of the “pro”
affirmative action litigant significantly affects the probability that the Court will vote
in favor o f affirmative action, controlling for the Court’s ideology and solicitor
general participation. I also found, however, that the proportion o f coalitions
lobbying “pro” affirmative action has a statistically negative affect on the outcome o f
the Court’s votes. At the micro level, I found that the proportion o f briefs filed in
favor o f affirmative action had a positive effect on the probability o f the justice’s
voting in favor o f the “pro” affirmative action litigant. The proportion of coalitions
favoring the “pro” affirmative action litigant had a statistically negative effect on the
probability o f the justices’ votes. While the ideology o f the individual justices was
found to be a strong predictor of the their votes in these cases, I found that “pro”
affirmative action participation by the solicitor general had a statistically negative
effect on the justices’ votes. My findings suggest that while coalitions may help to
mitigate the defects o f pluralism insofar as scholars have suggested that access to the
political process is encumbered by a mobilization o f bias, I do not find strong
evidence that the utility of these efforts in coalitions have a positive effect on the
outcome o f the Court’s affirmative action decisions. Scholars should continue to
investigate organized group participation in coalitions not only across different policy
domains but also across different institutional contexts.
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Appendix o f Cases and Amicus Participation in Support of Petitioners and
Respondents
Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 401 U.S. 424 (1971)
Briefs in Support of Petitioner
Solo Filer:

Chamber o f Commerce o f the United States (argued case as amicus
curiae)

Briefs in Support of Respondent
Solo
Solo
Solo
Solo

Filer
Filer
Filer
Filer

Solicitor General for the United States
Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General for the United States
Attorney General o f the State o f New York
United Steelworkers o f America, AFL-CIO

Defunis et al. v. Odegaard et al., 416 U.S. 312 (1974)
Briefs in Support o f Petitioner
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Coalition

Solo Filer

Chamber o f Commerce o f the United States
American Federation o f Labor and Congress o f Industrial
Organizations
American Jewish Congress
Jewish Rights Council
Advocate Society
American Jewish Committee
Joint Civic Committee o f Italian-Americans
Unico National
Anti-Defamation League o f B'nai B’rith

Briefs in Support of Respondent
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Coalition
Solo
Solo
Solo
Solo

Filer
Filer
Filer
Filer

Assistant Attorneys General, for the State o f Ohio
American Bar Association
President and Fellows o f Harvard College
Center for Law and Education, Harvard University
Board o f Governors o f Rutgers, the State University o f New Jersey
Student Bar Association o f Rutgers School o f Law
Deans o f the Antioch School o f Law
Association of American Law Schools
Association o f American Medical Colleges
Group o f Law School Deans
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Coalition

Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Coalition
Coalition
Coalition

Coalition

Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund
Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund
American Civil Liberties Union
American G.I. Forum
Aspira o f America, Inc.
IMAGE
League o f United Latin American Citizens
Puerto Rican Bar Association, Inc.
Puerto Rican Law Students Association, Inc.
La Raza Association of Spanish-Sumamed Americans
La Raza National Lawyers' Association
La Raza National Law Students Association
Council on Legal Education Opportunity
Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.
National Conference of Black Lawyers
American Indian Law Students Association, Inc.
American Indian Lawyers Association, Inc.
Legal Aid Society o f Alameda County
NAACP
National Organization for Women Legal Defense and
Education Fund, Inc.
National Education Association
National Council o f Jewish Women
Union o f American Hebrew Congregations
Commission on Social Action
International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace,
Agricultural Implement Workers o f America (UAW)
United Mine Workers of America (UMWA)
International Union, American Federation o f State, County
and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO
United Farm Workers of America
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Robert C. Wood, President, University o f Massachusetts
United Negro College Fund, Inc.
Americans for Democratic Action
Center for Community Change
Center for National Policy Review
Japanese Americans Citizens League
National Urban Coalition
National Urban League
Southern Christian Leadership Conference
University o f Notre Dame Center for Civil Rights
Children's Defense Fund o f the Washington Research Project, Inc.
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Morton, Secretary o f the Interior, et al. v. Mancari et al., 417 U.S. 535 (1974)
Briefs in Support of Petitioner
Coalition

Solo Filer

Montana Inter-Tribal Policy Board
National Congress o f American Indians
National Tribal Chairmen’s Association
Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund

Briefs in Support o f Respondent
(none)
Albemarle Paper Company v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975)
Solo
Solo
Solo
Solo

Filer
Filer
Filer
Filer

Chamber o f Commerce o f the United States
Lawyer’s Committee for Civil Rights Under Law
American Society for Personnel Administration
Scott Paper Company

Franks v. Bowman Transportation Company, 424 U.S. 747 (1976)
Briefs in Support of Petitioner
Solo Filer
Solo Filer

Solicitor General for the United States
Local 862, United Automobile Workers

Briefs in Support of Respondent
Solo Filer

Chamber of Commerce o f the United States

University o f California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)
Briefs in Support of Petitioner
Coalition
Coalition

Solo
Solo
Solo
Solo

Filer
Filer
Filer
Filer

Attorney General of Washington
University o f Washington
American Civil Liberties Union
ACLU o f Northern California
ACLU o f Southern California
Antioch School of Law
Asian American Bar Association o f the Greater Bay Area
Association o f American Law Schools
Association o f American Medical Colleges
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Coalition
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Coalition
Solo Filer
Coalition

Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Coalition
Coalition

Bar Association o f San Francisco
Los Angeles County Bar Association
Black Law Students Association at the University of California,
Berkeley School o f Law
Black Law Students Union of Yale University Law School
Board o f Governors o f Rutgers, State University o f New Jersey
The Rutgers Law School Alumni Association
The Student Bar Association of the Rutgers School of Law
Cleveland State University Chapter o f the Black American Law
Students Association
Columbia University
Harvard University
Stanford University
University o f Pennsylvania
Howard University
Law School Admission Council
Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law
Legal Services Corporation
NAACP
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.
National Association o f Minority Contractors
Minority Contractors Association o f Northern California, Inc.
National Council o f Churches of Christ in the United States
American Coalition o f Citizens with Disabilities
Americans for Democratic Action
American Federation o f State, County, and Municipal Employees,
AFL-CIO
American Public Health Association
Children's Defense Fund
International Union o f Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL
CIO, CLC (IUE)
International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace, Agricultural
Implement Workers o f America (UAW)
Japanese American Citizens League
Mexican-American Political Association
National Council o f Negro Women
National Education Association
National Health Law Program
National Lawyers Guild
National Legal Aid and Defender Association
National Organization for Women
National Urban League
United Farm Workers o f America, AFL-CIO
United Mine Workers o f America

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

171

Solo Filer
Coalition

Coalition
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Coalition

Coalition

Coalition

United States National Student Association
Young Woman’s Christian Association
National Employment Law Project, Inc
National Medical Association Inc.
The National Bar Association, Inc.
The National Association for Equal Opportunity in Higher Education
Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund
Aspira o f America
Society o f American Law Teachers
American Medical Student Association
Council on Legal Education Opportunity
Native American Law Students o f the University of California, Davis
The Native American Student Union o f the University o f California at
Davis
American Indian Bar Association
American Indian Law Students Association
American Indian Law Center
UCLA Black Law Students Association
UCLA Black Law Alumni Association
The Union Women's Alliance to Gain Equality
Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund
La Raza National Lawyers Association
County o f Santa Clara, California
League o f United Latin American Citizens
American G.I. Forum
National Council of La Raza
Los Angeles Mecha Central
IMAGE
National Association for Equal Educational Opportunity
John Vasconcellos
Unitas

Brief in Support o f Respondent
Solo Filer
Coalition

American Federation o f Teachers
American Jewish Committee
American Jewish Congress
Hellenic Bar Association o f Illinois
Italian-American Foundation
Polish American Affairs Council
Polish American Educators Association
Ukrainian Congress Committee o f America (Chicago Division)
Unico National
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Solo Filer
Coalition

Solo Filer
Coalition

Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Coalition
Solo Filer

American Subcontractors Association
Anti-Defamation League o f B'nai B'rith
Council o f Supervisors and Administrators o f the City o f New York,
Local 1, AFSA, AFL-CIO
Jewish Labor Committee
National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs (COLPA)
Unico National
Chamber o f Commerce o f the United States
Fraternal Order of Police
The Conference o f Pennsylvania State Police Lodges o f the Fraternal
Order o f Police
The International Conference o f Police Associations
International Association o f Chiefs o f Police
Order Sons of Italy in America
Pacific Legal Foundation
Queens Jewish Community Council
Jewish Rights Council
Young Americans for Freedom

Briefs of amici curiae were filed by
Solo Filer
Coalition
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Coalition

Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Coalition

Coalition
Solo Filer
Solo Filer

American Association o f University Professors
Committee on Academic Nondiscrimination and Integrity
Mid-America Legal Foundation
Equal Employment Advisory Council;
Fair Employment Practice Commission of California
Director o f the Department o f Health o f California
Director o f the Department o f Benefit Payments o f the State o f
California
National Association of Affirmative Action Officers
National Conference o f Black Lawyers
National Fund for Minority Engineering Students
North Carolina Association o f Black Lawyers
Polish American Congress
The National Advocates Society
The National Medical and Dental Association
Price M. Cobbs, M.D
(including 21 other M.D.s)
Ralph J. Galliano
Timothy J. Hoy
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Furnco Construction Corporation v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978)
Briefs in Support of Petitioner
Coalition
Solo Filer

Solicitor General for the United States
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Equal Employment Advisory Council

Briefs in Support of Respondent
(none)

Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979)
Briefs in Support of Petitioner
Coalition

Coalition
Coalition

Affirmative Action Coordinating Center
The National Conference of Black Lawyers
The National Lawyers Guild
The Center for Constitutional Rights
The Center for Urban Law
The Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund
The Asian Law Caucus
The Black American Law Students Association, Inc.
The Indian Law Resource Center
The La Raza Legal Alliance
The Law Students Civil Rights Research Council
The Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund
The National Emergency Civil Liberties Committee
The National Puerto Rican Law Students Association
The National Council o f Churches of Christ
American Civil Liberties Union
Society o f American Law Teachers Board o f Governors
American Federation o f State, Country and Municipal Employees,
AFL-CIO
International Union o f Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL
CIO, CLC
International Union of Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers, AFL-CIO
International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural
Implement Workers (UAW)
International Woodworkers o f America, AFL-CIO, CLC
National Education Association
United Farm Workers o f America, AFL-CIO
United Mine Workers o f America
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Coalition

Coalition
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Coalition
Coalition

Coalition
Solo Filer
Coalition

Coalition o f Black Trade Unionists
Coalition o f Labor Union Women
Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund
The Asian Law Caucus, Inc.
Asian Americans for Equality
California Fair Employment Practice Commission
California Division o f Fair Employment Practices
Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law
NAACP
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.
National Urban League
Howard University
National Medical Association, Inc.
The National Bar Association, Inc.
The National Association for Equal Opportunity in Higher Education
National Puerto Rican Coalition
The Puerto Rican Forum
National Union o f Hospital and Health Care Employees, RWDSU,
AFL-CIO
Patricia Schroeder
ACLU Women's Rights Project
Chicana Service Action Center
Creative Employment Project
Equal Rights Advocates, Inc.
Federally Employed Women
Federally Employed Women's Legal and Education Fund
League o f Women Voters of the United States
National Association o f Black Women Attorneys, Inc.
National Conference o f Puerto Rican Women, Inc.
National Federation o f Business and Professional Women's Clubs, Inc.
National Women's Employment Project
National Women’s Political Caucus
National Organization for Women
NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund
Organization o f Chinese American Women
60 Words Per Minute
Skilled Jobs for Women, Inc.
Wider Opportunities for Women, Inc.
Women Employed
Women in Apprenticeship Program, Inc.
Women in Construction Project
Women Working in Construction
Women's Division o f R.T.P., Inc.
Women's Equity Action League
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Solo Filer
Coalition

Solo Filer

Women's Equity Action League Educational and Legal Defense Fund
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom
YWCA Women's Trade Center
Women's Caucus, District 31 o f the United Steelworkers o f
America
American G. I. Forum
Incorporated Mexican American Government Employees
League o f United Latin American Citizens
S.E.R. - Jobs for Progress, Inc.
Women’s Equal Rights Legal Defense and Education Fund

Briefs in Support o f Respondent
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Coalition
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Coalition

California Correctional Officers Association
Government Contract Employers Association
Pacific Legal Foundation
Polish American Congress
National Advocates Society
Southeastern Legal Foundation, Inc.
United States Justice Foundation
Anti-Defamation League o f B'nai B'rith
Hellenic Bar Association o f Illinois
Institute for Liberty and Justice-Order or Sons o f Italy in America, Inc.
National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs (COLPA)
Ukrainian Congress Committee o f America (Chicago Division)
Unico National

Briefs of amici curiae in all cases were filed by
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Solo
Solo
Solo
Solo

Filer
Filer
Filer
Filer

Committee on Academic Nondiscrimination and Integrity
Equal Employment Advisory Council
National Coordinating Committee for Trade Union Action and
Democracy
Pacific Civil Liberties League
United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers o f America
Washington Legal Foundation
City o f Los Angeles
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Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980)
Briefs in Support of Petitioner
Solo FilerEqual Employment Advisory Council
Solo Filer
Pacific Legal Foundation
Briefs in Support of Respondent
Solo Filer
Coalition
Coalition
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Coalition

Solo Filer
Coalition

Coalition

Coalition
Coalition

Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Solo Filer

Alpha Kappa Alpha Sorority, Inc.
American Civil Liberties Union
Society of American Law teachers Board o f Governors
American Savings & Loan League, Inc.
National Association o f Black Manufacturers, Inc.
Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc.
Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law
Mexican American/Hispanic Contractors and Truckers Association,
Inc.
League of United Latin American Citizens
Incorporated Mexican American Government Employees (Image)
American G.I. Forum
Minority Contractors Assistance Project, Inc.
NAACP
International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and
Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW)
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.
National Urban League, Inc.
National Bankers Association, Inc.
National Bar Association, Inc.
National Bar Association, Inc.
American Business Council, Inc.
Affirmative Action Coordinating Center
National Conference o f Black Lawyers
National Lawyers Guild
Center for Constitutional Rights
Center for Urban Law
Hon. Parren J. Mitchell, Member of Congress
Anti-Defamation League o f B'nai B'rith
Minority Contractors Association, Inc.
National Conference o f Black Mayors, Inc.
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General Building Contractors Association v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982)
Briefs in Support of Petitioner
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Solo Filer

Equal Employment Advisory Council
National Constructors Association
Washington Legal Foundation

Briefs in Support of Respondent
Solo Filer
Solo Filer

Black Economic Survival
NAACP

United Building & Construction Trades v. Mayor, 465 U.S. 208 (1984)
Briefs in Support of Petitioner
Solo Filer

New England Legal Foundation

Briefs in Support of Respondent
Solo Filer

New Jersey Department o f the Public Advocate

Firefighters v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984)
Briefs in Support of Petitioner
Coalition

Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Solo Filer

American Federation o f Labor and Congress o f Industrial
Organizations
Public Employee Department, AFL-CIO
Anti-Defamation League o f B'nai B'rith
Detroit Police Officers Association
Equal Employment Advisory Council
United States Solicitor General
International Association o f Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO
Washington Legal Foundation

Briefs in Support of Respondent
Solo Filer
Coalition

City o f Detroit
Affirmative Action Coordinating Center
National Conference o f Black Lawyers
National Lawyers Guild
Center for Constitutional Rights
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Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Coalition
Coalition

Coalition

All Peoples Congress
Asian Law Caucus, Inc.
Association o f Oregon Black Lawyers
Black Educators' Alliance o f Massachusetts
Black Women for Policy Action
Boston Mobilization for Survival
Chinese-American Citizens Alliance
Council o f Minority Educators in Massachusetts Public Colleges and
Universities
Educators United
Esperanza Unida
Gray Panthers
La Alianza Legal De Oregon
La Casa Legal
La Raza Central Legal
League o f Martin
Massachusetts Citizens Against the Death Penalty
Massachusetts State Division
American Association o f University Women
Minority Law Students Association
National Anti Racist Organizing Committee
New England Minority Women in Business
Parish Council o f Holy Angels Catholic Church
Vulcan Pioneers o f Newark, N.J.
Willamette Valley Immigration Project
Women's Bar Association o f Massachusetts
Women's Coalition, Inc.
Women for Economic Justice
Women's Job Counseling Center
American Jewish Congress
Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law
Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund
National Black Police Association
American Civil Liberties Union
National Organization for Women
American Association of University Women
Equal Rights Advocates, Inc.
League o f Women Voters o f the United States
National Conference of Black Lawyers
National Women's Law Center
Women Employed
Women's Legal Defense Fund
Officers for Justice
International Association o f Black Firefighters~San Francisco Chapter
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The Black Agenda Council
Association o f Northern California Black W omen Lawyers
William Hastie Lawyers Association
Charles Houston Bar Association
Kappa Alpha PSI Fraternity
Black Women Organized for Political Action
Wiley Manuel Law Foundation
National Bar Association
California Association o f Black Lawyers
Wygant v. Jackson Board o f Education, 476 U.S. 267 (1986)
Briefs in Support o f Petitioner
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Coalition

Solo Filer
Solo Filer

United States by Acting Solicitor General Fried
American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO
Anti-Defamation League o f B'nai B'rith
Pacific Legal Foundation
Equal Employment Advisory Council
Local 36, International Association of Firefighters, AFL-CIO
Kevin Michael Byrne
Curtis J. Callaway
Ronald J. Danner
James A. Funk
Thomas I. Herlihy
Joseph Worth Lane, Jr.
Stuart J. Winokur
John E. Yocum
David F. Zollars
Michigan State Police Troopers Association, Inc.
Mid-America Legal Foundation

Briefs in Support of Respondent
Coalition

Coalition

Attorney General o f Minnesota
Attorney General o f California
Attorney General o f Louisiana
Attorney General o f Nebraska
Attorney General o f New Mexico
Attorney General o f Wisconsin
Affirmative Action Coordinating Center
National Conference of Black Lawyers
The National Lawyers Guild
Center for Constitutional Rights
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Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Coalition
Solo Filer
Coalition
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Coalition

Solo Filer
Coalition

American Association for Affirmative Action
League o f Martin
Sisters o f Saint Dominic
Women's Coalition, Inc.
Women's Division, General Board o f Global Ministries, United
Methodist Church
Congressional Coalition
Greater Boston Civil Rights
Jackson Education Association
Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law
American Civil Liberties Union
Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund
Michigan Civil Rights Commission
Michigan Department o f Civil Rights
Attorney General o f Michigan
NAACP
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.
National Education Association
California Teachers Association
Florida Teaching Professional-Nation Education Association
Georgia Education Association
Massachusetts Teachers Association
Michigan Education Association
Washington Education Association
Wisconsin Education Association Council
National School Boards Association
National Board, YMCA o f the USA
National Conference o f Black Lawyers,
Section on the Rights o f Women Equal Rights Advocates
National Organization for Women
NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund
California Women Lawyers Association
League o f Women Voters o f the United States
League o f Women Voters o f Michigan
Women's Law Fund, Inc.
Northwest Women's Law Center
Women's Law Project
Women Employed
Women's Equity Action League
National Bar Association, Women Lawyer's Division,
Greater Washington Area Chapter
Women's Legal Defense Fund
Wider Opportunities for Women
Employment Law Center
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Solo Filer

City o f Detroit

Local 28, Sheet Metal W orkers' International Association et al. v. EEOC et al., 478
U.S. 421 (1986)
Briefs in Support of Petitioner
Coalition
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Solo Filer

Local 542, International Union of Operating Engineers
Local 36, International Association o f Firefighters, AFL-CIO
Pacific Legal Foundation
Equal Employment Advisory Council
National Association o f Manufacturers

Briefs in Support of Respondents
Coalition

Solo Filer
Coalition

Coalition

Coalition

Solo Filer
Coalition

Attorney General o f California
Attorney General o f Louisiana
Attorney General o f Michigan
Attorney General o f Minnesota
Attorney General o f Nebraska
Attorney General o f New Jersey
Attorney General o f New Mexico
Attorney General o f Oregon
Attorney General o f West Virginia
Attorney General o f Wisconsin
City of Birmingham, Alabama
City o f Detroit
District o f Columbia
City o f Los Angeles
Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law
NAACP
American Civil Liberties Union
National Black Police Association
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.
NAACP
Mexican Americana Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.
National Urban League, Inc.
Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.
Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc.
New Jewish Agenda
National Conference o f Black Mayors, Inc.
NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund
California Women Lawyers
Employment Law Center
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Solo Filer

Equal Rights Advocates
League o f Women Voters o f the United States
National Women's Law Center
Northwest Women's Law Center
Wider Opportunities for Women
Women Employed
Women's Law Fund
Women's Law Project
National Bar Association, Women Lawyer's Division, Greater
Washington Area Chapter
Women's Legal Defense Fund
North Carolina Association o f Black Lawyers

Local 93, International Association o f Firefighters, AFL-CIO, C.L.C v. City o f
Cleveland et al., 478 U.S. 501 (1986)
Briefs in Support of Petitioner
Coalition
Solo Filer
Coalition
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Solo Filer

Anti-Defamation League o f B'nai B'rith
National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs
International Association o f Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO, CLC
Local 542, International Union o f Operating Engineers
Local 36, International Association o f Firefighters, AFL-CIO
Pacific Legal Foundation
Washington Legal Foundation
Equal Employment Advisory Council

Briefs in Support o f Respondent
Coalition

Coalition
Solo Filer
Solo Filer

Attorney General of California
Attorney General of Louisiana
Attorney General of Michigan
Attorney General of Minnesota
Attorney General of Nebraska
Attorney General of New Jersey
Attorney General of New Mexico
Attorney General of Oregon
Attorney General of West Virginia
Attorney General of Wisconsin
City o f Atlanta
Minority Business Enterprise Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc.
City o f Birmingham, Alabama
City o f Detroit
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Coalition

Solo Filer
Coalition

Coalition

Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Coalition

Coalition

Affirmative Action Coordinating Center
National Conference o f Black Lawyers
National Lawyers Guild
Center for Constitutional Rights
International Association o f Black Professional Fire Fighters
Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law
NAACP
American Civil Liberties Union
National Black Police Association
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.
NAACP
Mexican Americana Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.
National Urban League, Inc.
Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.
Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc.
New Jewish Agenda
National Conference of Black Mayors, Inc.
National Institute of Municipal Law Officers
National League o f Cities
International City Management Association
U.S. Conference o f Mayors
National Association of Counties
NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund
California Women Lawyers
Employment Law Center
Equal Rights Advocates
League o f Women Voters o f the United States
National Women's Law Center
Northwest Women's Law Center
Wider Opportunities for Women
Women Employed
Women’s Law Fund
Women's Law Project
National Bar Association, Women Lawyer’s Division,
Greater Washington Area Chapter
Women's Legal Defense Fund

United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987)
Briefs in Support o f Petitioner
Solo Filer

Pacific Legal Foundation

Briefs in Support of Respondent
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Coalition

Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Coalition

Coalition

Attorney General o f New York
Attorney General o f California
Attorney General of Illinois
Attorney General o f Louisiana
Attorney Genera! of Maryland
Attorney General o f Michigan
Attorney General o f Minnesota
Attorney General o f West Virginia
Attorney General o f Wisconsin
City o f Birmingham, Alabama
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund
Lawyers' Committee for Civil RightsUnder Law
American Civil Liberties Union
American Jewish Congress
Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund
NAACP
National Women's Law Center
Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund
Women Employed
Women's Legal Defense Fund
City o f Detroit
The District o f Columbia
The City o f Los Angeles

Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987)
Briefs in Support of Petitioner
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Coalition

United States by Solicitor General
Mid-Atlantic Legal Foundation
Pacific Legal Foundation
William Kidd
Edward Swiden

Briefs in Support of Respondent
Coalition

Attorney General of California
Attorney General of Idaho
Attorney General o f Louisiana
Attorney General o f Maryland
Attorney General o f Michigan
Attorney General o f Minnesota
Attorney General o f Nebraska

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Coalition

Coalition

Coalition

Coalition

Solo Filer

Attorney General o f New York
Attorney General o f Oregon
Attorney General o f Wisconsin
Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission
American Federation o f Labor and Congress o f Industrial
Organizations
American Society for Personnel Administration Cities
National League o f Cities
National Association o f Counties
U.S. Conference o f Mayors
International City Management Association
NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund
National Organization for Women
American Civil Liberties Union
California Women Lawyers
Employment Law Center
Equal Rights Advocates
Federally Employed Women Legal and Education Fund
League o f Women Voters of the United States
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund
National Women’s Law Center
Northwest Women's Law Center
Women Employed
Women's Equity Action League
Women's Law Project
Women's Legal Defense Fund
City o f Detroit
District o f Columbia
City o f Los Angeles
Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law
Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.
NAACP
Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc.
Equal Employment Advisory Council

City o f Richmond v. J.A. Croson Company, 488 U.S. 469 (1989)
Briefs in Support of Petitioner
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Coalition

Attorney General o f Maryland
Attorney General o f Michigan
Attorney General o f New York
Attorney General o f California
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Coalition

Coalition
Coalition
Coalition

Attorney General o f Connecticut
Corporation Counsel o f the District o f Columbia
Attorney General o f Illinois
Attorney General o f Massachusetts
Attorney General o f Minnesota
Attorney General o f New Jersey
Attorney General o f Ohio
Attorney General o f Oregon
Attorney General o f Rhode Island
Attorney General o f South Carolina
Attorney General o f Washington
Attorney General o f West Virginia
Attorney General o f Wisconsin
Attorney General o f Wyoming
Alpha Kappa Alpha Sorority
Coalition for Civil Rights
Coalition for Economic Equity
Council o f Asian-American Business Association
Golden Gate Section o f the Society o f Women Engineers
Hispanic Chamber o f Commerce, San Francisco
Kappa Alpha PSI Fraternity
National Bar Association
San Francisco Black Chamber o f Commerce
Western Region-NAACP
Aileen Hernandez Associates
American Property Exchange
Casa Sanchex, Cory Gin, Associates
Interstate Parking Company, Inc.
Jean Pierre and Company
Jefferson and Associates
McClain and Woo
Naomi Gray Associates, Inc.
Pegasus Engineering, Inc.
Selwen Whitehead Enterprises
American Civil Liberties Union
The ACLU o f Virginia
The ACLU o f Northern California
City o f San Francisco, California
County o f San Francisco
Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights under Law
Mexican-American Legal Defense and Educational Fund
NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund
NAACP
Women's Legal Defense Fund
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Solo Filer
Coalition

Solo Filer
Coalition

Maryland Legislative Black Caucus
Minority Business Enterprise Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc.
The Louisiana Association o f Minority and Women Owned
Businesses, Inc.
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.
National League o f Cities
U.S. Conference o f Mayors
National Association o f Counties
International City Management Association

Briefs in Support o f Respondent
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Coalition

United States by Solicitor General
Anti-Defamation League o f B'nai
Associated Specialty Contractors, Inc.
Equal Employment Advisory
Mountain States Legal Foundation
Pacific Legal Foundation
Southeastern Legal Foundation, Inc.
Washington Legal Foundation
Lincoln Institute for Research and Education

Wards Cove Packing Company v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989)
Briefs in Support of Petitioner
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Solo Filer

United States by Solicitor General
American Society for Personnel Administration
Chamber o f Commerce o f the United
Equal Employment Advisory Council
Center for Civil Rights

Briefs in Support of Respondent
Coalition

Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Coalition

American Civil Liberties Union
National Women's Law Center
NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund
Women's Legal Defense Fund
Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law
NAACP
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.
The Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund
The Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund
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Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989)
Briefs in Support of Petitioner
Coalition

Coalition
Solo Filer

Attorney General of Alabama
Attorney General of Massachusetts
Attorney General of Alabama
Attorney General o f Arkansas
Attorney General of California
Attorney General of Connecticut
Corporation Counsel o f the District o f Columbia
Attorney General of Florida
Attorney General of Georgia
Attorney General of Idaho
Attorney General of Indiana
Attorney General of Iowa
Attorney General of Kansas
Attorney General of Kentucky
Attorney General o f Louisiana
Attorney General of Maryland
Attorney General of Minnesota
Attorney General of Missouri
Attorney General of Montana
Attorney General o f Nebraska
Attorney General of Nevada
Attorney General o f New Hampshire
Attorney General of New Jersey
Attorney General of New York
Attorney General of Ohio
Attorney General of Oklahoma
Attorney General o f Rhode Island
Attorney General of South Carolina
Attorney General of Texas
Attorney General of Vermont
Attorney General of Virginia
Attorney General of Virgin Islands
Attorney General of West Virginia
Attorney General o f Wisconsin
Attorney General of Wyoming
American Civil Liberties Union
Alabama Civil Liberties Union
Women's Equity Action League
Equal Employment Advisory Council
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Coalition

Coalition

National League o f Cities
National Governor’s Association
U.S. Conference o f Mayors
Council o f State Governments
International City Management Association
National Conference of State Legislatures
National Association o f Counties
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.
Women's Legal Defense Fund
National Women's Law Center
International Association o f Black Professional Firefighters

Briefs in Support o f Respondent
Solo Filer
Solo Filer

International Association of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO
Pacific Legal Foundation

Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission et al., 497 U.S.
547(1990)
Briefs in Support o f Petitioner
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Coalition
Solo
Solo
Solo
Solo

Filer
Filer
Filer
Filer

United States by Acting Solicitor General
Associated General Contractors o f America, Inc.
Galaxy Communications, Inc.
Mountain States Legal Foundation
Anti-Defamation League o f B'nai B'rith
Pacific Legal Foundation
Washington Legal Foundation
Committee to Promote Diversity
Jerome Thomas Lamprecht

Briefs in Support o f Respondent
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Coalition

American Civil Liberties Union
Congressional Black Caucus
National Association of Black Owned Broadcasters, Inc.
National Bar Association
United States Senate
American Jewish Committee
Black Citizens for a Fair Media
Communications Committee o f the Connecticut Conference o f the
United Church o f Christ
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Solo Filer
Coalition
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Coalition

Solo Filer

Fidelia Lane
Department o f Communications o f the Capitol Region Conference o f
Churches
Office o f Communication of the United Church o f Christ
People for the American Way
Reverend Alexis Sidorak
Steven Sidorak
Sherman G. Tarr
Telecommunications Research and Action Center
Reverend Mark Welch
Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.
Cook Inlet Region, Inc.
Granite Broadcasting Corporation
Giles Television, Inc.
Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law
NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc.
National League o f Cities
National Conference o f State Legislatures
National Association o f Counties
Council o f State Governments
U.S. Conference o f Mayors
International City Management Association
American Women in Radio and Television, Inc.

Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995)
Briefs in Support of Petitioner
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Coalition

Associated General Contractors o f America, Inc.
Atlantic Legal Foundation
Federalist Society, Ohio State University College o f Law Chapter
Pacific Legal Foundation
Washington Legal Foundation
Equality in Enterprise Opportunities Association, Inc.

Briefs in Support of Respondent
Coalition

Attorney General o f Maryland
Attorney General o f Maryland
Attorney General o f Arizona
Attorney General o f Connecticut
Attorney General o f Hawaii
Attorney General o f Illinois
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Coalition
Coalition
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Coalition

Coalition

Coalition

Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Solo Filer
Coalition

Attorney General of Indiana
Attorney General o f Massachusetts
Attorney General o f Minnesota
Attorney General o f New Mexico
Attorney General o f New York
Attorney General o f North Carolina
Attorney General o f Ohio
Attorney General o f Oregon
Attorney General of Washington
Attorney General o f Wisconsin
Acting Corporation Counsel for the District o f Columbia
Coalition for Economic Equity
Mid-Peninsula Minority Contractors Association
Congressional Asian Pacific American Caucus
National Urban League
Congressional Black Caucus
Equality in Enterprise Opportunities Association, Inc.
Latin American Management Association
Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law
American Civil Liberties Union
Women's Legal Defense Fund
National Women's Law Center
National Council o f La Raza
Minority Business Enterprise Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc.
National Minority Supplier Development Council, Inc.
National Black Chamber o f Commerce, Inc.
National Association o f Minority Contractors
Minority Media and Telecommunications Council
League o f United Latin American Citizens
Office o f Communication o f the United Church o f Christ
National Hispanic Media Coalition
Communications Task Force
National Association o f Black Owned Broadcasters
American Hispanic Owned Radio Association
Emerging Telecommunications Entrepreneurs Association
NAACP
National Coalition of Minority Businesses
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.
National Association o f Minority Businesses
National Bar Association
Council o f 100-An Organization o f Black Republicans, Inc.
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Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the
Coalition

Maryland Women Business Entrepreneurs Association
National Association o f Women Business Owners
Illinois Association o f Women Contractors and Entrepreneurs
WBE Line, Inc.
Federation of Women Contractors & Women's Business Development
Center
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